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I
Introduction
Tdday's world, if not quite a global village, is highly interna-
tional in its consciousness. An article in a magazine published
in Lebanon sets off a political scandal in the United States.'
Events in South Africa or Nicaragua, in Chernobyl or Bhopal,
are quickly known around the world. More than 1,400 foreign
journalists are based in the United States. Foreign opponents
of United States policies take their case to the American public.
The distinction between domestic and international issues in-
creasingly blurs. Many issues of national security, economics,
health, the environment, culture, and even politics that are de-
bated within a country, especially a country as conspicuous as
the United States, have international or worldwide dimensions.
Given the resulting flow of media communications into and
out of the United States, it is surprising that so few questions
have arisen concerning the protection afforded to transborder
speech by the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court has touched on the subject in an im-
migration law case involving the government's power to deny a
visitor's visa on the basis of the ideological or political persua-
sions of the would-be visitor,3 and in cases involving the govern-
ment's power to restrict the foreign travel of U.S. citizens.
But, as of the end of 1986, the Court had only once confronted a
restriction on "pure speech" crossing the border. In Lamont v.
1. See Pear, The Reagan White House: Missing the Iran Arms Story: Did the
Press Fail?, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1987, at A15, col. 3 (late city ed.).
2. The Foreign Press Center, a division of the United States Information
Agency, reports that its mailing list of foreign journalists based in the United States
includes about 750 in New York City, 525 in Washington, D.C., and 150 in Los Angeles.
Telephone interview with Nicholas King, Director of the Foreign Press Center in
New York (March 16,1987); telephone interview with Don Jones, Director of the For-
eign Press Center's Los Angeles office (March 16, 1987).
3. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see infra text accompanying notes
58-71.
4. E.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); see inifra text accompanying notes
87-104.
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Postmaster General,5 decided in 1965, the Court held invalid
under the first amendment a statute requiring that "commu-
nist political propaganda" mailed into the United States be de-
tained at the Post Office until the addressee was notified and
requested its delivery.6
Presently, attention to transborder speech in United States
law appears to be increasing. In December 1986, the Supreme
Court heard arguments in Keene v. Meese,7 a case challenging
the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act that reg-
ulate as "political propaganda" the speech disseminated in the
United States by agents of foreign entities." In October 1986, a
federal district court struck down the regulations used by the
United States Information Agency in deciding whether to cer-
tify films as "educational" for the purpose of duty-free import
to other countries under an international agreement.9 Also in
1986, the Supreme Court accepted for review a new case deal-
ing with the denial of visitors' visas for reasons based on the
ideological or political leanings of the would-be visitors.10 Aca-
demic attention also is beginning to focus on regulation of
transborder speech."
Meanwhile the technology of communications, particularly
of communications satellites, is increasingly capable of making
national frontiers irrelevant. 12 Legal restrictions on trans-
border speech hence are growing in their impact, since there is
more potential speech to restrict, 13 at the same time that they
come under increased judicial and professional scrutiny. Ap-
5. 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see infra text accompanying notes 20-24.
6. 381 U.S. at 305.
7. 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983), 619 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1985), prob.
juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986); No. 85-1180, argued Dec. 2, 1986, 55 U.S.L.W. 3410.
The case was decided on April 28, 1987. 107 S.Ct. 1862. See infra note 189.
8. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 611(j), 614(a)-(b) (Supp. 1985); ikfra text accompanying notes
131-88; infra note 189.
9. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), appeal docketed,
No. 86-6630 (9th Cir.); see infra text accompanying notes 122-35, 534-51, 593-601
10. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 56 Qff'd by an equally
divided court 4001 U.S.L.W. U.S. (Oct. 19, 1987); see infra text accompanying notes
76-81. See also Haase v. Webster, 807 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reinstating a lawsuit
against the FBI by an American writer alleging that it was FBI policy to search and
seize at customs the papers of U.S. travelers returning from Nicaragua. See infra note
116-21 and accompanying text.
11. An excellent study is Neuborne & Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain. America's
National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719 (1985).
12. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 716 (3d ed. 1987); infra text accom-
panying notes 257-59.
13. See infra, e.g., text accompanying notes 257-59, 380-84.
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praisal of the restrictions that exist in United States law is
therefore timely.
Another reason for examining those restrictions springs
from the position the United States has taken in international
debates on transborder speech. The United States has champi-
oned the principle of a "free flow" of information across na-
tional frontiers. It has staunchly supported Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares a right
to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers." 14
The "free flow" position of the United States has been partic-
ularly evident in debates at the United Nations over control of
direct broadcast satellites (DBS). 5 In those debates the United
States has opposed almost any restriction on transborder DBS,
and especially any requirement for "prior consent" by the
country receiving the broadcasts.'6
In these contexts, both domestic and international, it is ap-
propriate to canvass the restrictions on transborder speech that
exist in United States law and to evaluate them under the first
amendment. Such a study may advance the growing debate
over the validity or wisdom of specific restrictions. In addition,
by bringing together diverse laws scattered through the United
States Code, adopted at different times and for different pur-
poses, a study of this kind may promote a more systematic, ge-
neric approach to transborder speech. At the same time, in
view of the international position taken by the United States,
such a study can usefully show to what degree the United
14. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74-75 (1948); see infra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text. On U.S. support for Article 19 and its principles, see, e.g., Hagelin,
irtra note 15, at 269, 274; infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., K. QUEENY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 79 (1978); Gorove, International Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite:
"Prior Consent" Revisited, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (1985); Price, The First
Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite, 23 UCLA L. REv. 879, 879-80,
883-84 (1976); Hagelin, Prior Consent or the Free Flow of Information Over Interna-
tional Satellite Radio and Television: A Comparison and Critique of US. Domestic
and International Broadcast Policy, 8 SY. J. INT'L L. & COM. 265 (1981); Magraw,
Telecommunications: Building a Consensus, 1984 HARV. INT'L L. J. 27, 28-30.
16. In 1982, for example, in opposing a General Assembly Resolution supporting
the principle of prior consent, the U.S. delegate declared that: "[A]ny principle re-
quiring that [a] broadcaster must obtain the consent of a foreign Government would
violate United States obligations towards both the broadcasters and the intended audi-
ence; it would also violate article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
the right to freedom of expression." 37 U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm. (34th
mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/APC/37 34 (1982).
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States allows a "free flow" of information across its own bor-
ders. A comprehensive study of U.S. restrictions on trans-
border speech thus can help determine whether these
restrictions, the product of piecemeal accumulation over many
years, are consistent both with national policies existing today
and with the first amendment.
This article presents such a survey of United States laws reg-
ulating transborder speech, together with a commentary on
their underlying policies and their constitutional validity. The
article deals first with speech flowing into the United States
and then-more briefly, since fewer laws apply-with outgoing
speech. Each part focuses first on provisions regulating infor-
mation flow in general and then on provisions addressed specif-
ically to the electronic media, radio and television.
II
Regulation of Speech Flowing Into the
United States
A. Regulation of Incoming Information Flow in General
The legal response of the United States to the entry of infor-
mation from abroad reflects a clash of opposing principles. On
one side stands the concept, grounded in the first amendment,
that government should not interfere with the communication
of information, at least when one party to the communication
(in this case the listener) is a citizen or resident of the United
States.1 7 Opposing this concept is a battery of United States
laws that restrict the incoming flow of information in the inter-
ests of national security, foreign policy, the nation's control
over its borders, trade protectionism, or other concerns.' And
since there is also a tradition of judicial deference to the legisla-
tive and executive branches in matters of foreign or interna-
tional affairs,19 these laws rarely have been overturned by the
courts. The result is something of a standoff: U.S. citizens have
the right to receive information from abroad, but this right fre-
quently is limited by determinations of the legislative and exec-
utive branches.
17. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
18. See infra notes 48-247 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984).
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1. Principles and Practices Protecting Incoming
Information Flow
The first amendment and related principles of United States
law surely are not limited to communications that both origi-
nate and are received within the United States. Legal protec-
tions for freedom of speech must have some application to the
import -and export of information. For this self-evident propo-
sition one finds, however, curiously little judicial support. As
of the end of 1986 there were only two major Supreme Court
cases. The Court's only opinion that addressed the position di-
rectly was Lamont v. Postmaster General.20 There the Court
struck down, under the first amendment, a federal postal stat-
ute prohibiting the delivery, except on specific written request
by the addressee, of material mailed from abroad that the Sec-
retary of the Treasury had determined to be "communist polit-
ical propaganda."'" The Court observed that the statute "sets
administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, ap-
praise it, write the addressee about it, and await a response
before dispatching the mail."22 The Court held that by impos-
ing on the addressee the "affirmative obligation" to request de-
livery, an obligation "almost certain to have a deterrent effect,"
the statute violated the addressee's first amendment rights.3
Three concurring justices in Larnont saw the decision as re-
flecting a first amendment right to receive information. "The
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise will-
ing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers
and no buyers. '24 In subsequent cases involving domestic
rather than transborder communications, the Court has pro-
vided further support for a first amendment right to receive
information from a willing speaker.25
The Supreme Court's second major case on transborder
speech, through 1986, was Kleindienst v. Mandel.26 The case
20. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
21. Id. at 302-07.
22. Id. at 306.
23. Id. at 307.
24. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg and Harlan, JJ., concurring).
25. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
26. 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
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involved denial of a visitor's visa to a foreign academic invited
to speak in the United States.' The Court indicated that U.S.
citizens have a first amendment right to receive information
from a foreign speaker.2 But it found that right outweighed, at
least on the facts presented, by the government's power to ex-
clude aliens. 9
Apart from the first amendment, the United States' endorse-
ment of the principle of a free incoming flow of information is
reflected in its support for the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.s° Article 19 of the Declaration provides: "Everyone has
the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This right in-
cludes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers."3' While the Universal Dec-
laration is not a treaty and thus not directly controlling law in
the United States,3 2 it has been cited by several courtss and
arguably has legal effect, either as part of the customary law of
nations or as an authoritative interpretation of the United Na-
tions Charter.s4 Perhaps more important than the Declara-
tion's legal status in the United States is the United States
government's support for Article 19 in international forumss 5
This support should make it politically and morally difficult for
the United States to refuse to accept a free flow of information
and ideas across its own frontiers-to fail to practice what it
preaches.
In practice, the United States does have a basic openness to
information from abroad. Foreign newspapers and periodicals,
for example, circulate freely. Any government attempt to re-
27. See 408 U.S. at 757.
28. Id. at 763-64.
29. Id. at 769-70.
30. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
31. Id. The Universal Declaration was adopted unanimously by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1948 (the Soviet Union and other East European nations
abstaining). Id.
32. See Burke, Coliver, De La Vega, & Rosenbaum, Application of International
Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 305 (1983)
[herinafter Burke].
33. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-83 (2d Cir. 1980); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1964).
34. See Burke, supra note 32, at 305-08; Powell, Toward a Negotiable Definition of
Propaganda for International Agreements Related to Direct Broadcast Satellites, 45
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 3, 9 n.29 (1982); Paust, Transnational Freedom of Speeck
Legal Aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, 45 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53 n.3 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Hagelin, supra note 15, at 294.
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strict their circulation surely would violate, if not the first
amendment rights of the publishers or distributors,3e the first
amendment rights of Americans wishing to receive the
publications.3 7
Another way the United States honors the "free flow" princi-
ple is by opening U.S. media, except broadcasting,-" to alien or
foreign ownership. Newspapers, magazines, news services, film
and television producers, cable television networks, cable tele-
vision systems, and all other nonbroadcast media in the United
States may be owned and controlled by foreign nationals,
whether or not they reside in the United States.s9 In other con-
texts, such as production of television programming, United
States endorsement of the free flow principle may ring hollow,
since in practice the flow consists overwhelmingly of American
exports.' Foreign ownership of U.S. media, however, is a con-
spicuous reality, especially in newspapers and other publishing
enterprises4 ' and cable television.4
36. Publishers or distributors of foreign print media who reside in the United
States probably would have first amendment protection against restrictions on the
distribution of those media. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) ("Freedom
of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country"); Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See also, e.g., Minnesota Star and Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 272 U.S.
58 (1963).
37. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); supra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 267-302 and accompanying text.
39. Restrictions on ownership by resident aliens, at least with regard to print me-
dia, might well be unconstitutional. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Cf. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 83
(1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). With respect to broadcast stations, see infra notes
267-89 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 260-66, 644-50 and accompanying text.
41. For example, the International Thomson Organization, a Canadian corpora-
tion headquartered in London, owns many newspapers in the United States. See 1986
EDITOR & PUBLISHER INT'L YEARBOOK at 1-379 (1986); NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1980, at 2,
col. 3. The Australian Rupert Murdoch owned major daily newspapers in New York,
Chicago, and Boston, plus other media properties in the U.S., before he acquired U.S.
citizenship in 1985 in order to purchase major broadcast properties in the U.S. See
1984 EDITOR & PUBLISHER INT'L YEARBOOK, at 1-439 (1984). European publishers
have increasingly entered the magazine, trade journal, and book publishing industries
in the United States. See Wall St. J., June 13, 1985, at 35, cols. 2-4; see also NAT'L L.J.,
May 26, 1980, at 2, col. 3 (Thomson organization buying a third U.S. specialty publish-
ing company).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 311-22. The openness of United States me-
dia to foreign ownership apparently goes beyond what is required by the protections
for alien investment embodied in the United States' bilateral trade and investment
treaties with its major trade partners. These treaties typically exclude "communica-
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In summary, while the case law remains sparse, the Supreme
Court's decision in Lamont,4" together with its opinion in
Mandel" and its rulings in other right-to-receive cases,45 goes
far toward establishing a first amendment right to receive in-
formation from abroad. These cases, combined with U.S. en-
dorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights46 and
with practices such as tolerance for foreign ownership of U.S.
nonbroadcast media,47 provide strong evidence of a national
commitment to the concept of a "free flow" of information into
the United States.
But at the same time, the United States has a variety of laws,
discussed in the next section, that restrict incoming informa-
tion flow. And despite the first amendment, these laws, except
for the one struck down in Lamont, have to date been upheld
by the courts.
2. Restrictions on Incoming Information Flow
(a) Restrictions on Visitors' Visas Under the McCarran-
Walter Act
The McCarran-Walter Immigration Act" contains two provi-
sions that may bar the entry of aliens into the United States,
even as short-term visitors, if they hold views offensive to the
U.S. government.49 Subsection 28 of section 1182(a) 50 bars the
entry of aliens who are, or at any time have been, "anarchists,"
members or affiliates of the Communist Party "or any other
totalitarian party," or persons who "advocate the economic, in-
tions," along with banking, transport, and other activities, from their protection of
reciprocal investment. See Note, The Rising Tide qf Reverse Flow: Could a Legisla-
tive Breakwater Violate U.S. Trade Commitments?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 551, 568-71
(1974). The treaty with West Germany specifies that communications "includes radio
and television, among other means of communication." Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Germany, Protocol, para. 11, 2
U.S.T. 183a, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. The treaties do not otherwise define "communica-
tions," but at least some of the U.S. media that are open to foreign ownership, such as
cable television systems, would appear to fall within that term.
43. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
48. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
49. See generally Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions" Closing the Border to Political
Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987); Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 722-
28.
50. 8 US.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
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ternational, and governmental doctrines of world communism
.... "5I Subsection 2752 bars the entry of aliens who the U.S.
government has reason to believe seek to enter the United
States "to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the
public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of
the United States."53
Under these provisions (which date from the Joseph McCar-
thy era of the 1950s) the U.S. government maintains a list, or
"Lookout Book," of aliens to be denied entry.m The 1984 list
was reported to include eight thousand persons from Canada
alone.e In 1986 an official of the U.S. State Department told a
congressional committee that in the previous year 47,500 per-
sons had been formally excluded from the country under sub-
section 28. While the vast majority of these had been granted
automatic waivers, some 800 had been denied waivers.56 In ad-
dition, 33 aliens had been excluded under subsection 27.
In the 1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel,5s the Supreme
Court upheld the application of subsection 28 to deny a visitor's
visa to a Marxist scholar from Belgium who was invited to
speak at academic conferences in the United States.59 The At-
torney General had refused to grant a waiver to permit
Mandel's entry, and the Court, by a 6-3 vote, upheld the Attor-
ney General's action.6°
The Court indicated that although Mandel had no constitu-
tional right to enter the country, American academics did have
a first amendment right to receive information from him at the
academic gatherings he would attend.61 This right to receive
51. Id.
52. Id. at § 1182(a)(27).
53. Id. In addition, subsection 33, added in 1978, bars the entry of aliens who par-
ticipated in Nazi war crimes or other "persecution of any person because of race, reli-
gion, national origin, or political opinion" during the years 1933-45. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(33).
54. See, e.g., Itzcouitz v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 6,447 F.2d 888,889 (2d Cir.
1971); Shapiro, supra note 49, at 932.
55. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984, at 21, col. 1; see Shapiro, supra note 49, at 932 (ap-
proximately 50,000 persons listed in 1986 as potentially excludable under subsections
27 or 28).
56. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at 6, col. 1; see also Shapiro, supra note 49, at 931
n.11.
57. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at 6, cols. 1-2.
58. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
59. Id. at 770.
60. Id at 753, 770.
61. I at 764.
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could not be denied simply because "the mode of regulation
bears directly on physical movement," any more than the same
right could have been denied in Lamont because the regulation
on its face "dealt only with the government's undisputed power
to control physical entry of mail into the country. 6 2 Moreover,
the Americans' right to hear Mandel was not satisfied by the
availability of alternative means for receiving his ideas, such as
his books and published speeches, or tapes and telephone hook-
ups. In view of "what may be particular qualities inherent in
sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning," the
Court was "loath to hold on this record that existence of other.
alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional inter-
est" in having direct, personal access to Mandel's ideas.63
Nonetheless, the Court held that this constitutional interest
could not prevail against the "plenary congressional power to
make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens."6' The Court
previously had held that the power to exclude aliens was "to be
exercised exclusively by the political branches of govern-
ment," and it was "not inclined in the present context to re-
consider this line of cases."
The Court did stop short of recognizing power in the execu-
tive branch to deny a waiver, and hence a visa, to a particular
alien because of his ideas. While the government had argued
that it need not give any reason for its decision to exclude
Mandel, 7 the Court went to some length to avoid confronting
this position. Noting that earlier in the litigation the Attorney
General had given a reason for excluding Mandel (Mandel's un-
knowing and minor violations of the conditions of entry on a
prior visit), the Court found that to be sufficient. Where a deci-
sion to exclude an alien was based on "a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason," it would not be scrutinized by the Court or
weighed against the first amendment interests in the case."
Mandel thus left the opposing interests in precarious balance.
The case confirms that, in accord with Lamont, U.S. citizens
have a first amendment right to receive information from for-
eign speakers, and probably to receive it face-to-face. At the
62. Id. at 764-65.
63. Id at 765.
64. Id. at 769.
65. Id. at 765 (quoting brief of the United States).
66. Id. at 767.
67. See i& at 769.
68. Id. at 770.
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same time, Mandel upholds the "plenary power" of Congress to
exclude aliens, and indicates that this power comprehends the
exclusion of classes of aliens (such as the classes listed in sub-
section 28) because of their ideas.69 The power thus stands in
contrast to the "content neutrality" usually required of govern-
ment action affecting first amendment rights.70 And while the
Court shied away from holding that the government could deny
a waiver to a particular alien because of his ideas, it said it
would not scrutinize any colorable reason that the government
put forward for such a denial.71
After Mandel, Congress moved to shift the balance by adding
the McGovern Amendment to the McCarran-Walter Act in
1979.72 This provision was adopted "[f]or purposes of achieving
greater United States compliance [and] ... encouraging other
signatory countries to comply" with the Helsinki Accords of
1975. 73 The amendment provides that when an application for a
visitor's visa is made by an alien excludable under subsection 28
"by reason of membership in or affiliation with a proscribed
organization," but otherwise admissible to the United States,
the Secretary of State "should" recommend to the Attorney
General that a visa be issued, unless the Secretary of State cer-
tifies to Congress that admission of the alien "would be con-
trary to the security interests of the United States."74
The executive branch apparently has reacted to the McGov-
ern Amendment by finding some aliens who otherwise would
be covered by the amendment to be excludable under subsec-
tion 27 of the McCarran-Walter Act instead of subsection 28.
In Abourezk v. Reagan,76 the government denied visas under
subsection 27 to four persons who might have fallen under sub-
section 28 and the McGovern Amendment.77 The decision of
69. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 51.
70. See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
71. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
72. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982).
73. Id. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, re-
printed in 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975); Paust, supra note 34, at 63; Carliner,
United States Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act" The Treatment of Aliens, 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 400, 407-08 (1980).
74. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982).
75. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 724-25 & n.22.
76. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert granted, Dec. 15, 1986, No. 86-656.
77. The four were Tomas Borge, the Interior Minister of Nicaragua; Nino Pasti, a
former member of the Italian Senate, former general in the Italian armed forces, and
(Vol. 9:635
1987] TRANSBORDER SPEECH
the court of appeals somewhat restricted the government's
power to act under subsection 27. The court held that when an
alien is a member of a proscribed organization so that subsec-
tion 28 applies, the government may not bypass the McGovern
Amendment and proceed under subsection 27 unless the reason
for the perceived threat to national interests under subsection
27 is independent of the fact of membership in the organ-
ization.7
In dissent, Judge Robert H. Bork thought subsection 27 prop-
erly could come into play if the alien's membership in the pro-
scribed organization "raises additional concerns, as it does
when it involves a connection to a government that implicates
American foreign policy .... ,7 Judge Bork warned that the
majority's decision "begins, albeit cautiously, a process of judi-
cial incursion into the United States' conduct of its foreign
affairs. ' 's° The government has successfully petitioned for
Supreme Court review in Abourezk.8 '
Under either subsection 27 or 28, a number of foreign intel-
lectuals who hold views offensive to the U.S. government have
been denied visitors' visas and thus prevented from expressing
their views in the United States. 2 In 1986, a U.S. Senate com-
participant in the World Peace Council, an organization believed by the U.S. State
Department to be controlled by the Soviet Communist Party; and Olga Finley and
Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, two Cuban women with expertise in family law who were
said by the U.S. State Department to be members of an organization affiliated with
the Communist Party of Cuba. 785 F.2d at 1048-49.
78. 785 F.2d at 1058.
79. Id. at 1071 (Bork, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1076 (Bork, J., dissenting).
81. Abourezk v. Reagan, 56 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1987).
82. In 1985, Farley Mowat, a prominent Canadian writer on wildlife and conserva-
tion, was denied entry. Officials of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) explained that he had been listed for many years in the Service's "Lookout
Book" because he was affiliated with "leftist organizations" and for other reasons that
were "confidential." N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1985, at 10, col. 8. Others whose visa re-
quests have been denied in recent years include Hortensia de Allende, widow of the
president of Chile; Gerry Adams, leader of the political wing of the Irish Republican
Army; Roberto d'Aubuisson, president of El Salvador's Constituent Assembly; Ruben
Zamora, spokesman for the El Salvadoran Revolutionary Democratic Front; Dario Fo
and Franca Rame, Italian political satirists; and Patricia Lara, a Colombian journalist.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1986, at 10, cols. 3-7. Novelists Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Car-
los Fuentes are among other prominent writers and thinkers who have been barred or
have declined to visit the United States because of these laws. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14,
1984, at 24, col. 3. See Shapiro, supra note 49, at 930, 933 n.23, 935 & n.35; Neuborne &
Shapiro, aupra note 11, at 723, 725-28.
The case of Patricia Lara, the Colombian journalist, was especially noteworthy. Ms.
Lara came to New York in October 1986 at the invitation of Columbia University to
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mittee held hearings on a bill designed to prevent such exclu-
sions.8 3 The bill would have barred the exclusion of any alien
"because of any past or expected speech, activity, belief, affilia-
tion, or membership which, if held or conducted within the
United States by a United States citizen, would be protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution. '"84 The Reagan Ad-
ministration opposed the bill, though offering to support "rea-
sonable changes" in subsection 28 to "ameliorate concerns
about possible infringements on the first amendment rights of
Americans.""a
For a nation committed to the principles of the first amend-
ment, changes in the McCarran-Walter Act are in order. Sub-
section 28, which prima facie empowers the U.S. government
to bar short-term visitors because of their ideas or political alle-
giances, is particularly offensive to first amendment values. To
be sure, subsections 27 and 28 are immigration laws, designed to
control the flow of people into the United States. As the
Supreme Court emphasized in Mandel, "plenary congressional
attend ceremonies there honoring Latin American journalists. On arrival she was
taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, held for five days,
and then deported to Bogota. INS officials explained that her name had appeared in
their "Lookout Book" and that she was excludable under subsection 27 and other
sections of the law. They conducted no hearing and refused to be more specific, saying
their information was "of a confidential nature that we can't disclose." The president
of Columbia University said the case was "anathema to a free society." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 15, 1986 at 17, cols. 1-4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1986, at 6, cols. 5-6. A U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State subsequently said on television that Ms. Lara had been expelled
because there was evidence that she was a member of a Colombian terrorist group-a
charge the U.S. government had not made public, or given Ms. Lara a chance to re-
fute, before expelling her. See TIME, Dec. 29, 1986, at 68. Ms. Lara denied the charge.
Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 49, at 933 n.23.
83. S. 2263, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also H.R. 2361,99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. REC. H2875 (daily ed. May 6, 1985).
84. S. 2263, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1986, at 6, cols. 1-2.
Senator Mathias, sponsor of the bill, stated: "We are not talking about the rights of
aliens. We are talking about the rights of Americans to hear the views of others. Why
shouldn't Americans be able to hear unpopular views, even if they diverge from the
views of a majority or disagree with official policy?" Id.
85. Id. The Administration spokesman said: "It is not the policy of this Adminis-
tration to deny visas to aliens merely because of their abstract political ideology." He
maintained, however, that the government must keep, for foreign policy reasons, the
subsection 27 power to exclude aliens who seek to engage in activities deemed "preju-
dicial to the public interest." Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 49, at 939 (quoting a
State Department official as testifying that government must keep power to exclude
aliens "on purely ideological grounds for important reasons of state"); Lewis, Test of
Freedom, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1987, at 27, cols. 5-6 (nat'l ed.) (quoting a State Depart-
ment Legal Adviser as saying the department supports changes in ideological clauses
of act).
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power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has
long been firmly established. ' ' m But such policies and rules can
operate to restrict the flow of ideas and information into the
United States. At least where brief visits are concerned, a
country that values free speech and champions a free flow of
information across national borders cannot consistently bar vis-
itors from entering its own borders because of their speech or
ideas.
(b) Restrictions on Foreign Travel of U.S. Citizens
The United States restricts the incoming flow of information
when it prevents U.S. citizens from traveling to other countries.
Such travel provides the traveler, his associates, and his domes-
tic audiences with information about those countries, informa-
tion that may relate to the policies or actions of the United
States government as well.87 Travel restrictions can be divided
into two kinds: a ban on travel anywhere by a particular per-
son, and a ban on travel by all persons to a particular country.
The Supreme Court has held that freedom to travel abroad is
"a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech
and association .... " Thus a U.S. citizen may not be denied a
passport absent evidence that his proposed travel poses a seri-
ous threat to U.S. interests.8 9 In Aptheker v. Secretary of
State,90 the Court invalidated a provision of the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Act of 1950 that denied passports to knowing
members of communist organizations, saying the statute swept
too broadly and hence abridged the freedom of travel.9 ' By
comparison, in Haig v. Agee92 the Court allowed the Secretary
of State to lift the passport of an ex-CIA agent, where it was
stipulated that his speech activities abroad (which included the
naming of U.S. intelligence agents) posed a danger to the U.S.
national security.93
While lifting an individual's passport for reasons particular to
86. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
87. "In many different ways, direct contact with other countries contributes to
sounder discussions at home." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958) (quoting Z.
CHAFEE, THREE HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 195-96 (1956)).
88. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
89. See id at 514; see also, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965).
90. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
91. Id. at 514.
92. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
93. Id. at 287.
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that individual may infringe his constitutional rights, such ac-
tion is unlikely to have much impact on the incoming flow of
information about foreign countries. Other U.S. travelers, in-
cluding journalists, remain free to go to those countries and re-
port on them. The same cannot be said of restrictions on all
travel by U.S. citizens to particular countries. Such restrictions
may substantially limit knowledge by the U.S. public of what is
happening in those countries." Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has upheld restrictions of this kind. In Zemel v. Rusk,95
the Court upheld a law allowing the Secretary of State to inval-
idate passports to Cuba, finding the right to travel outweighed
by the national interest in restricting travel to a country bellig-
erent to the United States.6 The Court dismissed the direct
freedom-of-speech claim by denying the existence of a "right to
gather information.""
In Regan v. Wald," the Court reaffirmed Zemel in upholding
an executive regulation, issued under the Trading With the En-
emy Act, treating as prohibited economic transactions the
purchase of food and lodging by ordinary tourist or business
travelers to Cuba. 9 The claim based on the constitutional right
to travel was rejected as not overcoming "weighty concerns of
foreign policy," in this case the desire of the U.S. government to
deny to the Cuban government access to hard U.S. currency.100
With respect to the freedom-of-speech claim, the Court said
simply that no first amendment right of the kind present in
Aptheker was offended by an across-the-board travel restric-
tion.'0 ' The Court did not consider possible first amendment
rights to receive or gather information, which had made sub-
stantial progress in the years since Zemel.10 2 However, given
the high premium that the Court in Regan v. Wald placed on
deferring to the executive and legislative branches in matters
94. Of course, non-U.S. citizens can still go to those countries and report in the
United States.
95. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
96. Id. at 15-16.
97. Id. at 17.
98. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
99. Id at 229; see Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1
(1968); see 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985); 47 Fed. Reg. 17030, 32060 (1982).
100. 468 U.S. at 229.
101. Id. at 241-42.
102. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1975); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762-65.
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of foreign affairs,l"o it is doubtful that recognition of any such
first amendment rights would have changed the outcome. 1 4
The prohibitions on travel by U.S. citizens upheld in Zemel v.
Rusk and Regan v. Wald probably have a significant impact in
curtailing the flow into the United States of information about
Cuba. Still, the information-blocking effects of these travel
bans are incidental. Few would claim that the bans had the
purpose of excluding information about Cuba,les as the McCar-
ran-Walter Act apparently has the purpose of excluding unwel-
come ideas from the United States.1°6 Further, restrictions on
the movement of people do not necessarily establish precedents
for restrictions on the flow of pure information. Where restric-
tions on pure information are concerned, the Supreme Court's
only case in point, through 1986, was Lamont, which struck
down the law burdening the flow of mail into the United
States.107
(c) Customs Restrictions on Communicative Materials
Along with broad power over the entry of persons into the
United States, the legislative and executive branches have sig-
103. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 242.
104. f Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762-65 (recognizing the first amendment
right but finding that on the facts presented, the power to exclude aliens outweighed
it).
105. But cf Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 759 (amount spent by Ameri-
can travelers to Cuba prior to regulation upheld in Regan v. Wald was dwarfed by
amount of trade still allowed with multinational affiliates of U.S. corporations, "giv-
ing rise to a strong suspicion that the regulations were intended to cut off travel
rather than dollars").
106. See supra notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
107. 381 U.S. 301. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. But see the more
recent decision in Meese v. Keene, infra note 189. The Trading With the Enemy Act,
involved in Regan v. Wald, has a now-limited application to pure information flow.
The restrictions imposed under the Act on trade with Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam,
and Cambodia prohibit the import of books, periodicals, or films from those countries,
unless the U.S. Treasury Department grants a special license based on lack of eco-
nomic benefit to the designated nation, or unless the transaction falls within one of
the exceptions provided for research institutions, "scholars," and news organizations.
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982); 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.204, 515.101-515.809, 515.544,
.515.545(a)(1)-(2), 515.546 (1985); Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 728-32. These
restrictions reportedly were enforced during the 1960s against material from North
Vietnam and China and in 1981 against material from Cuba. Id. at 731-32, 754-55. In
the face of litigation, however, the government in 1982 agreed to allow the unlicensed
import of "single copies" of books, newspapers, and other materials from the desig-
nated countries, and that position evidently still stands. Id. at 731-32, 754. Unlicensed
imports of more than one copy by members of the general public remain prohibited.
Id at 732 & n.57, 754.
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nificant control over the entry of objects. With respect to com-
municative materials, the U.S. customs law prohibits the
importation of any "obscene" matter, or "any matter advocat-
ing or urging treason or insurrection against the United States,
or forcible resistance to any law of the United States ... .",,08
The substantive restrictions thus imposed are not onerous.
The Supreme Court has held that the applicable standard of
"obscenity" is the same one used to judge domestic material.1' 9
Following this lead, the Court has affirmed a decision constru-
ing the ban on materials advocating insurrection or illegality as
reaching no farther than domestic law can.110 Thus, so far as
their substance is concerned, communicative materials from
abroad are as free as domestic materials to enter and circulate
within the United States.
That freedom, however, may be deceptive, since customs offi-
cials have broader enforcement powers than domestic officials.
Searches and seizures within the United States usually require
a warrant or probable cause, as provided in the fourth amend-
ment to the federal Constitution."" The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has allowed a search without warrant or probable cause of
an incoming letter suspected of carrying heroin." 2 The Court
stated that customs agents may search any luggage or effects
crossing the border, and that no one could reasonably expect
privacy against a border search.1 13
If incoming material is thus detained for inspection at the
border, its distribution in the United States is delayed. This de-
lay is not subject to the stringent safeguards that would apply
to any such "prior restraint" on the distribution of domestic
materials.1 ' 4 Responding to a claim of unconstitutional re-
straint at customs, a federal district court, in a decision af-
108. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1982). These provisions apply to the importation of "any
book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, or drawing
. .. " Id.
109. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973).
110. Church of Scientology v. Simon, 460 F. Supp. 56, 58 (C.D. Cal. 1978), off'd
mem, 441 U.S. 938 (1979). Thus, under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969),
materials cannot be excluded on these grounds unless they are "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and... likely to incite or produce such action."
111. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
112. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
113. Id. at 618-19.
114. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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firmed by the Supreme Court, declared the problem de
minimis:
In this case, the Church of Scientology's papers.. were de-
tained for a very short period by the Customs Service, before
the Service determined the papers to be importable. Under
the Customs Service's broad powers to restrict imports and
conduct a search of materials entering the country from
abroad, this temporary delay and retention of documents do
not constitute a constitutional deprivation. 15
As this language suggests, a prolonged detention of communi-
cative materials by customs might amount to a constitutional
deprivation.
One use of customs searches has been recognized as im-
proper. When Edward Haase, an American writer critical of
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, returned to the United States
from a trip to Nicaragua in 1985, customs agents at the Miami
airport, together with an FBI agent, searched his luggage and
seized and copied some of his papers."' In Haase's suit against
the FBI and the Customs Service alleging violations of his con-
stitutional rights, the government effectively confessed error,
offering to undo everything that had been done to Haase." 7
The court of appeals nonetheless held that Haase's suit for
declaratory relief should not have been dismissed.118 Haase
alleged that other travelers had been similarly subjected to in-
trusive border searches on returning from Nicaragua, as part of
an apparent government policy," 9 and the court ruled that the
government must respond to that allegation.' Meanwhile, the
Customs Service in August 1986, issued internal directives
designed to provide guidance to field agents in such
situations.121
115. Church of Scientology v. Simon, 460 F. Supp. at 58, qff'd mem., 441 U.S. 938
(1979).
116. See Haase v. Webster, 807 F.2d 208, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
117. The government offered to return all the copies of Haase's papers and certi-
fied that they had not been further copied or disseminated. Id. at 211.
118. Id at 217. The court of appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the
claim for injunctive relief. Id.
119. See also Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 733 ("In practice, the statute
[19 U.S.C. § 1305, see suprm note 108 and accompanying text] has served as an invita-
tion to overzealous border officials anxious to seize books and newspapers that appear
unfriendly to the United States").
120. 807 F.2d at 216.
121. The directives covered subjects such as personal searches, photocopying, and
the legal definitions of sedition and treason. Telephone interview with Ellen Mc-
Clain, attorney for the U.S. Customs Service, Washington D.C. (March 30, 1987).
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It thus appears that, at least in Haase's case and perhaps
more broadly, the U.S. government improperly searched and
seized the papers of travelers returning to the U.S. from Nica-
ragua. It also appears that this practice or policy was stopped,
but only as a result of litigation. In this case, it seems, the legal
protections of the U.S. Constitution have freed the incoming
flow of information from a government attempt to monitor or
restrict that flow.
(d) Customs Exemptions for Communicative Materials
Under the Beirut Agreement
The Beirut Agreement is a multinational treaty designed to
encourage the international circulation of audio-visual materi-
als of an educational character by exempting them from import
duties, license requirements, taxes, and other restrictions of
importing countries.122 Under the Agreement, a person seeking
duty-free treatment for audio-visual materials must apply for a
certificate of educational character from the appropriate
agency of the exporting country.12 The certificate is then
submitted to the importing country, which makes its own de-
termination whether the material qualifies for exemption, but
giving "due consideration" to the exporting country's deter-
mination.124
The President of the United States, as authorized by legisla-
tion implementing the treaty, 2 5 has designated the United
States Information Agency (USIA) to administer the Beirut
Agreement for the U.S. I2 The functions thus conferred on the
USIA include both the "certification" of materials for export
from the United States and the "authentication" of materials
certified by another country for duty-free import into the
United States.12 The regulations used by the USIA in issuing
certificates for export were held to violate the first amendment
122. Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Audi-
tory Materials of an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Character, Jan. 12, 1967, 17
U.S.T. 1579, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197 U.N.T.S. 3. See Note, USIA Censorship of Educa-
tional Films for Distribution Abroad, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REV. 403 (1984).
123. Treaty, art. IV, 17 U.S.T. at 1582-84.
124. Id.
125. Pub. L. No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (1966).
126. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.1-502.8 (1986); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp.
492, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1986) appeal docketed, No. 86-6630 (9th Cir.).
127. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.2-502.6 (1986).
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in Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick,12 a federal district court deci-
sion, now on appeal, that is discussed later in connection with
outgoing speech.129
The USIA's conduct in authenticating materials for import
into the United States under the Beirut Agreement appears, to
date, not to have attracted criticism. This is somewhat surpris-
ing. The regulations applied by the USIA in determining
whether materials are "educational" for the purpose of U.S. im-
port are identical to those struck down in Bullfrog Films with
regard to U.S. export.130
Moreover, Article V of the Beirut Agreement reserves the
right of receiving states "to censor material in accordance with
their own laws or to adopt measures to prohibit or limit the
importation of material for reasons of public security or or-
der. '13 1 When the U.S. Congress was considering ratification of
the Agreement in 1966, concern was expressed about the entry
of foreign political materials. One congressman pointed to Ar-
ticle V as assurance that the Agreement "does not require us to
bring in a single film from Yugoslavia that is communistic in
nature."' 32 To deny duty-free entry to a film because it was
"communistic in nature," whether or not such denial was au-
thorized by the Beirut Agreement, would constitute discrimi-
nation based on political content that might well violate the
first amendment.13
The apparent absence of challenge to the USIA's implemen-
tation of the Beirut Agreement with respect to materials seek-
ing duty-free import into the United States may indicate that
the Agency has routinely accepted the certifications of export-
ing countries. Or perhaps would-be importers, located outside
the United States, have had legal or practical difficulties in
challenging USIA rulings." 4 In any event, the decision on ap-
128. 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-6630 (9th Cir.).
129. See ifra text accompanying notes 594-610.
130. See 22 C.F.R. § 502.6 (1986).
131. Treaty, art. V, 17 U.S.T. at 1584.
132. See Note, supra note 122, at 408.
133. See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Bullfrog
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. at 506, appeal docketed, No. 86-6630 (9th Cir.); see also
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) (Black, J.) (U.S. Constitution prevails over
inconsistent treaty).
134. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). But see Note, State Laws
Restricting Land Purchase by Aliens, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 135, 155 (1982). In
any event, a would-be importer could have an agent in the United States who was
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peal in Bullfrog Films presumably will settle the first amend-
ment validity of the existing USIA regulations as applied to
imports as well as exports."s
(e) Regulation of Foreign "Political Propaganda" Under
the Foreign Agents Registration Act
One statute squarely aimed at information flowing into the
United States from foreign sources is the Foreign Agents Regis-
tration Act (FARA),xs6 which regulates such information as
"political propaganda. ' 13 7 FARA dates from 1938 and 1942,
times of world war and of fear that "foreign agents" and "for-
eign propaganda" could undermine America's resolve."s The
Act requires every "agent of a foreign principal" to register
with the U.S. Justice Department and to file supplemental reg-
istration statements every six months.13m A "foreign principal"
is defined as any foreign government, foreign political party,
foreign corporation, or "person outside of the United States"
who is not a citizen and domiciliary of the United States. 4 ° Ex-
emptions are provided for diplomats, persons engaged in pri-
vate business, and certain other classes of people who otherwise
would be required to register as agents under the act."4'
FARA imposes on registered agents several requirements
with respect to any "political propaganda" they distribute in
the United States. "Political propaganda" is defined for the
most part neutrally, as any communication intended to "influ-
ence a recipient ... with reference to the political or public
interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign
country . . . or with reference to the foreign policies of the
United States .... ,142 Registered agents are required to place
injured by the impact of the USIA regulations on importation of the films and who
thus would have standing to sue. Cf. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
135. If the regulations are struck down in their application to exports, the Agency
surely will not attempt to preserve them for imports, where a U.S. audience would be
affected. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
136. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1982 & Supp. II 1982).
137. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 611(j), 614(a)-(b); infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
138. Act of June 8, 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631; Act of Apr. 29, 1942, ch. 263, 56 Stat.
248. The House Report on the 1938 Act stated that "the spotlight of pitiless publicity
will serve as a deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda." H.R. REP. No. 1381,
75th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1937). See also infra note 178.
139. 22 U.S.C. § 612 (1982 & Supp. II 1982).
140. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b).
141. 22 U.S;C. § 613(a), (d); see also id. §§ 611(d), 612(f), 613.
142. 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1979). The definition is not entirely neutral. It includes,
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on public file with the Justice Department copies of any "polit-
ical propaganda" they transmit within the United States.
143
They are required to report publicly to the Department of Jus-
tice on the places, times, and extent of each transmittal.4 4 And
they are required to label conspicuously each piece of propa-
ganda they transmit.1' The prescribed label for a film, for ex-
ample, includes the names of the agent and the foreign
principal, a statement that "dissemination reports" on the film
are available for public inspection at the Justice Department,
and a statement that "[r]egistration does not indicate approval
of the contents of this material by the United States Govern-
ment.' 146  The prescribed label does not include the word
"propaganda.' 47
While FARA had been held constitutional insofar as it re-
quired the registration of foreign agents,14 two recent cases,
one reaching the Supreme Court, challenged for the first time
the act's "political propaganda" requirements. 49 Both cases in-
volved the same three documentary films - one on nuclear
war, If You Love This Planet, and two on acid rain, Acid from
Heaven and Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery. All three films
were produced by the National Film Board of Canada (Film
Board) and distributed in the United States by the Film Board's
New York office. The Film Board was an agency of the Cana-
dian government, and its New York office accordingly was a
registered foreign agent under FARA. In June 1982, the Film
Board submitted to the Justice Department, along with its
semi-annual registration statement, a list of sixty-two new film
titles for distribution in the United States. In January 1983, the
Justice Department, after screening five of the films, notified
among other things, communications intended to "promote in the United States ra-
cial, religious, or social dissensions." id.
143. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1979).
144. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1979); 28 C.F.R. § 5.401(a)-(b); Report Form CRM-159
(1985).
145. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1979); 28 C.F.R. § 5.402(a).
146. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1979); 28 C.F.R. § 5.402(e); Report Form CRM-159; see also
28 C.F.R. § 5.400(c).
147. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1979).
148. E.g., Attorney General v. The Irish People, 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1982).
149. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983), sub nom. Keene v. Meese,
619 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986), decided, 107
S. Ct. 1862 (1987), see infra note 189; Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986). The author was of counsel in the Supreme Court
for appellee Keene in Keene v. Meese.
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the Film Board that the three named films constituted "polit-
ical propaganda" under FARA.1m
Two lawsuits followed. The U.S. distributor of one of the
films, together with libraries and other groups wishing to ex-
hibit the films, brought Block v. Meese.' The libraries and
other groups claimed that the distributor's required public re-
porting of their names as exhibitors of "political propaganda"
would deter them from showing the films.152 The distributor
claimed that he lost income as a result of exhibitors' reluctance
to rent or buy the films.15 Meanwhile, a California state sena-
tor who wanted to exhibit the films to stimulate public debate
on the issues they addressed brought Keene v. Meese.'1  He
claimed he was deterred from showing the films by the harm to
his political and personal reputation that would result, he said,
when it became known that he had shown a film officially
designated by the U.S. government as foreign "political
propaganda. ' 5
In both cases, the U.S. government took the position, surpris-
ingly, that while FARA required the foreign agent to put the
statutory label on the film, the person exhibiting the film was
free to take the label off.' As a result, the courts in both cases
ruled that the plaintiffs could not complain about the labeling
requirement. 5 7
In Keene, the federal district court in California first ruled
that the threat to Keene's reputation gave him standing to chal-
lenge the act's designation of the films as "political propa-
ganda."' The court then held that the act violated Keene's
150. See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d at 1306-07; Keene v. Smith, 59 F. Supp. at 1516.
See generally Note, Neutral Propaganda. Three Films "Made in Canada" and the For-
eign Agents Registration Act, 7 COMM/ENT L.J. 435 (1985).
151. Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
152. See 793 F.2d at 1308. In the case of a film, the prescribed dissemination report
to the Justice Department must include the names of organizations showing the film,
See 28 C.F.R. § 5.401(a)-(b); Report Form CRM-159 (1985).
153. See 793 F.2d at 1308.
154. See supra note 7. See infra note 189.
155. 619 F. Supp. at 1120.
156. See Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Block v. Meese,
793 F.2d at 1307 n.1; Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. at 1519 & n.2.
157. See 793 F.2d at 1307 n.1; 569 F. Supp. at 1519 & n.2. The district court in Keene
remarked that "[s]ince the chief importance of the labelling requirement is obviously
to inform viewers of the origins of the film, it is frankly surprising to learn that exhib-
itors of material covered by the Act may, with impunity, frustrate Congressional in-
tent." Id.
158. 619 F. Supp. at 1119.
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first amendment rights.159 "Propaganda" as used in ordinary
speech is a "word of reproach,"'" the court said, and "whoever
disseminates materials officially found to be 'political propa-
ganda' runs the risk of being held in a negative light by mem-
bers of the general public.''6 Thus, Congress had put Keene to
the impermissible choice of foregoing his first amendment
right to show the films or suffering harm to his reputation.1 2
The district court's ruling in Keene was appealed directly to the
U.S. Supreme Court, where the case was argued in December
1986.116
Meanwhile, in Block, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that the distributor had standing
to challenge FARA, since he would lose money as a result of
the reluctance of others to exhibit the films."6 But Judge
Antonin Scalia, writing for the court, went on to reject the con-
stitutional challenge. FARA's own definition of "propaganda"
was neutral, the court said. If the word had a derogatory mean-
ing in common usage, this did not signify that the U.S. govern-
ment in using the word was disparaging the speech the word
described, but rather that the public looked unfavorably on
that kind of speech (political speech designed to persuade).'6
In any event, the court continued, the government itself has
the right to speak, and this includes the right to criticize other
people's speech.1 6 The Supreme Court declined to review
Block,'67 leaving Keene as the only challenge to FARA before
the Court.
The Supreme Court conceivably could rule in Keene, as the
Government urged,'" that Keene lacked standing to challenge
159. Id. at 1124-25.
-160. Id at 1121.
161. Id. at 1124.
162. Id. at 1125-26.
163. See supra note 7.
164. 793 F.2d at 1307-09.
165. Id at 1312
166. Id. at 1310-14.
167. Certiorari was denied in Block on July 7, 1986 (106 S. Ct. 3335), two and one-
half months after the Court had noted probable jurisdiction in Keene (106 S. Ct. 1632,
April 21, 1986). Block was decided by the court of appeals on June 18, 1986, and had
been argued in that court on Feb. 12, 1985, more than 16 months before. See 793 F.2d
at 1303. If Block had not been delayed in the court of appeals, it would have reached
the Supreme Court before the grant of review in Keene; in that situation, the Court
might well have granted review in Block as well.
168. Appellant's Brief at 10-18, Keene v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (85-1180); Appel-
lant's Reply Brief at 2-8, Keene v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (85-1180).
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FARA because the alleged effect on his reputation was too
speculative. Such a ruling, however, would seem evasive and
unfair in view of the Court's refusal to review Block, in which
the court of appeals found that standing did exist.16 9 Block es-
tablished that somebody was hurt by FARA's treatment of for-
eign-source speech as "political propaganda," and further that
the injury resulted from the Act's effect in deterring the dis-
semination of such speech in the United States.
Moreover, there are other parties, not before the court in
either case but particularly relevant here, who are even more
directly affected by the "political propaganda" requirements of
FARA. These are the foreign agents and their foreign princi-
pals. FARA has an impact not only on persons like the Keene
and Block plaintiffs, who are discouraged by the act's require-
ments from disseminating the speech of foreign agents in the
United States, FARA also imposes its requirements much
more directly on the foreign agents, who must file, report, and
label any "political propaganda" they disseminate.7 0
The impact of these requirements on the foreign agents could
not readily be challenged in either Block or Keene. The Cana-
dian Film Board had decided for political reasons not to join the
litigation,1 7 ' and the rules of standing generally limit a party to
complaining about injuries he himself has suffered. 72 If a suit
were brought by a foreign agent, however, or if the rights of the
foreign agent were allowed to be raised by other parties, 73 the
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. The foreign agent is not allowed to remove the label (see 22 U.S.C. § 614(b); 28
C.F.R. § 5.402(e)), and is thus compelled to communicate the government's message.
In a series of cases the Supreme Court has established a first amendment right "not to
speak," holding that the government may not compel persons to communicate
messages with which they disagree. E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n of California, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
171. A. Kenneth Shere, who was U.S. General Manager of the National Film
Board of Canada at the time the Block and Keene cases arose, stated that he was asked
to join as a plaintiff in Block, but refused. He explained:
As an agency of the Government of Canada, we have no business suing the
United States. Our business is to deal government-to-government. [It is] to
obey U.S. laws, not to challenge them. Besides, we have other fish to fry
right now in our relations with the United States.
Telephone Interview with A. Kenneth Shere (Jan. 8, 1987).
172. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975).
173. The rule against raising another party's rights has exceptions, as where an-
other party confronts "some genuine obstacle" to asserting his own rights. Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976); see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1148 (11th
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direct impact of FARA's requirements on the foreign agent
would eliminate any question about standing. 7 4 Moreover, the
effect of those requirements in burdening and "chilling" the
foreign agent's speech would present a strong first amendment.
case on the merits, probably stronger than in either Block or
Keene.7 5
The reluctance of the Canadian government to sue the U.S.
government in these cases thus should not obscure the burdens
that the "political propaganda" requirements of FARA impose,
not only on American distributors like the Block and Keene
plaintiffs, but more directly, on foreign agents and the speech
they disseminate in the United States.
Does FARA offend the first amendment rights of those en-
gaged in disseminating foreign-source speech? The parties in
Block and Keene fought a battle of dictionaries and usage ex-
perts over whether "propaganda" is a disparaging word.' 76 The
Department of Justice, however, had effectively conceded that
it was. The Department told a congressional committee in 1983
that it would "support the use of a more neutral term like polit-
ical 'advocacy' or 'information' to denominate information that
must be labeled."'1' 7 Moreover, the original purpose of Con-
gress in adopting FARA rather plainly embodied a negative at-
titude toward "propaganda."'7 8
ed. 1985). The natural political reluctance of the Canadian government to sue the U.S.
government, see supra note 171, should bring this case under the exception.
174. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973).
175. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301; Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-66
(1976). It apparently would not matter whether the foreign agent was a U.S. citizen,
since "[f]reedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country."
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945), citing Bridges v California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941); see also Ylck Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 220, 227 (1886).
176. See 793 F.2d at 1311-12; 569 F. Supp. at 1520-22.
177. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Edward S. Schmults to Chairman Rob-
ert W. Kastenmeier, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice, House Judiciary Committee, Aug. 8, 1983, reprinted in Joint Appendix at
118, Keene v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (85-1180).
178. See supra note 138. See also, e.g., the Justice Department's statement, in pro-
posing the 1942 amendments adding the "political propaganda" provisions to FARA,
that the amendments were designed to strengthen the act, "[i]n view of the increased
attempts by foreign agents at the systematic manipulation of mass attitudes on na-
tional and international questions, by adding requirements to keep our Government
and people informed of the nature, source, and extent of political propaganda distrib-
uted in the United States .... " Amending Act Requiring Registration of Foreign
Agents" Hearings on HR 6045 Before Subcomm. No. 4 qf the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1941) (statement of L.M.C. Smith).
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But even if "propaganda" is not held to be a disparaging
term, the Act's labeling, reporting, and filing requirements are
imposed only on foreign-source speech, not on domestic speech.
Foreign material thus is singled out for special disclosure re-
quirements. This is done, moreover, on the premise that for-
eign material is less objective and less trustworthy than
domestic material. As two Supreme Court justices said in a
1943 dissenting opinion (a statement with which the Court's
majority did not appear to disagree), FARA was "intended to
label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers
may not be deceived by the belief that the information comes
from a disinterested source." 17 9 While the two justices thought
that "[s]uch legislation implements rather than detracts from
the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment,"''i
the assumption that foreign material is less trustworthy than
domestic material-less likely to come from "a disinterested
source"-would seem to involve content discrimination of a
kind now recognized as inconsistent with the first
amendment.''
To be sure, discrimination between groups of speakers is not
necessarily the same thing as discrimination based on content
or point of view. But speaker-based discrimination itself ap-
pears to be constitutionally suspect.8 2 Moreover, requirements
of source disclosure, even when applied to all speech of a given
kind, have been viewed critically by the Supreme Court.' 3
When such requirements are imposed on political speech by
some speakers (foreign), but not by other speakers (domestic),
they should be especially vulnerable.
Moreover, in this context the speaker-based discrimination
implicates the speaker's point of view. In today's interdepen-
dent world a great many political, economic, and environmen-
tal issues possess international as well as domestic dimensions.
179. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., joined by Douglas,
J, dissenting); see id. at 236 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978);
Karst, Equality as a Central Principal in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20
(1975); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
182. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S.
Ct. 2968, 2972 n.9 (1986); id. at 2986-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 244-51
(1983); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
183. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-66 (1976); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960).
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Furthermore, international issues involving the United States
often present disagreements between the U.S. government and
foreign governments, foreign political parties, or other entities
abroad. Acid rain, one of the issues addressed by the Canadian
films, is a good example. It involves a bilateral controversy be-
tween the governments of the United States and Canada.'
FARA requires films on acid rain that are financed by the Ca-
nadian government to be filed, labeled and reported as "polit-
ical propaganda" when distributed in the United States.
Meanwhile the U.S. government's speech on acid rain bears no
such badge of untrustworthiness. On this and other interna-
tional issues, FARA's discrimination against foreign-source
speech becomes discrimination against views that are opposed
to the views of the U.S. government.1 s5
FARA probably also deters foreign-source speech in the
United States by deterring "foreign principals" from having
U.S. agents in the first place. The cumbersome and continuous
requirements that FARA imposes on foreign agents with re-
spect to their distribution of "political propaganda" may dis-
courage some foreign entities from using agents to distribute
their material in the United States.sa Foreign-source material
can be distributed in the United States without using a "foreign
agent," but often not as effectively. 7 If foreign sources are dis-
couraged from using such agents, the likely effect is to reduce
the access of the American public to foreign-source speech.
184. See, e.g., U.-Canadian Relations Take a Testy New Turn, N.Y. Times, Feb.
26, 1983, at 3, col. 5 ('The neighbors remain far apart on the issue of acid rain").
185. cz. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 ("suggests an
attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its
views to the people").
186. There is an intended stigma attached to being a foreign agent. See the state-
ment by one of the House managers at the time FARA was amended, in 1966, to
broaden the exemption for persons engaged in commercial activities: "While there is
no disgrace in being registered as a 'foreign agent,' there is a stigma that should not be
unnecessarily extended." 112 CONG. REC. 10536 (1966).
187. Foreign material, political or otherwise, can be sent directly to recipients in
the United States by mail or other means, in which case it is not subject to FARA. See
Note, supra note 150, at 440 & n.36; cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301.
Also, when foreign source material is distributed in the United States by someone
who is not an agent of the foreign source, FARA does not apply. See, e.g., Capitalist
Edition of Pravda for U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1986, at 43, cols. 1-2 (private U.S.
citizen publishing a daily edition of Pravda in English for distribution in the United
States, without contact with the Soviet publishers). In such a case, however, the
American distributor must have his own incentives for distributing the material, and
the foreign source lacks control (copyright aside) over whether and how the distribu-
tion is done.
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FARA's regulation of foreign-source speech as "political
propaganda" thus burdens that speech whether or not "propa-
ganda" is considered a disparaging word.""
Finally, the question is not simply one of first amendment
law. If the United States courts eventually reject the first
amendment challenge to FARA, domestic and international ob-
jections to the statute will remain. FARA's singling out of for-
eign-source speech for regulation as "political propaganda" will
continue to be not only a relic of wartime fearfulness, but an
emblem of unwillingness on the part of the United States to let
foreign and domestic ideas compete on level ground within U.S.
borders.1 8 9
188. Also questionable under the first amendment is the way FARA requires gov-
ernment functionaries to sit in judgment on protected speech to determine whether it
meets the act's vague definition of "political propaganda." Broad as that definition is,
see supra text accompanying note 142, the Justice Department in Keene and Block
found that only three of 62 Canadian films met it. See supra text accompanying note
150. Meanwhile the record in Keene disclosed that the Soviet films Alexander Nevsky,
Potemkin, and Crime and Punishment had been deemed "political propaganda"
under FARA. Joint Appendix at 63, Keene V. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (85-1180). The
vagueness involved in identifying "political propaganda" under FARA seems constitu-
tionally unacceptable under decisions of the Supreme Court. E.g., Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
189. The Supreme Court decided Meese v. Keene on April 28, 1987 (107 S. Ct.
1862). By the vote of 5 to 3, the Court reversed the district court and upheld the con-
stitutionality of FARA's "political propaganda" provisions.
The majority opinion, by Justice Stevens, first held that Keene had standing to
challenge the statute. The Court explained that Keene had submitted detailed, un-
contradicted affidavits supporting the conclusion "that his exhibition of films that
have been classified as 'political propaganda' by the Department of Justice would sub-
stantially harm his chances for reelection and would adversely affect his reputation in
the community." Id. at 1868. At best, Keene "would have to take affirmative steps at
each film showing to prevent public formation of an association between 'political
propaganda' and his reputation," and in any event those steps "would be ineffective
among those citizens who shun the films as 'political propaganda.'" Id. at 1868-69.
On the merits, the Court began by noting that "the term 'political propaganda' has
two meanings," one disparaging and one neutral. Id. at 1869. The Court further noted
that FARA's definition of the term "includes misleading advocacy" as well as accu-
rate, respected advocacy. Id. at 1869. The Court read the statutory definition, how-
ever, as "broad" and "neutral." Id. at 1870.
The Court then held that the district court had erred in ruling that FARA's use of
the term "political propaganda" placed unconstitutional burdens on Keene's speech.
First, FARA "does not pose any obstacles to appellee's access to the materials he
wishes to exhibit." Id. at 1871. Rather, "Congress simply required the disseminators
of such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to
evaluate the importance of the propaganda." Id. True, prospective viewers of the
films may "harbor an unreasoning prejudice against arguments that have been identi-
fied as the 'political propaganda' of foreign principals and their agents .... Id. But
FARA "allows appellee to combat any such bias simply by explaining ... that Can-
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(f) Restrictions on Foreign Production of Communicative
Materials: the "Manufacturing Clause" of the
Copyright Act
The flow of communicative materials into a country may be
affected by restrictions on foreign production of those materi-
ada's interest in the consequences of nuclear war and acid rain does not necessarily
undermine the integrity or the persuasiveness of its advocacy." Id.
Second, the Court found the reasoning of the district court to be "contradicted by
history." Id. at 1872. Since FARA's "political propaganda" provisions were more than
four decades old, "it seems obvious that if the fear of misunderstanding had actually
interfered with the exhibition of a significant number of foreign-made films, that ef-
fect would be disclosed in the record." Id. at 1872-73. There was no evidence that any
public suspicion engendered by the word "propaganda" had "had the effect of Govern-
ment censorship." Id. at 1873.
Finally, the Court invoked "the respect we normally owe to the Legislature's power
to define the terms that it uses in legislation." Id.
The Court's opinion is unpersuasive in several respects. It is notable, in general, for
Its narrow concentration on the arguments made by the district court and its failure to
respond at any point to the dissenting opinion.
In relying on the asserted neutrality of the statute's definition of "political propa-
ganda," the Court ignored what Justice Blackmun in dissent called "the realities of
public reaction to the designation." Id. at 1874 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court
itself had recognized those realities in its discussion of standing, where it noted that
Keene would have to take affirmative steps at each film showing to prevent harm to
his reputation. See id. at 1868-69.
In claiming neutrality for the statute, the Court also ignored recent statements by
high Justice Department officials acknowledging that the statute was not neutral. See
id. at 1879 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court likewise passed over statements
from the legislative history showing a non-neutral congressional purpose of deterring
the spread of "political propaganda." See supra notes 138, 178; 107 S. Ct. at 1874 &
nn.1, 2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
More broadly, the Court's opinion does casual violence to first amendment doctrine.
In stressing that FARA did not have "the effect of Government censorship" (id. at
1873), the Court ignored many decisions holding that government can violate the first
amendment not only by prohibiting or censoring speech, but also by inhibiting or de-
terring speech. See id. at 1876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)). In defending FARA on the ground that it "simply
requires ... additional disclosures..." (id. at 1871), the Court ignored decisions strik-
ing down disclosure requirements because they had a deterrent effect on speech. See
id. at 1877 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960)).
Particularly relevant here are the implications of Meese v. Keene for the legal atti-
tude of the United States towards transborder speech. The Court quoted approvingly
the 1943 dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236,
251; quoted at 107 S. Ct. 1871 n.15; see supra note 179 and accompanying text. That
opinion, stating that FARA "implements rather than detracts from the prized free-
doms guaranteed by the first amendment," described the act as "intended to label
information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers may not be deceived by the
belief that the information comes from a disinterested source." 318 U.S. at 251 (Black,
J., dissenting), quoted at 107 S. Ct. 1871 n.15.
The Court not only found constitutionally acceptable in 1987 the wartime premise
that foreign speech is less reliable than domestic speech - less likely to come from a
1987]
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als. To the extent that materials must be produced within the
United States, their importation obviously is barred. Whether
a requirement of domestic production reduces the volume of
communicative materials available in the United States, and
whether it reduces the foreign content of the materials avail-
able, will depend on the kind of materials involved.
The "manufacturing clause" of the United States Copyright
Act,"° which expired in 1986, was a classic restriction on for-
eign production of communicative materials. Dating from
1891,11 the clause required that nondramatic literary works in
the English language, if authored by domiciliaries of the United
States,192 be printed in the United States or Canada in order to
"disinterested source"-but expressed no doubt about the continuing validity of the
premise, no suggestion that Congress might want to reconsider it.
The Court thus found it sufficient, when films reflecting the views of the Canadian
government on acid rain are designated as "political propaganda" under FARA, that
proponents of the films can "combat any bias [resulting from the designation] simply
by explaining" that Canada's interest in acid rain "does not necessarily undermine the
integrity or the persuasiveness of its advocacy." Id. at 1871. Meanwhile, no such
designation, and no such need to combat any resulting bias, are required for the views
on acid rain held by the United States government, or by any other domestic speaker.
This differential treatment of speech by the Canadian and United States govern-
ments, and by foreign and domestic speakers generally, was approved by the Court
without discussion.
The Court recognized that the issue of FARA's discrimination against foreign-
source speech had been raised by Keene in the Supreme Court. Id. at 1870. But the
Court noted that the district court had rejected Keene's argument and left it at that,
giving no consideration of its own to the claim. Id. This silent treatment was particu-
larly noteworthy in an opinion by Justice Stevens, who a year before had argued that
a statute was unconstitutional because, in his view, it discriminated between media
inside and outside of Puerto Rico. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2986 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2979
n.9 (majority in response denies that such discrimination exists). In ducking the issue
in Meese v. Keene, the Court may have wished to avoid an express constitutional
endorsement of FARA's discrimination against foreign speakers and foreign speech.
In the wake of Meese v. Keene, the burden rests on Congress to amend or repeal
FARA. Only in that way can the United States remove the deterrence that FARA's
regulatory requirements must impose on the circulation of foreign-source speech by
actual and potential foreign agents in the United States. See supra notes 186-87 and
accompanying text. Only in that way can the United States show its willingness to let
foreign speech compete on equal terms with domestic speech, thus honoring both first
amendment values and United States pronouncements about a free flow of informa-
tion across national frontiers. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (Supp. III 1985)(expired 1986).
191. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1976) (Copyright Law
Revision).
192. The clause applied prima.facie to authors who were domiciliaries or citizens
of the United States. See 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985). But it excluded U.S.
nationals who were domiciled outside the United States for at least one year immedi-
ately preceding the importation of the book, 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(1) (1985), and thus
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be able to invoke the infringement remedies provided by U.S.
copyright law.195 The clause had various exceptions: the first
2,000 copies of any work; works imported for personal use or
scholarly libraries; books in Braille; and others.194 The pur-
pose of the clause was purely protectionist-"to protect the
American printing industry from the competition of foreign
printers.'P1 9 5
In 1972, reacting against protectionism, Congress set the
manufacturing clause to expire in 1982.11 In 1982, beset by pro-
tectionist pressure, Congress extended the clause, over Presi-
dent Reagan's veto, for another four years.'9 On June 30, 1986,
the clause expired, despite a 7-6 vote to renew it and make it
permanent by a House of Representatives subcommittee four
days earlier. 95 The closeness of the congressional results in
1982 and 1986 suggests that, while the clause is now dead, it
could be revived if protectionist sentiment should increase.
Since the requirement of U.S. or Canadian manufacture ap-
plied only to books in the English language by domiciliaries of
the United States, the impact of the manufacturing clause on
the flow of "foreign" speech into the United States would seem
to have been small. The clause applied not to the content of a
book, but to its place of printing. When an English-language
book by an author domiciled in the United States is printed
abroad, the importation of that book normally brings no foreign
content, no communication from a foreign source, into the
United States.
On the other hand, because the costs of printing are higher in
the United States than in some foreign countries (the raison
d'e'tre of the manufacturing clause), the ban on foreign printing
may have prevented some books from being printed at all. The
manufacturing clause was challenged on this ground as incon-
sistent with the first amendment, and was upheld in a 1986 de-
effectively applied only to domiciliaries of the United States. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIM.
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.22[A] (1986).
193. 17 U.SC. § 601(a) (Supp. 1I 1985).
194. Id.
195. Stonehill Communications, Inc. v. Martuge, 512 F. Supp. 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (Supp. III 1985).
197. Act of July 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-215, 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1985); see 32 BNA
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 227 (1986). ,
198. See 17 U.S.C.. § 601(a) (1985) (vote of House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice on H. 4696, June 26, 1986).
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J.
cision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.19
The court's majority saw no constitutional problem because the
clause did not prevent an author from importing his foreign-
printed book, but only deprived him of full copyright protection
if he did.2°° A concurring judge was more perceptive in noting
that the clause could raise a first amendment problem if it in-
hibited the publication of a book, but concluded that this dan-
ger had not been established, especially in view of the clause's
various exceptions."'
In any event, if the manufacturing clause did prevent some
books from being published, they would have been English-lan-
guage books by authors domiciled in the United States. Regret-
table as the loss to the American public might have been, it
would not have been a loss of communicative content from
abroad.
As a precedent, however, the manufacturing clause could
have a wider impact. It was a precedent for legislation requir-
ing that communicative materials disseminated in the United
States, at least if authored by domiciliaries of the United States,
be produced in the United States. The model could be invoked
to support a requirement that a certain proportion of programs
on U.S. television be produced in the United States. Such a re-
quirement is not unthinkable. As one writer has observed, if
the time came when "the United States ha[d] lost its preemi-
nent position in the packaging and export of information and
entertainment," and "the volume of programming from abroad
increased substantially," legislation might well be proposed or
enacted in the United States, as it has been in other coun-
tries,20 2 to limit the amount of foreign-produced programming
on domestic television. 3
199. Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986).
200. Id. at 222.
201. Id. at 225 (Oakes, J., concurring).
202. See, e.g., Proposal of the Commission of the European Communities for a
Council Directive Concerning Broadcast Activities, submitted to the Council of the
European Communities on April 30,1986. The proposal would require Member States
to reserve at least 30% of their television time, apart from news, sports, game shows,
and advertising, for works produced by nationals of Member States, and would raise
the percentage to at least 60% three years after the Proposal went into effect. O.J.
Eup. COMM. (No. C 179) 4, arts. 2, 4, 22, (July 17, 1986).
203. Price, The First Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite, 23
UCLA L. REV, 879, 887-88 (1976). The Federal Communications Commission, in
adopting, in 1975, its "prime time access rule" that bans programming produced by
U.S. television networks from one hour of prime time each evening, showed sympathy
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If some requirement of domestic production of television pro-
grams was adopted, the impact would be more closely related to
communicative content than it was with respect to books under
the manufacturing clause. Requiring television programs to be
produced in the United States would not mean that the same
content by the same author, domiciled in the United States,
would simply be "manufactured" in the United States rather
than abroad. Program production is a collaborative enterprise
that involves many people and often reflects the place of pro-
duction. Program production in the United States rather than
abroad would mean that fewer foreigners participated, and that
the programs' content embodied fewer foreign ideas, cultures,
values, and points of view.
The fact remains that the manufacturing clause, after ex-
isting in United States law for almost a century, was allowed to
expire in 1986. This congressional decision must be counted as
an important move by the United States away from protection-
ism in the realm of communicative materials.
(g) Restrictions on Importing Copyrighted Works
Produced Abroad
While the manufacturing clause has expired, another provi-
sion that restrains the importation of communicative materials
remains in United States copyright law. Section 602 of the
Copyright Act 2" allows a copyright owner to block the import
into the United States of copies of his work that were produced
abroad, even if their production was lawful and even if the
copyrighted work is not otherwise available in the United
States.
United States copyright law gives a copyright owner the ex-
clusive right to sell, rent, or otherwise distribute copies or pho-
norecords of his work.205 This right, however, normally is
subject to the "first-sale doctrine." The first-sale doctrine pro-
vides that once a particular copy or phonorecord has been law-
fully made, the owner of that copy or phonorecord is entitled to
for the argument that the rule "discriminates against American producers and favors
foreign producers." Prime Time Access Rule, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d
829, para. 22 (1975). But the Commission noted "the reduced role which foreign prod-
uct plays in access programming this year," and said that action to repeal or change
the rule to aid American producers was therefore unnecessary. Id.
204. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1985).
205. Id. § 106(3).
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sell it, or otherwise transfer it, without further authority from
the copyright owner."°.
Section 602 is an exception to the first-sale doctrine. It al-
lows a copyright owner to prohibit the importation into the
United States of copies or phonorecords of his work that "have
been acquired outside the United States," °7 even if they were
lawfully made and acquired.m
Section 602 applies to two separate situations. The first in-
volves "pirate" copies or records produced without authority
from the copyright owner, but in a country where their produc-
tion was nonetheless lawful (typically because the country had
no copyright relations with the United States, and hence the
work was in the public domain there),2" The second situation
involves copies or records lawfully produced abroad with the
authority of the copyright owner, and otherwise in full compli-
ance with U.S. copyright law.21° In either situation, under sec-
tion 602, "the mere act of importation ... would constitute an
act of infringement and could be enjoined. 2 1 1
Section 602 itself has exceptions, but limited ones (more lim-
ited than were the exceptions to the manufacturing clause).1
Section 602 does not apply to copies or records imported by the
United States government or by a U.S. state government, ex-
cept for "use in schools. 21 3 It does not apply to the importation
of one copy or record at a time for the private use of the im-
porter; to copies or records carried into the United States in a
traveler's personal baggage; or to importation by educational or
scholarly organizations of one copy of an audiovisual work for
archival purposes, or five copies of other works for archival or
214library lending purposes.
206. Id. § 109(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title... is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy or
phonorecord").
207. Id. § 602(a) ("Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have
been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106").
208. See idE See also H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1976) (COPYRIGHT
LAW REvIsION).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying note 194.
213. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (1985).
214. Id. § 602(a)(2)-(3).
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Section 602 reportedly is employed by record companies to
block the importation of recordings of popular music that are
out of print or otherwise not available in the U.S.
2 15
In addition to use of the statute by record companies holding
the sound-recording copyrights in recorded music, a test case
was pending in late 1986, in which publishers, composers, and
songwriters holding the composition copyrights in the underly-
ing musical works were seeking to establish their right under
section 602 to block importation of recordings of the music. 21
6
This claim could have a much broader impact than the claims
of record companies. The claims of record companies are lim-
ited to records made since 1972, when copyright protection for
sound recordings began in the United States.217 The claims of
the publishers, composers, and songwriters apply to music re-
leased up to seventy-five years ago.2118 Moreover, while the
sound recordings on a single record or tape usually have a sin-
gle owner, an album of ten songs might have ten different com-
position copyrights; all ten owners would have to give
permission for the album to be imported.2 19  Nevertheless,
under the language and scheme of the Copyright Act, it would
appear that the publishers, composers, and songwriters have a
reasonable chance of establishing their claim.?
The congressional reports on section 602 offer no reasons for
215. A New York Times article in December, 1986, reported that a number of re-
cordings of popular music could be purchased abroad but not in the United States,
because the copyright owners had blocked import under section 602. Some of the
recordings had gone out of print in the United States; others included "many compact
discs released in Europe and Japan [that] ... have not yet found American release."
"You have to be very careful about what you import," one record seller reportedly
said. "[I]t's hard to explain to someone why we can't sell them a 12-inch of Spring-
steen's 'Incident on 57th Street.' If it's good enough to be heard in England, why can't
an American hear it?" N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1986, at C9, col. 6. See also U.S. Law
Spells Bad News for Import Fans, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 1, 1987, at 43, col. 1 (N.Y.
Times dispatch).
216. See N.Y. Times, supra note 215 (case reportedly pending before U.S. District
Court in New Jersey).
217. Pub. L. No. 92-140,85 Stat. 391 (1971). See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 55 (1976); 1 M. NmmE _, NIMME ON COPYRIGHT § 4.06 [A][1] (1986).
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)-(b) (1985).
219. See N.Y. Times, supra note 215. The owner of a nationwide record-store chain
reportedly said, "If the publisher wins, it would stop us importing all kinds of things
because there's no way to bookkeep it all." Id.
220. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53
(1976) (stating that a literary work can be embodied in a phonorecord, which implies
that a musical work also can be, and hence can be infringed by unauthorized distribu-
tion of the phonorecord).
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creating this exception to the first-sale doctrine.221 The provi-
sion seems defensible, however, as applied to "pirate" copies.
These are copies produced abroad without authority from the
copyright owner, and their importation at cheap prices would
compete unfairly with authorized copies. A ban on importing
"pirate" copies also existed in the 1909 Copyright Act, predeces-
sor to the present 1976 Act.22
Section 602 is hard to defend, however, as applied to copies
made abroad with the authority of the copyright owner, a new
provision in the 1976 Act.m The defense offered by record
companies - that "[p]arallel imports are an unfair and illicit
disruption of the marketplace"' - is simply an objection to
competition. The first-sale doctrine is designed to protect com-
petition by preventing copyright owners from controlling the
"marketplace" for copies of their works once those copies have
been sold with the copyright owner's permission.2 5 To create
an exception for imported copies, as section 602 does, is incon-
sistent with principles of domestic competition and interna-
tional free trade, and with a free flow of communicative
materials across national borders.
Section 602 might be challenged under the first amendment,
but probably without success. A United States resident seeking
to import a book or record unavailable in the United States,
and blocked from doing so under section 602, might invoke the
first amendment right to receive information from abroad that
the Supreme Court has recognized in Kleindienst v. Mandel226
and Lamont v. Postmaster General.22 " It would probably be an
adequate response, however, that section 602 allows the impor-
tation of one copy at a time for the private use of the importer,
and of five copies of a book or record for library lending
purposes.228
221. See H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-71 (1976); S. REP. No. 473,94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 151-52 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1976)
(Conference Report).
222. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1977); see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1976).
223. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1976). Compare 17 U.S.C.
§ 602 (1985) with Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1977).
224. N.Y. Times, supra note 215.
225. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B] (1986); Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
226. 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 58-71.
227. 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2)-(3); cf Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d
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It is true that, by prohibiting wholesale importation, section
602 also restricts the ability of would-be importers to distribute
works in the United States, and the ability of many members of
the U.S. public to receive the work.229 But the power granted
by section 602 is, after all, part of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner under the U.S. copyright law.2 30 These rights
are authorized by the U.S. Constitution2 I and are generally
consistent with the first amendment.m2 For example, a copy-
right owner has the right, without offending the first amend-
ment, to prevent any publication or. distribution of his work,M
or to prevent the use of too many quotations from his work in
news accounts.? Similarly, although the first-sale doctrine en-
hances public access to published works, the doctrine probably
is not required by the first amendment. It is likely that Con-
gress could have given copyright owners the right to control all
distribution, including all resale, of copies of their works.m
Section 602 does less than that, lifting the first-sale doctrine
only to block the import of copies from abroad.
Does this "discrimination" against foreign copies present a
constitutional problem? The court of appeals decision uphold-
ing the manufacturing clause,2 3M another provision that discrim-
inated against foreign production, suggests not. Moreover,
while the manufacturing clause arguably restrained the ability
of U.S. authors to publish their works, ' section 602 gives U.S.
authors greater rights than they would have under the first-sale
doctrine. Section 602 hurts, not U.S. authors, but would-be dis-
220, 225 (2d Cir. 1986) (Oakes, J., concurring), discussed supra notes 199-201 and ac-
companying text.
229. Or the asserted deterrent effects on the import of foreign information under
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, supra notes 151-55, 169-75 and accompanying
text.
230. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 602 (1985).
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
232. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-60
(1985); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[A, B] (1986).
233. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559; Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255, 296 N.Y.S.2d
771, 776 (1968).
234. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559.
235. Cf id. at 560 (finding sufficient first amendment protection embodied in Copy.
right Act's distinction between expression on the one hand and facts or ideas on the
other, and in doctrine of fair use).
236. Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986).
237. See id. at 225 (Oakes, J., concurring).
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tributors and receivers of the work in the United States.'"
This impact on distributors and receivers seems too slight to
overcome the authority of Congress to indulge in a form of pro-
tectionism by giving copyright owners special protection
against foreign-made copies.2-
Section 602 remains an objectionable provision of United
States law, at odds at once with competition, free trade and the
free flow of information. However, it probably does not offend
the first amendment.
3. Summary Concerning U.S. Regulation of Incoming
Information Flow in General
The legal stance of the United States toward information
flow from abroad bears deep marks of ambivalence. On the one
hand there is support for a "free flow" into the United States,
represented most notably by the holding in Lamont m and by
the first amendment right to receive information from abroad
recognized in both Lamont and Mandel. 4z On the other hand
there are the several statutes that restrict incoming informa-
tion flow, together with the court decisions mostly upholding
them.
In support of the free-flow commitment, it can be noted that
the only cases involving government restrictions on "pure"
speech from abroad are Lament and the cases under the For-
eign Agents Registration Act (FARA). In Lamont, the
Supreme Court struck down the restriction,2  while the FARA
case, Meese v. Keene, was still before the Supreme Court as this
text was written.24 The other statutes inhibiting the flow of
information do not involve "pure" speech, but speech mixed
238. Section 602 does hurt theforeign authors of sound recordings of the works, by
allowing the copyright owner to block importation of those recordings into the United
States. Although the statute is not phrased in terms of foreign authorship, but of
phonorecords "acquired outside the United States" (17 U.S.C. § 602(a), see supra note
195), it has a disproportionately injurious impact on foreign authors of sound record-
ings. It may be argued that this discrimination violates the obligation of "national
treatment" imposed on the United States by the Universal Copyright Convention.
Universal Copyright Convention, concluded Sept. 6, 1952, art. II, 6 U.S.T. 2731,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868.
239. But see supra note 238.
240. 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
241. See supra notes 26-29, 58-71 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 136-89 and accompanying text. On the decision, see supra note
189.
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with the entry of aliens, with travel, with the entry of objects or
goods, or with the rights of copyright owners.2 " The nonspeech
activities regulated by these statutes not only are traditional
subjects of government regulation, but often involve considera-
tions of national security, foreign policy, or border control. The
Supreme Court has long given special deference to the execu-
tive and legislative branches in these areas.us
Still, it is hard to deny that the visa restrictions of the McCar-
ran-Walter Act, though based on the government's power to ex-
clude aliens, are designed to prevent dissemination in the
United States of unwelcome ideas from abroad.246 The Foreign
Agents Registration Act is similarly designed. While FARA
does not by its terms exclude any speech from the United
States, it requires that political speech disseminated by agents
of foreign entities be filed, reported, and labeled as "political
propaganda" on the premise that foreign speech is less trust-
worthy than domestic speech." 7 The McCarran-Walter Act
and FARA both reveal an unwillingness on the part of the
United States to allow foreign speech to enter the country and
compete on equal terms with domestic speech. While these
statutes stand, the allegiance of the United States to the free-
flow principle remains compromised.
B. Regulation of Incoming Electronic Media Flow
This section reviews the provisions of United States law that
relate specifically to incoming broadcasts or other transmis-
sions of radio or television programming. There are several
reasons for treating electronic media separately. First, broad-
casting traditionally has been treated separately and subjected
to greater regulation than other media under U.S. law.ms Sec-
ond, special government regulation or control of broadcasting
exists in most other countries as well. 49 Separate considera-
244. See supra notes 36-104, 108-35, 204-39 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 58-71, 103 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 48-86 and accompanying text; Shapiro, supra note 49, at 934-
35, 940-42.
247. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376-78 (1984);
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1973) (prohibiting cigarette
advertising "on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Communications Commission").
249. See, e.g., B. PAULU, RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING ON THE EUROPEAN
CONTINENT (1967); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS, ch. 5 (McWhin-
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tion of tHe electronic media in the U.S. therefore facilitates in-
ternational comparisons.
Third, whether or not these characterizations justify the spe-
cial regulation of broadcasting under U.S. law, the broadcast
media are thought to have a number of special characteristics.
There is the alleged scarcity of broadcast frequencies, which
has provided the traditional rationale for the limited first
amendment protection afforded to broadcasting. 2-° There is the
"uniquely pervasive presence" of the broadcast media "in the
lives of all Americans," particularly in the privacy of their
homes.25l There is broadcasting's unique accessibility to chil-
dren, including those too young to read.- 2 And there is the
unique popularity, persuasiveness, and influence of the me-
dium.25 Broadcasting's power as a vehicle of news and political
communication,' as a source of entertainment and accultura-
tion,25 and as a mode of advertising probably goes far to ex-
ney ed. 1971); C. DEBBASCH, TRAITt Du DROIT DE LA RADIODIFFUSION RADIO ET Tkit-
VISION 15-50, 291-317 (1967).
250. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). But rf FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 376 n.11 (suggesting the Court may reconsider the
"prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity").
251. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748.
252. Id. at 749.
253. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
195 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the public's prime source of information"); M.
FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 760 (3d ed. 1987) (quoting 1980 New York Times column
by Tom Wicker noting that television has become "the principal instrument of Ameri-
can politics"); Gorove, International Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite
"Prior Consent" Revisted, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8 (1985) (reporting view
expressed by Soviet delegate to United Nations that "television is the most powerful
means of mass communication available"). United States courts, however, would
have difficulty in approving the notion that the very persuasiveness of a medium lim-
its its constitutional protection. See, e.g., Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631 (1975); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521 (1977).
254. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, supra note 253, at 742 ("vivid field telecasts during the
Vietnam war may have been a strong factor in the shift of public attitude against that
war, beyond the potential of any print journalism"); see also supra note 253. The
power of television to move public opinion may come in part from the simultaneity of
the viewing. When many millions of people each know that millions of others are
watching the same broadcast at the same time, they may be more readily moved in
their common reactions and resulting public attitudes than when they read newspa-
pers alone.
255. See, e.g., Price, supra note 203, at 887-90; DE SOLA POOL, DIRECT BROADCAST
SATELLITES AND THE INTEGRITY OF NATIONAL CULTURES, ASPEN INSTITUTE PROGRAM
ON COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY, CONTROL OF THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE
VALUES IN CONFLICT 27 (1974); Magraw, Telecommunications: Building a Consensus,
HARv. INT'L L.J. 27, 29 (Nov. 1984).
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plain the concern of almost all governments to keep this
medium under special control.
There is yet another reason for treating electronic media sep-
arately in a study of U.S. regulation of transborder speech.
"Since radio and television signals obviously do not stop at in-
ternational borders,'1a2 7 they pose special problems for nations
wishing to control their international passage. The transborder
flow of television transmissions cannot be controlled, as can
other kinds of media flows, through traditional methods of gov-
ernment border control applied to immigration, foreign travel,
or objects or mail entering the country.
Moreover, the advent of communications satellites means
that it is no longer just "neighboring countries" from which un-
wanted broadcasts may come.2m As the national concerns and
international debate over DBS make clear,2-o the allotment and
regulation of terrestrial broadcast frequencies no longer can as-
sure a nation that it will not be invaded by undesired broad-
casts from abroad. The increasingly international nature of
electronic media transmissions, and the special difficulties
these transmissions pose for governmental attempts to corral
them within national frontiers, call for special treatment of
electronic media in a study of regulation of transborder media
flows.
The provisions of U.S. law that address incoming electronic
media flows are divided in this section into three categories: (1)
restrictions on foreign production of media content or on for-
eign ownership of U.S. communications facilities; (2) restric-
tions on terrestrial broadcasts into the United States; and (3)
restrictions on the reception or retransmission in the United
States of program-carrying signals from foreign satellites.
256. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969) ("It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive
propaganda... [It] may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written
word"); 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1973), quoted supra note 248; Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
257. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 253, at 716.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. See also Gorove, supra note 15,
at 8 ('Te fear among nations favoring prior consent [to DBS broadcasts] is that for-
eign [DBS] could influence their cultural, political and ideological identity in ways
they cannot control").
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1. Restrictions on Foreign Production of Media Content or
Foreign Ownership of Communications Facilities
(a) No Limits on Foreign Production of Programming
The United States to date has placed no legal limits on the
amount of U.S. radio or television programming that may be
produced or originated abroad. This may be because the United
States has had no cause for imposing any such limit. For non-
legal reasons, "the percentage of externally produced presenta-
tions on the American screen is among the lowest in the
world."m Unlike other countries, the United States has not
"felt the sting of unwanted foreign programming."261 It has
had no need to protect its cultural, economic, or political values
against a massive invasion of foreign material.
If this situation were to change, pressures to limit foreign
programming might develop.2 2 As has been noted, the manu-
facturing clause of the Copyright Act, though now expired,
could provide a precedent for such measures.2 3 Another prece-
dent could be found in the FCC's "prime time access rule.""
This rule bars the broadcast of programs produced by the three
U.S. television networks from one hour of prime time each eve-
ning, "in order that the voices of other persons might be
heard."2 5 If the FCC can impose such a restriction in order to
reduce the programming sway of the U.S. networks and pro-
mote a diversity of programming sources,26 there is little rea-
son to doubt that the FCC or Congress could take comparable
measures to reduce a perceived excess of foreign programming
and encourage American program sources. The fact remains
that no such measures exist or are now being considered.
(b) Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Broadcast
Stations
While the United States has no restrictions on foreign owner-
260. Price, supra note 203, at 887.
261. Id.
262. Id; see supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
263. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1985); see supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
264. Prime Time Access Rule, 50 F.C.C.2d at para. 3.
265. Id. at para. 16.
266. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1971)
(basically upholding the rule); NAITPD v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 534 (2d Cir. 1975). Com-
pare Krattenmaker, The Prime Time Access Rule: Six Commandments for Inept Reg-
ulation, 7 CoMM/ENT L.J. 19 (1984).
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ship of its print media,' or on foreign production of its broad-
cast programming,,28 it does limit foreign ownership of its
broadcast stations. Section 310 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 provides that no broadcast license may be held by a
foreign government, an alien, a foreign corporation, or a corpo-
ration whose capital is more than twenty percent foreign.
These provisions date back to the Radio Acts of 1912 ° and
1927,2 1 the predecessors of the present statute. They were in-
tended to protect the national security in wartime. As the Sec-
retary of the Navy stated in 1934:
the lessons ... learned from the foreign dominance of the
cables and dangers from espionage and propaganda dissemi-
nated through foreign-owned radio stations in the United
States prior to and during the [First World] War brought about
the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, which was intended to
preclude any foreign dominance in American radio. 2
Thus the FCC has declared: "The alien ownership restriction
... is primarily and uniquely fashioned to curb alien activities
against the United States in time of war."'
The ban on foreign ownership of broadcast stations was not
adopted without misgivings. Even in 1934, some argued that a
flat ban was unnecessarily broad, given the President's emer-
gency powers in wartime, and that the rule would unduly re-
strict international trade in peacetime.7 4 In 1985, the ban
gained public notice when it led Rupert Murdoch to acquire
U.S. citizenship in order to buy broadcast properties in the
United States.2 5 A major U.S. newspaper commented that
267. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
269. 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)-(b) (1985). For corporations holding broadcast licenses indi-
rectly (holding companies), the statute limits foreign ownership or board-of-directors
membership to 25%, with discretion in the FCC to approve deviations. 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(b)(4). See generaly Watkins, Alien Ownership and the Communications Act, 33
FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1980).
270. Pub. L. No. 62-264,37 Stat. 302 (1912). Section 2 of the 1912 Act required
broadcast licensees to be U.S. citizens or domestic corporations. See Watkins, supra
note 269, at 4-6.
271. Pub. L No. 70-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). Section 12 of the 1927 Act further
prohibited foreign stock holdings in U.S. corporations that held licenses. See Watkins,
supra note 269, at 4-8
272. Watkins, supra note 269, at 6 (quoting Hearings on H.R 8301 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934)).
273. Attribution of Ownership Interests, Report and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 997, par&
22 (1984); see Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S, 924 (1959).
274. See Watkins, supra note 269, at 6.
275. Wall St. J., May 9,1985, at 28 col. 1.
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J.
"the xenophobia of this rule is half a century out of date.2' 6
The U.S. citizenship requirement for broadcast licensees ap-
parently has not been challenged on constitutional grounds,
but it could be. In other areas, the Supreme Court has treated
alienage as a "suspect classification" that must be justified by a
compelling state interest.2 " The Court thus has struck down
state laws barring resident aliens from becoming engineers278
or lawyers.7 9 At the same time, however, the Court has upheld
laws barring aliens from becoming public functionaries such as
police, probation officers, or school teachers. °
Broadcasting is not a public function in the United States.s'
Moreover, broadcasting involves the exercise of first amend-
ment rights,=2 a fact that argues further against the validity of
a law flatly prohibiting resident aliens~w from engaging in the
activity.2s On the other hand, most of the cases striking down
U.S. citizenship requirements have dealt with state laws, not
federal ones,2 5 and the federal government has always had
wide latitude to make policy regarding aliens.2
Although the ban on alien ownership appears to be unneces-
sary and xenophobic, the original "national security" justifica-
tion probably is still a sufficient governmental interest to
withstand constitutional challenge. Communications facilities
in general are no less important to national security now than
they were during the First World War.27 Moreover, there may
well be an international custom of keeping such facilities out of
foreign hands.2" Beyond that, the deference shown by the
276. Id.
277. See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
278. Examining Board v. de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
279. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
280. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
281. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1973).
282. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
283. Resident aliens are protected by the first amendment. See Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
284. Cf. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775,800 (1978)
(rule against newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership in same city upheld, the Court
noting that newspapers remain free to own broadcast stations in other cities).
285. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 278-80.
286. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972); Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Note, The Equal Treatment of
Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069 (1979).
287. Witness the apparent targets of Soviet espionage efforts in the United States
in the mid-1980s. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 11, 1985, at B5, col. 3 (national ed.).
288. The bilateral trade and investment treaties between the United States and its
major trade partners typically exclude "communications" from their provisions assur-
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Supreme Court towards legislative judgments in areas of na-
tional security and foreign policy indicates that section 310 of
the Communications Act would be upheld.2s9
It is, therefore, worth considering how far the rationale un-
derlying section 310 might extend. One scholar has written
that if section 310 is constitutional, and "if it owes its validity to
national security considerations," then "significant implications
arise for the power of the United States to regulate incoming
signals originating abroad," such as those from direct broadcast
satellites. ° "The federal government could take equivalent
steps to protect national security by regulating direct broadcast
messages. Under this analysis, an American licensing proce-
dure would be warranted." 1
Those implications do not necessarily follow. The FCC in-
deed has imposed the U.S. citizenship requirement of section
310 on domestic licensees of direct broadcast satellites (DBS).m
However, it has declined to impose that requirement on entities
that lease space on domestic satellites, whether to distribute
programming to cable systems in the U.S. or to provide satel-
litp-to-home service (with scrambled signals that paying cus-
tomers can decode).2 3
Is there a relevant difference? The FCC has explained that a
DBS licensee, like a conventional broadcast licensee, controls
"the facility's power or transmissions,"," as distinguished from
providing programming over a facility controlled by someone
else. In this view, it is control of the facility itself - "the oper-
ational aspects of a valuable communications facility""5 - that
invokes the national security considerations thought to justify
the ban on foreign ownership.
At least historically, the view has merit. The perceived dan-
ger of foreign ownership is based on the totality of what for-
eigners might do with the facility in wartime, not simply on
ing reciprocal rights of investment. See Note, 72 MicH. L. REV. 551, 568-71 (1974);
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
290. Price, supra note 203, at 900.
291. Id.
292. 47 C.F.R. § 100.11 (1985).
293. Satellite Business Systems, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization,
95 F.C.C.2d 866, para. 17 & n.7 (1983).
294. Id.
295. Id.
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their ability to reach the U.S. public with broadcast messages-'
To be sure, the difference may be only a matter of degree, since
the operation of a communications facility consists of sending
messages. But the U.S. citizenship requirement of section 310
rests basically on concerns about media control, not media
content.
Still, the requirement does have implications for other as-
pects of broadcast regulation. It suggests that other kinds of
regulation may be more readily applied to foreign than to do-
mestic broadcasts.2 7 Further, section 310, by excluding for-
eigners from control of U.S. broadcast facilities, "surely results
in some reduction in the diversity of voices within the United
States."298 While its original intent and its constitutional justi-
fication are rooted in concerns of national security, particularly
in times of war, section 310 inevitably has the continuing peace-
time effect of reducing the "foreign content" of U.S. radio and
television programming. As long as the United States main-
tains section 310, it is declaring, with respect to one fundamen-
tal aspect of the U.S. broadcast media, that the principle of
openness to foreign input is secondary to asserted concerns of
national security, concerns that may well be antiquated.
(c) Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of DBS Licensees
In its 1982 decisions authorizing service by direct broadcast
satellites (DBS) in the United States and granting construction
permits to eight would-be DBS operators,2  the FCC extended
to DBS operators the U.S. citizenship requirement prescribed
for broadcast licensees by section 310 of the Communications
Act.3" Whether or not this action was required by section 310,
it was nevertheless consistent with the national security con-
cerns underlying that section. 0 ' If a conventional broadcast
station in foreign hands somehow represents a threat to U.S.
296. See supra text accompanying note 272 (1934 statement of the Secretary of the
Navy that not only propaganda but espionage are the dangers of foreign dominance).
297. See Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the First Amendment, 15
HARV. INT'L L.J. 514, 524 (1974).
298. Price, supra note 203, at 900.
299. Direct Broadcast Satellites, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982); STC
Decision, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 953 (1982); CBS, Inc., Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 92 F.C.C.2d 64 (1982).
300. 90 F.C.C.2d at app.D, subpart B; 47 C.F.R. § 100.11 (1985); See upra text ac-
companying note 292.
301. See supra notes 270-73, 287-88 and accompanying text.
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national security, a DBS facility in foreign hands-a facility ca-
pable of reaching virtually all the homes in a U.S. time
zones--poses at least as great of a threat.
(d) No Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of
Programming Entities Using U.S. Domestic
Satellites
While banning foreign ownership of domestic DBS facilities,
the FCC, as already noted,3 has declined to impose the U.S.
citizenship requirement on entities that distribute program-
ming in the United States by leasing space on conventional
satellites. °4 The line thus drawn between control of facilities
and provision of programming is not always easy to discern.
Thus, the FCC has allowed a domestic satellite operator to
lease five transponders for a six-year period, with an option to
purchase at any time, to a British company planning to use
them to provide direct service to U.S. homes. °5 As the FCC
acknowledged, the differences between control of leased tran-
sponders for this purpose and control of a DBS satellite were
not overwhelming." But the FCC stressed the legal point
(perhaps begging the question) that the British company would
not need an FCC license for this service, ° and noted that "sev-
eral foreign controlled entities" already were distributing pro-
gram services by satellite to U.S. cable systems.-'* Relying on
the distinction between facilities and programming, the FCC
stated that "none of these programming services control the op-
erational aspects of a valuable communications facility,"3° so
that subjecting the foreign entities to foreign-ownership re-
strictions "would not seem to serve the purposes of section
310(b)."310
302. BROADCASTING, Dec. 10, 1984, at 46.
303. See supra text accompanying note 293.
304. See Satellite Business Systems, 95 F.C.C.2d 866, para. 17 & n.7; aupra notes
293-94 and accompanying text.
305. Satellite Business Systems, 95 F.C.C.2d at par. 18.
306. The main differences-which do not seem insubstantial- were that the con-
ventional satellite had one-tenth the power of DBS, requiring almost twice as large a
receiving dish, and that its signals would be scrambled. Id. at para. 16.
307. Id. at para. 17 n.7.
308. In addition, other foreign-controlled entities "sell foreign programming to
U.S. owned programming services," which in turn distribute the programming to
cable systems. Id.
309. Id. at pam. 17.
310. Id.
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(e) No Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Cable
Systems
In contrast to the U.S. citizenship requirement for control of
conventional broadcast stations and of DBS facilities, efforts to
restrict foreign ownership of cable television systems in the
United States have been rejected by both the FCC and Con-
gress. In 1976, the FCC declined to act against foreign owner-
ship of cable, explaining (a) that the limited foreign investment
in U.S. cable systems posed no threat to national security, and"
(b) that cable operators lack the "totality" of control over pro-
gram content possessed by broadcasters. 311 The Commission
compared cable instead to nonbroadcast media:
Alien ownership restrictions do not apply to communicators
generally, to newspapers, wire news services, non-license radio
and television networks, film and television producers, cable
system networks and channel lessees, and it is not clear that
they should apply to a system operator solely because of his
potential ability to influence, through his program origination
efforts, the ideas and attitudes of cable subscribers. 12
In 1980, as foreign investment in U.S. cable increased, the
FCC reconsidered but adhered to its position.313 The Commis-
sion refused to interpret section 310 of the Communications
Act "as reflecting a general policy against foreign investments
in communications enterprises in the United States."' 14 Con-
gress also has declined to move against foreign ownership of
U.S. cable systems, except in the most tentative way.3 1 5
311. Cable Television Citizenship Requirements, Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d
723, para. 9 (1976). See generally Note, Direct Foreign Investment in Cable Television
Systems: An Analysis of Alien Ownership in the Context of the United States and
Canada, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 113 (1983).
312. 59 F.C.C.2d at para. 9.
313. Foreign Ownership of CATV Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 77
F.C.C.2d 73 (1980).
314. Id. at para. 20.
315. Congress' main concern has been that Canada, the source of almost all foreign
ownership of U.S. cable, did not reciprocate by letting Americans own Canadian cable
systems. See id. at para. 12; Note, supra note 311, at 113-15, 118. A cable bill approved
by the Senate Commerce Committee in 1982 authorized the FCC to make rules bar-
ring ownership of U.S. cable systems by nationals of countries that did not grant recip-
rocal rights to U.S. citizens. S. REP. No. 2172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 605(b) (1982); see
also S. REP. No. 518, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982); S. REP. No. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 605(b) (1983) (authorizing FCC only to "conduct inquiries" on the subject); S. REP.
No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983). In the Cable Communications Policy Act as
finally passed in 1984, however, Congress stopped well short of that. It created a Tele-
communications Policy Study Commission for the apparent purpose, among others, of
looking into the problem, and perhaps exerting pressure on the Canadian govern-
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There is an obvious inconsistency between the FCC's position
on foreign ownership of cable and its positions on foreign own-
ership of broadcast stations, DBS facilities, and program prov-
iders. Broadcasters and DBS operators have been subjected to
U.S. citizenship requirements, while program providers have
not been, on the theory that it is physical control of the facility,
not influence over program content, that warrants a ban on for-
eign ownership."' 6 With respect to cable television systems,
however, control of the facility is overlooked. It is overlooked
although a cable operator may control 50 or 100 channels, in
contrast to a broadcaster's single channel, and although nor-
mally there will be no other cable operator in the area.s17 Ig-
noring this impressive amount of facility control, the FCC
creates and rejects the argument that foreign ownership of U.S.
cable should be banned solely because of the system operator's
"potential ability to influence, through his program origination
efforts, the ideas and attitudes of cable subscribers. 3 1
8
One explanation for the inconsistency lies in the fact that
cable systems are not licensed by the FCC, as broadcasters and
DBS operators are, but by local or state governments.1 9 (Pro-
gram providers are not licensed at all.) The FCC thus had no
ready vehicle for imposing foreign-ownership restrictions on
cable. 20
Another explanation lies in the fact that the foreign owner-
ship of U.S. cable is virtually all from one country, Canada, a
friend and neighbor of the United States. 21 Both the FCC and
Congress, in their refusal to restrict foreign ownership of cable,
apparently were influenced by the "close and friendly ties" be-
tween the United States and Canada.sze It would be unrealistic
ment. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 611 (1985); see 130 CONG.
REC. 14285 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
316. See supra notes 294-95, 303-10 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126
(7th Cir. 1982); H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984).
318. Cable Television Citizenship Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d at par. 9; see supra
text accompanying notes 311-12.
319. See, e.g., Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of 1984, H.R. REP.
No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984).
320. The FCC has imposed some ownership restrictions on cable, banning owner-
ship by local television broadcasters, television networks, and telephone companies.
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54, 76.501 (1985). But broadcasters, telephone companies, and (ef-
fectively) television networks are themselves licensed by the FCC.
321. See Foreign Ownership of CATV Systems, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
77 F.C.C.2d 73, para. 17 (1980); Note, supra note 311, at 118.
322. See 77 F.C.C.2d at para. 8 (opinion of Commissioner Washburn).
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to ignore the cushion this factor provides for the tolerant posi-
tion the U.S. has taken on foreign ownership of its cable
systems.
2. Restrictions on Terrestrial Broadcasts Into the
United States
(a) Frequency Allotments by Treaty
Conventional broadcasts capable of reaching into the United
States from neighboring countries are limited by the allotment
of frequencies for the broadcast stations. The AM radio allot-
ments are governed by multilateral treaties on broadcasting in
the North American Region signed in 1937 and 1950. 33 Accord-
ing to Dean Monroe Price, the allocations between the U.S. and
Mexico in the 1937 Agreement, as well as those between the
United States and Canada, "leave the implication that clear
channel authorization was distributed so that the strongest
Mexican and Canadian stations (in. terms of geographical
reach) were spaced away from the common border."' A Dean
Price remarks that in this way, without violating the first
amendment, "some classes of foreign broadcasts can be practi-
cally prevented from penetrating American borders. '"3 2
Whatever was true of the 1937 Agreement, however, it is not
clear that the same policies control the U.S.-Mexico allocations
prevailing today.3s
(b) Regulation of Programming Transmitted from the
United States for Broadcast Back into the
United States
One provision of United States law imposes U.S. regulation,
indirectly, on programming broadcast into the United States
from another country. Section 325(b) of the Federal Communi-
cations Act requires an FCC permit for the transmission of ma-
terial from the United States "to a radio station in a foreign
country" for the purpose of broadcasting the material back into
323. North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, Dec. 13, 1937, 55 Stat.
1005, T.S. No. 962; North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, Nov. 15, 1950,
11 U.S.T. 413, T.I.A.S. No. 4460; see 1982 FCC. ANN. REP. 29-30.
324. Price, supra note 203, at 898 (citing, with respect to Mexico, C.B. ROSE, NA-
TIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTING 241 (1940)).
325. Price, supra note 203, at 898-99.
326. Although Mexico was not a party to the 1950 Regional Agreement, a separate
agreement was subsequently reached between the U.S. and Mexico generally parallel-
ling the 1950 Agreement. See 1982 FCC. ANN. REP., supra note 323, at 30.
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the United States.- The provision derives from attempts in
the 1930's by some stations that were denied U.S. radio licenses
to move their transmitters to Mexico and receive American
programming there for broadcast to United States audiences.328
Congress' theory was that "[t]he United States cannot control
such transmitting apparatus, but it can at least place difficulties
in the way of securing American [program] talent."3-
Where section 325(b) applies, ° it reflects an aggressive U.S.
concern for the content of broadcasts into the U.S. from an-
other country. In a 1935 case, the FCC denied the required per-
mit on the basis that "[t]he character of the programs likely to
be arranged and transmitted from the proposed studio [in the
United States] does not appear to be such as would promote
better international relations or serve the public interest.
.. Thus, the focus was limited to the programs to be trans-
mitted from the United States for retransmission back into this
country.
In a 1957 case, the FCC took a similarly restrained approach,
granting the permit because it found nothing wrong with the
U.S. originated programs. The FCC said it lacked jurisdiction
"to make determinations with respect to the programming of
the Mexican station."m The court of appeals, however, re-
versed,m3 noting that while the FCC lacked power "to prevent
[the Mexican station] from broadcasting to San Diego locally
originated programs which are objectionable by American stan-
dards," it did have power "to refrain from issuing a permit
which would give those programs a larger American audi-
ence." The court held that the FCC, in deciding whether to
grant the permit, was required to consider the total program-
ming of the Mexican station to determine whether it had "such
serious defects... as would affect the public interest. '1 35
327. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1985).
328. Price, supra note 203, at 898.
329. C. B. RoSE, supra note 324, at 240.
330. The provision was held not to apply where the programming was conveyed
from the United States to Mexico by the physical delivery of recorded programs in-
stead of by radio transmission. Baker v. United States, 93 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 642 (1938).
331. In the Matter of T. Yount, 2 F.C.C. 200, 207 (1935).
332. See Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 248 F.2d 646, 650 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 651.
335. Id.
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Used in this manner, section 325(b) employs programming
supplied from the United States as a lever to regulate all the
programming of foreign stations broadcasting into the United
States. While the provision has broad implications, it appears
to have been rarely used and to have had little practical impact.
After fifty years, the two cases noted appear to be the only ones
in which section 325(b) has been applied.
(c) Prohibition of "Pirate" Broadcasting into the United
States
The United States prohibits unlicensed radio broadcasting,
"pirate" broadcasting,- from ships offshore into the United
States. Thus in United States v. McIntire,3 7 the government,
relying on both section 301 of the Communications Act3
(prohibiting the use of radio without an FCC license) and the
International Telecommunications Convention of 1959, 3 suc-
ceeded in enjoining broadcasts from a ship three and one-half
miles off the coast of New Jersey. Citing the national interest
in preventing interference with the use of duly licensed fre-
quencies, and also "the adverse effects of defendants' unli-
censed broadcasts upon the public interest," the court upheld
"the power of the United States to restrict and regulate radio
broadcasts originating beyond territorial limits." 0
The concept of pirate broadcasts into a nation from beyond
its boundaries, and without its authorization,3 1 can cover not
only the traditional pirate transmitters on the high seas, but
also the new possibility of unauthorized broadcasts into a na-
tion's territory from a satellite. There is tension between con-
demning pirate broadcasts from an offshore ship and insisting
that nations tolerate a "free flow" of incoming broadcasts from
satellites.342
In any event, if an offshore, foreign, or satellite station suc-
336. A "pirate" broadcaster has been defined as "one who transmits into the terri-
tory of a nation from beyond that nation's territorial boundaries and without its au-
thorization." Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 770 (1968).
337. 370 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.J. 1974).
338. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1985).
339. International Telecommunications Convention of 1959, art. VII, para. 1, 12
U.S.T. 2377, 2480, T.I.A.S. No. 4893.
340. 370 F. Supp. at 1302.
341. See supra note 336.
342. See Hagelin, supra note 15, at 291 n.55; supra notes 14-16 and accompanying
text.
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ceeds in broadcasting into the United States, even in violation
of U.S. law, members of the U.S. public apparently are entitled
to receive the broadcasts. Section 705 (formerly section 605) of
the Federal Communications Act, 3 which prohibits the unau-
thorized reception of radio communications, probably does not
apply at all to reception with the consent of the sender.344 But
section 705 in any case contains a proviso exempting "any radio
communication which is transmitted by any station for the use
of the general public... ,3 a provision that would appear to
protect reception of pirate broadcasts. In addition, the first
amendment's "right to receive" might well prevent govern-
ment interference with reception by U.S. residents of broad-
casts transmitted to them.w Also possibly relevant is Section
326 of the Federal Communications Act, which prohibits the
FCC from interfering "with the right of free speech by means
of radio communications."347
(d) U.S. Retaliation Against Advertising by U.S. Firms
on Canadian Stations With U.S. Audiences
United States television stations located near the Canadian
border are widely received in Canada, thanks to the high pene-
tration of cable in the major Canadian cities along the bor-
der.Y" The television interchange between the United States
and Canada thus flows largely in one direction, with some fifty-
four percent of prime time viewing in Canada devoted to pro-
grams produced in the United States. -49
Since so many Canadians watch U.S. television, U.S. stations
have become good media for Canadian advertisers. In 1974, the
Canadian government estimated that Canadian advertisers
were spending twenty million dollars per year at bordering
U.S. television stations, or about ten percent of the total televi-
sion advertising revenues in Canada.'
343. 47 U.S.C. § 705 (1985) (formerly § 605).
344. See infra notes 406-18 and accompanying text.
345. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985).
346. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). Cf. Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 55 (1969).
347. 47 US.C. § 326 (1985).
348. See Stoler, The Border Broadcasting Dispute: A Unique Case Under Section
301, 6 INTL TRADE LJ. 39, 40-41 (1981). The cable penetration in major Canadian
markets was estimated in 1978 at seventy percent. Id. at 40.
349. Id. at 41.
350. Id.
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This outflow of advertising dollars dismayed the Canadian
government, especially in light of its potential impact on the
cultural policy objectives for Canadian television.351 Hence in
1976, Canada adopted a tax law denying Canadian advertisers a
business-expense deduction for advertising placed on U.S.
broadcast stations and directed primarily to a Canadian audi-
ence.352 Owners of the U.S. broadcast stations near the border
protested, claiming that their advertising revenues from Cana-
dian sources had dropped by more than fifty percent as a result
of the law.3 "
At the behest of these "border broadcasters," Congress, in
1984, passed legislation responding in kind.3" The "Canadian
Mirror Act" denies a tax deduction to U.S. advertisers for the
expenses of advertising "carried by a foreign broadcast under-
taking and directed primarily to a market in the United
States," where the foreign country denies the reciprocal deduc-
tion to its advertisers.3 "
Such tit-for-tat retaliation between friendly neighbors repre-
sents an unfortunate resolution of a trade dispute. But Presi-
dent Carter, in recommending the legislation to Congress,
rejected four apparently stronger proposals by the U.S. border
broadcasters for economic retaliation against Canada.3 "
Whether or not the U.S. legislation was a reasonable response
to the Canadian move, it clearly was a response and not a U.S.
initiative. The burden imposed by the U.S. and Canadian en-
actments on the flow of broadcast advertising between the
countries is essentially the work of Canada, albeit resulting
from perceived economic and cultural needs.
That burden, in any event, has little impact on media con-
351. Id.
352. Act of Sept. 22, 1976, Bill C-58 § 3 (presented by the Minister of Finance to the
First Session of the Thirtieth Canadian Parliament, April 18, 1975); see Stoler, supra
note 348, at 42-43; BROADCASTING, Oct. 15, 1984, at 64; BROADCASTING, Nov. 5, 1984, at
46.
353. Stoler, supra note 348, at 43.
354. Trade and Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2991 (1984), 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4910, 4947 (amending section 162 of Internal Revenue Code of
1954); see Stoler, supra note 348, at 46-53.
355. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2991.
356. Stoler, supra note 348, at 51. The other proposals were: (1) special duties on
all Canadian feature films and records exported to the U.S.; (2) quantitative restric-
tions on imports of Canadian feature films and records to the U.S.; (3) continuation of
the provision of U.S. tax law limiting deductions for expenses incurred attending con-
ventions abroad; and (4) taking account of the "unreasonable" nature of the Canadian
tax restriction "when dealing with Canada on matters of mutual concern." Id.
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tent. If U.S. advertisers use U.S. stations instead of Canadian
stations to reach the U.S. audience, the content of neither the
advertising nor the programs is likely to change much. 57
Somewhat like the now-expired manufacturing clause of the
U.S. Copyright Act, this restraint addresses the place of origi-
nation rather than the content of the material communi-
cated. "
(e) Carriage of Foreign Broadcast Signals by U.S. Cable
Systems
The FCC's regulation of cable television does not treat cable
carriage of foreign broadcast stations much differently from
cable carriage of domestic stations. The rules define a televi-
sion broadcast station as including "any television broadcast
station licensed by a foreign government,"5 9 and they make it
clear that foreign stations "may... be carried" by U.S. cable
systems if consistent with the rules. °
The FCC's rules do provide that foreign stations, unlike do-
mestic ones, need not be carried by U.S. cable systems. Foreign
stations may not assert a claim to compulsory carriage, or to
program exclusivity, against U.S. cable systems.361 The FCC's
"must carry" and program-exclusivity rules were designed to
protect local broadcast stations against cable competition, in
support of the "localism" policy embedded in the FCC's licens-
ing scheme. 2 It does not seem unreasonable to deny this pro-
357. The same is probably true if Canadian advertisers use Canadian stations in-
stead of U.S. stations to reach the Canadian audience. There is, however, a potential
indirect effect on program content if the Canadian stations use the additional reve-
nues to produce programming. In this respect, the Canadian legislation may function
as a tax levied on Canadian advertisers, and on U.S. stations, to subsidize the produc-
tion of Canadian programming.
358. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
359. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(b) (1986).
360. Id. The equal treatment of foreign stations when cable systems choose to
carry them was illustrated in Kiro, Inc. v. FCC, 631 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The
case involved a television station in Seattle, Washington, affiliated with the CBS net-
work, which complained about competition from Seattle cable systems carrying Cana-
dian stations, since those stations offered CBS network programming before that
programming was available on CBS affiliates in the U.S. The FCC denied relief, ap-
plying its usual standard of whether the complaining station had shown substantial
economic harm from the cable competition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
fact that the alleged harm arose from carriage of foreign stations by the U.S. cable
systems was not accorded any significance.
361. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(b) (1986).
362. See M. FRANKIUN, MASS MEDIA LAw 915, 918 (3d ed. 1987); United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1968). The program-exclusivity rule
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 9:635
tection to foreign stations that are not licensed by the FCC.
FCC regulation aside, there is one notable way in which U.S.
law discourages cable carriage of foreign stations. The 1976
Copyright Act establishes a compulsory copyright license for
cable carriage of "distant signals," enabling cable systems to
carry nonlocal stations on payment of government-prescribed
royalties.363 This compulsory license expressly covers signals of
Canadian and Mexican stations.364 It does so, however, only for
carriage of those signals by U.S. cable systems located near the
Canadian or Mexican border - specifically, within 150 miles of
the Canadian border or within "off the air" reception range of
stations in Mexico.'
Microwave or satellite facilities are capable of transmitting
Canadian or Mexican signals (or signals from more distant
countries, for that matter) to cable systems anywhere in the
United States.' One may ask, therefore, why foreign signals
were not treated the same as U.S. signals so far as the compul-
sory license was concerned. To be sure, in the view of Congress
the hard decision was to bring any carriage of Canadian or
Mexican signals under the compulsory license. 7 Moreover,
cable systems near the border were, by and large, the ones al-
ready carrying Canadian or Mexican signals.3s But if a U.S.
was terminated in 1980. See M. FRANKLIN, supra, at 915; In the Matter of Cable Teles
vision Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, In the Matter of Inquiry Into the
Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 82 F.C.C.2d 375 (1980). The must-carry rule, as then
drafted, was held to violate the first amendment in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
363. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1), (4) (1985).
364. Id, § 111(c)(4) (1985).
365. Id; see infra notes 366-78 and accompanying text. Cable systems north of the
42d parallel but more than 150 miles from the Canadian border may also carry Cana-
dian signals under the compulsory license. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(4) (1985).
366. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, supra note 362, at 914; Brotman, Cable Television and
Copyright" Legislation and the Marketplace Model, 2 CoMM/ENT L.J. 477, 481 (1979-
1980) (television "superstations" distributed nationwide by satellite).
367. The Senate bill would have made "the carriage of any foreign signals by a
cable system... subject to full copyright liability, because the compulsory license was
limited to the retransmission of broadcast stations licensed by the FCC." H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1976) [hereinafter House Report]. The House Com-
mittee, and eventually the Congress, decided not to go that far, recognizing "that
cable systems primarily along the northern and southern border have received au-
thorization from the FCC to carry broadcast signals of certain Canadian and Mexican
stations." Id.
368. See id. To take further account "of those cable systems that are presently
carrying or are specifically authorized to carry Canadian or Mexican signals," the
House Committee and the Congress "grandfathered" under the compulsory license
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cable system remote from the border wants to carry a foreign
signal-if a system in central California or northern New Mex-
ico, for example, where there are many Mexican-Americans, to
carry a signal from Mexico-why should it not be entitled to do.
so under the compulsory license?69
The foreign stations left out of the compulsory license, and
the owners of the copyrights on the programs transmitted by
those stations, presumably are delighted by this result. They
are given full copyright protection against U.S. cable systems
remote from the border.370 This protection enables them, at
least in theory, to negotiate their own royalties for carriage by
those systems.3 1
any Canadian or Mexican signals already carried at the time of the Act, even if the
cable systems were outside the prescribed zones along the border. Id. at 95. See 17
U.S.C. § 111(c)(4) (1985).
369. Congress suggested no good reason. That broadcast stations in the United
States are "licensed by the FCC," House Report, supra note 367 at 94, while stations
abroad are not, has little relevance. Unlike the compulsory-carriage and program-
exclusivity rules, see supra note 362 and accompanying text, the compulsory license is
not a benefit for the stations carried, but a restriction imposed on them. While the
House Committee saw the issue as raising "important international questions of the
protection to be accorded foreign copyrighted works in the United States," House Re-
port, supra note 367, at 94, it did not say what those questions were. The interna-
tional obligation of the United States is only to give foreign works the same protection
accorded to domestic works. Universal Copyright Convention, concluded Sept. 6,
1952, art. II, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341,
T.I.A.S. No. 7868. The House Committee further stated:
While the Committee has established a general compulsory licensing scheme
for the retransmission of copyrighted works of U.S. nationals, a broad com-
pulsory license scheme for all foreign works does not appear warranted or
justified. Thus, for example, if in the future the signal of a British, French,
or Japanese station were transmitted in the United States by a cable system,
full copyright liability would apply.
House Report, supra note 367, at 94. The Committee did not explain why it would not
be "warranted or justified" to treat foreign signals the same as American signals so far
as the compulsory license was concerned. See supra text accompanying notes 367-68
and infra text accompanying notes 370-72.
370. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1985); Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 369.
371. In practice, one may wonder whether the compulsory license is not a net ad-
vantage for foreign stations. By enabling U.S. cable systems to carry their signals
without prior negotiation, it may produce carriage by systems that otherwise would
not make the effort. At the same time, the license enables the station and the copy-
right owners to collect royalties automatically from the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.
See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d), 801-10 (1985).
The desirability of the compulsory license is suggested by the vehement complaints
of U.S. copyright owners against Canada for not reciprocating by providing them with
comparable compensation for carriage of their programs by Canadian cable systems.
See International Copyright/Communications Policies" Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings); see also BROADCASTING,
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The interests of copyright owners, however, are not the para-
mount considerations where the compulsory license is con-
cerned. The compulsory license subordinates the interests of
copyright owners in order to enable cable systems to carry the
programs of distant stations, and in order to enable the public
to receive those programs. 72 Given this purpose, it is unlikely
that Congress left most foreign stations out of the compulsory
license, while including all domestic stations, in order to benefit
the foreign stations and their program-copyright owners. It
seems more likely that Congress, in declining to extend the
compulsory license to Mexican and Canadian signals generally
(or to all foreign signals), determined that it was less important
for the U.S. cable audience to have access to foreign programs
than to domestic programs. It is unclear why the choice be-
tween domestic and foreign programs was not left to the U.S.
viewing public, with the compulsory license applying to all sig-
nals once it was applied to any.~ Such equal treatment of do-
mestic and foreign media would have been more consistent
with the "free flow" principle.
Other congressional judgments about foreign programming
and U.S. audiences are embodied in the particular lines drawn
by Congress in applying the compulsory license to Canadian
and Mexican signals. With respect to Canadian signals, Con-
gress made the license applicable to U.S. cable systems located
within 150 miles of the border (or north of the 42d parallel
where that is a greater distance).,74 Thus, "Detroit, Pittsburgh,
Cleveland, Green Bay and Seattle would be included within the
compulsory license area, while New York, Philadelphia, Chi-
cago, and San Francisco would be located outside the area.
3 75
One may ask whether the viewing public in New York, Phila-
delphia, Chicago, and San Francisco, rather than the Congress,
should judge the desirability of receiving Canadian signals in
those cities.
Oct. 13, 1986, at 104 ("sense of the Senate" resolution). To be sure, what the U.S.
copyright owners want from Canada is a compulsory license rather than no compen-
sation for their signals, whereas Canadian and Mexican stations left out of the com-
pulsory license by U.S. copyright law are consequently entitled to full compensation.
It may be, however, because of the difficulties of negotiating individual royalties, that
in practice the choice is between compulsory carriage and no carriage.
372. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 367, at 89; M. FRANKLIN, supra note 362, at
916.
373. See supra notes 363-67.
374. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(4) (1985).
375. House Report, supra note 367, at 94.
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With respect to Mexico, instead of specifying a distance from
the border, Congress made the compulsory license applicable
for U.S. cable systems that receive the Mexican signals "off-
the-air" rather than by microwave or satellite.3' 6 To receive a
Mexican signal adequately off-the-air, a U.S. cable system nor-
mally would have to be within 100 miles of the transmitter.Y"
Thus, a cable system in a U.S. border city such as San Diego
presumably could receive, under the compulsory license, a sta-
tion from the Mexican border city of Tijuana.378 But cable sys-
tems in central California or northern New Mexico apparently
could not receive Mexican signals under the compulsory li-
cense. Neither could a cable system in Los Angeles, which is
beyond off-the-air distance from Mexico.379
These and other areas of the United States have large Mexi-
can-American and Spanish-speaking populations despite their
distance from the Mexican border. The congressional judg-
ment excluding these areas from the compulsory license there-
fore may deny Mexican programming to cable audiences that
would wish to receive it.
The off-the-air standard for bringing Mexican signals under
the compulsory license has the further result of discriminating,
not only among cable audiences in the United States, but
among stations in Mexico. This standard means that carriage
by U.S. cable systems under the compulsory license is limited
to stations located in Mexican border cities. The licensed car-
riage would not extend, for example, to a station in Mexico
City, whose signal could reach the border only by microwave or
satellite. As a result, the Mexican stations received in the
United States are likely to reflect the U.S. cultural influence
that is more pronounced along the border, instead of the more
authentic Mexican culture offered by stations deeper inside the
country.
376. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(4) (1985).
377. Although the distance for good off-the-air reception varies with the terrain,
the height of the transmitter, and other factors, it is normally under 100 miles. Tele-
phone interview with Brian James, engineer for the National Cable Television Associ-
ation, Washington, D.C. (April 20, 1987).
378. c. BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK 1985, at C-1963 (list of televi-
sion stations in San Diego market includes Tijuana stations).
379. See supra note 376. Los Angeles is approximately 110 miles from Tijuana.
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3. U.S. Restrictions on Reception or Retransmission of
Signals from Foreign Satellites
As of December 1984, there were approximately eighty active
telecommunications satellites revolving in geostationary orbit
above the equator. 0 Approximately fifteen of them belonged
to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion (INTELSAT).-' Approximately twenty-five were domes-
tic satellites of the United States. z The remaining forty or so
were domestic or regional satellites of other countries, includ-
ing Canada, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, and the Soviet
Union.8 3 In the United States, and probably in other countries,
"it is virtually impossible to watch television or listen to the
radio without soon seeing or hearing something that.., at some
point pass[ed] through a satellite transponder." s
Given the large and growing role of satellites in distributing
television programming throughout the world, national restric-
tions on the reception or retransmission of signals from foreign
satellites may constitute important barriers to incoming media
380. See Smith, Space WARC 1985: The Quest for Equitable Access, 3 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 229, 231 n.9 (1985) (citing Second Report of the Advisory Committee for the ITU
World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Or-
bit and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It, Jan. 1985, at 2). Geostationary
orbit exists 22,300 miles above the equator. A satellite in that orbit revolves at the
same speed as the earth and thereby remains "stationary" over a given point on the
earth. See Cryan & Crane, International Telecommunications Pirates: Protecting
US. Satellite Signals From Unauthorized Reception Abroad, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 851 & n.1, 852 & nn.4-12 (1985). A geostationary satellite's signal is receivable
over a large area (known as a "footprint"), making it "an almost ideal method of dis-
tributing programming, either as an intermediary to local broadcast stations or cable
systems, or as a direct transmitter in what is known as DBS (direct broadcast satel-
lite) transmission service." 1983 Hearings, supra note 371, at 17 (statement of David
Ladd). The discussion here is limited to non-DBS satellites.
381. INTELSAT Report 1985-86, at 1. INTELSAT is an international consortium
that operates a system of communications satellites and earth receiving stations
serving more than 165 nations, dependencies, and territories. Id.. In 1984, INTEL-
SAT had 63 signatories to its treaty and revenues of more than $411 million. See Sepa-
rate Systems Report and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985). See generally L. HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1056-58 (2d ed. 1980). INTELSAT was
established by the "Interim Agreements" in 1964, T.I.A.S. No. 5646; the "Definitive
Agreement" went into effect Feb. 12, 1973. T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter Agreement].
382. Staple, The New World Satellite Order: A Report from Geneva, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 699, 701 (1986) (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 35, 228 (1985)
(1985 U.S. Orbital Assignment Plan)).
383. Staple, supra note 382, at 701 (citing D. Demac, G. Codding, Jr., H. Hudson, &
R. Jakhu, Equity in Orbit The 1985 ITU Space WARC, annot. B (International Insti-
tute of Communications (1985)).
384. BROADCASTING, July 8, 1985, at 43.
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flow. This section examines the extent to which such restric-
tions exist in United States law.
(a) Reception Without Consent of Originator
Reception in the United States of a program-carrying signal
from a foreign satellite--other than a DBS satellite --without
the consent of the originator" may violate several provisions
of United States law. The most readily applicable prohibition is
found in section 705(a) (formerly section 605) of the Federal
Communications Act.38 7 The second and third sentences of sec-
tion 705(a) provide:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter-
cepted communication to any person. No person not being en-
titled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate
or foreign communication by radio and use such communica-
tion (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto3m
At least one of these sentences apparently would apply to pro-
hibit reception of satellite signals without the consent of the
originator.
385. As already noted, this discussion is concerned with conventional, "fixed ser-
vice" satellites that transmit programming to broadcast stations, cable systems, or
other distributors, and not with direct broadcast satellites (DBS) that in the future
may broadcast directly to homes. See supra note 380; Hagelin, supra note 15, at 265.
In any event, reception from a DBS satellite presumably would not be without the
consent of the originator.
386. References to the consent of the "originator" include the consent not only of
the entity that transmits the signal carried by the satellite, but also of the owners of
the copyrights on the programs carried by the signal.
387. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985). See Explanation of Section 705 as Redesignated and
Amended by H.R. 4103, 130 CONG. REC. 14286 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Packwood) (section 705 "provides protection against the unauthorized reception of
subscription television (STV), multi-point distribution services (MDS), and satellite
communications").
388. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985).
389. The second sentence, expressly covering any person "not being authorized by
the sender," presumably would apply whenever the person receiving the satellite sig-
nal "divulge[s] or publish[es]" the programming to any other person, that is, allows
anyone else to view it Even if the person receiving the signal views the programming
in hermit-like isolation, he probably has "receive[d]" it without "being entitled
thereto" and used it "for his own benefit," in violation of the third sentence. On the
applicability of section 705(a) to the unauthorized reception of satellite signals, see,
e.g., 130 CONG. REc. 14287 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood), quoted supra
note 387; Regulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, First Report
and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 205, par. 31 (1979); Rice, Calling Offensive Signals Against
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There are, however, at least two possible defenses under sec-
tion 705. First, a 1984 amendment exempts the reception "for
private viewing" of "satellite cable programming," if the signal
is not scrambled and if a market mechanism has not been es-
tablished to let people pay to receive the signal.3 0 Second, the
proviso to section 705(a) exempts from the section's coverage
"any radio communication which is transmitted by any station
for the use of the general public."' 1 These possible defenses,
together with others based on the Constitution, will be dis-
cussed shortly in considering the legal status of particular ex-
amples of foreign-satellite reception in the U.S."
In addition to section 705, reception of a signal from a foreign
satellite without the consent of the originator, if done by a
cable system that retransmitted the signal, would produce a vi-
olation of U.S. copyright law. 9 3 It also could constitute an inva-
sion of privacy under applicable state law.Y4
Further, failure by the United States to take measures
against unauthorized reception of foreign-satellite signals could
violate treaty obligations of the U.S. It might violate Article 17
of the International Radio Regulations, in which the member
states of the International Telecommunications Union agree to
prohibit and prevent "the unauthorized interception of radio
communications not intended for the general use of the pub-
liC. ''3 5 A refusal by the U.S. government to act against unau-
thorized "distribution" of satellite signals also might violate the
Brussels Satellite Convention, which obligates each of its signa-
tories "to take adequate measures to prevent the distribution
on or from its territory of any program-carrying signal by any
distributor for whom the signal emitted to or passing through
Unauthorized Showing of Blacked-Out Football Games: Can The Communications
Act Carry the Ball?, 11 COLUM J. L. & ARTs 413, 424, 426 (1987). On the applicability
of the third sentence of section 705(a) to a person who views the programs for his own
enjoyment without financial gain, see, e.g., Movie Systems v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492, 494
& n.5 (8th Cir. 1983); Rice, supra, at 421-22 & n.56.
390. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1985). See infra notes 421-29 and accompanying text.
391. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a); see supra note 345, infra notes 430-40, and accompanying
text.
392. See infra text accompanying notes 421-76.
393. See 17 US.C. § 111(b) (1985).
394. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, TORTS 849 (5th ed. 1984).
395. International Telecommunications Convention of 1959, art. 17, 12 U.S.T. 2377,
2525, T.I.A.S. No. 4893. But of. Cryan & Crane, supra note 380, at 864 ("The ITU has
not sought to regulate airwave piracy, and therefore is not a promising forum for
satellite signal carriers seeking to stem signal theft").
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the satellite is not intended."' "
(b) Reception With Consent of Originator
(i) The FC's Position: Such Reception Is Illegal Unless
Authorized by the FCC
If someone in the United States receives programming from
a foreign satellite" with the consent of the originator, does the
reception violate United States law? The Federal Communica-
tions Commission says it does, unless the FCC has given its own
consent.
The FCC first took this position in a 1979 decision in which it
lifted its regulation of receive-only satellite earth-stations (i.e.,
dish antennas).3 " The Commission recounted that domestic
satellite service had been initiated in the United States at the
end of 1973, and by early 1977 its growth had become explo-
sive.3" Early receive-only earth stations, being very expensive,
were installed primarily by common carriers to serve multiple
users.4"° But the technology and the equipment market ad-
vanced quickly, and in 1975 the FCC first authorized a cable
system to construct an earth station for its own private use."°
A flood of similar applications followed, and the FCC progres-
396. Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals
Transmitted by Satellite, art. 4(i), (lii) (ratified by United States in October 1984),
reprinted in 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 723, art. 4(i), (iii) [hereinaf-
ter Brussels Satellite Convention]. However, the Convention provides broad excep-
tions. Member states need not prohibit unauthorized reception of signals carrying
"reports of current events," used for instructional purposes, quoted in accordance
with "fair practice," or distributed "solely for the purpose of teaching ... ." Id. at art.
4(1), (ii), (iii). Ratification of the Brussels Convention was considered by the U.S.
Copyright Office and other federal agencies to require no new legislation in the
United States; section 605 of the Communications Act, now section 705, together with
the copyright laws, was regarded as adequate implementing legislation. See 1983
Hearings, supra note 371, at 32-33 (statement of David Ladd). See generally Cryan &
Crane, supra note 380, at 871-74.
397. References to "foreign satellites" mean domestic or regional satellites of for-
eign nations and do not include INTELSAT satellites. See supra notes 380-83 and
accompanying text.
398. Reregulation of Domestic Receive-Only Satellite Earth Stations, First Report
and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1979) [hereinafter Earth Stations]; see also Amendment of
Parts 73 and 97, Report and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 32, para. 34 (1985) [hereinafter Re-
broadcasts]; Transborder Satellite Video Services, Memorandum Opinion, Order and
Authorization, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, para. 61 (1981).
399. 74 F.C.C.2d at para. 6.
400. Id.
401. Florida Cablevision, Order and Authorization, 54 F.C.C.2d 881 (1975); see
Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 6.
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sively streamlined its procedures. In 1977, it dropped the re-
quirement that earth-station licensees obtain FCC approval to
receive specific programming from a domestic satellite.' In
1979, the FCC deregulated receive-only earth-stations alto-
gether, ruling that a license was no longer necessary to con-
struct and operate one.4°s
But this did not mean, the FCC declared, that an earth-sta-
tion operator could receive programming from a foreign satel-
lite, even with the consent of the originator, without
governmental permission. The Commission said that the treaty
obligations of the United States under the INTELSAT Agree-
ment stood in the way.404 Under section XIV(d) of the Agree-
ment, a signatory nation intending to use satellite-related
facilities separate from the INTELSAT system for the purpose
of international telecommunications must first notify and con-
sult with INTELSAT, in order to assure technical compatibility
and "to avoid significant economic harm to the global system of
INTELSAT."'405 Only after such consultation has taken place,
and INTELSAT's Assembly of Parties has responded with its
recommendations, may the proposed non-INTELSAT opera-
tion go forward.406 The FCC noted these treaty obligations and
continued:
Thus, any deregulation of receive-only earth stations does not
imply permission to receive service from non-U.S. domestic
satellites .... Such permission can be provided only after dis-
charge of our treaty obligations to INTELSAT. Therefore, un-
til such permission is granted, any reception of non-U.S. signals
is unauthorized and subject to the sanctions of Section 605 [of
the Federal Communications Act].40 7
(ii) Evaluation of the FCC's Position
The FCC's position evidently is respected by earth-station op-
erators. At least one such operator does seek permission from
the FCC, subject to the consultation process with INTELSAT,
402. Florida Cablevision, Memorandum Opinion, 67 F.C.C.2d 339 (1977); see Earth
Stations, supra note 398, at paras. 6-7.
403. Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 7.
404. 1& at para 35 n.27; see T.I.A.S. No. 7532; see supra note 381.
405. T.I.A.S. No.7532 at art. XIV (d); Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35
n.27.
406. Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35 n.27.
407. Id. See also Rebroadcasts, supra note 398, at para 34 (INTELSAT Agreement
"protected in the U.S. through enforcement of section 705").
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in order to receive programming from a foreign satellite with
the consent of the originator.4m It is not clear, however, where
the FCC gets the legal authority for its position.
The FCC seems to rely basically on the INTELSAT Agree-
ment. Since that Agreement provides that permission to re-
ceive international telecommunications service from a non-
INTELSAT satellite can be granted "only after discharge of
our treaty obligations to INTELSAT," the FCC reasons that
"until such permission is granted, any reception of non-U.S. sig-
nals is unauthorized and subject to the sanctions of Section
605."'4  One must ask whether this reasoning is sound.
The reception of signals from a foreign satellite by a person
in the United States, with the consent of the originator but
without the permission of the U.S. government pursuant to the
INTELSAT Agreement, might indeed violate the obligations of
the United States under that Agreement. Article XIV (d)
requires that the consultation process first be pursued "[t]o the
extent that any Party or Signatory or person within the juris-
diction of a Party" intends to use non-INTELSAT facilities for
international telecommunications. 10 It does not follow, how-
ever, that non-INTELSAT reception by a person in the United
408. See, e.g., In the Matter of Cable News Network, Inc., Memorandum Opinion,
Order and Authorization, File No. 907-DSE-L-85, May 14, 1985 (application for au-
thority to construct and operate a receive-only earth-station in the domestic fixed-
service, to be located in Atlanta, Georgia, to receive signals from all domestic commu-
nications satellites as well as the Soviet Union's GHORIZONT STATIONS 4 and 7
satellites); Rebroadcasts, 101 F.C.C.2d at para. 6 Comments of Turner Broadcasting
System [hereinafter Turner Comments]; see also infra notes 489-502 and accompany-
ing text
In addition to the various requests by Cable News Network, in February 1987,
Orbita Technologies Corp., a company specializing in the reception of programming
from Soviet domestic satellites, filed a similar request with the FCC. Orbita asked the
FCC for permission to downlink programming from Soviet satellites, with the permis-
sion of the Soviets, on behalf of Discovery Channel, a cable programming service that
proposed to retransmit 66 hours of the Soviet programming during one week to its 14
million cable subscribers in the United States. BROADCASiNG, Feb. 16, 1987, at 53-54,
97. The FCC denied permission, saying the request had been made too late for the
required INTELSAT coordination. Id at 97. Although Orbita contended that it did
not need FCC permission, because the reception "would cause no economic harm to
Intelsat," Orbita and Discovery bowed to the FCC's ruling and sought to obtain the
programming through INTELSAT satellites instead. BROADCASTING, Feb. 23,1987, at
96. As a result of heavy INTELSAT traffic, they received only 28 hours of "live"
programming, and Discovery used tapes for the rest of the hours. Id See also infra
notes 497, 505.
409. Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35 n.27.
410. INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No.
7532 (1973) (emphasis added).
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States would violate U.S. domestic law. Article XIV (d) mani-
fests no intention to be self-executing.411 Indeed, it is doubtful
that a treaty can be self-executing so as to impose criminal
sanctions under U.S. law without an implementing Act of
Congress.1
The FCC purports to find such implementing legislation in
section 605 (now section 705) of the Communications Act. Re-
ception of non-U.S. satellite signals without official permission
given pursuant to the INTELSAT process, the FCC says, "is
unauthorized and subject to the sanctions of section 605. ' '413
The FCC appears never to have indicated which provision of
section 605 (now section 705) it relies on.41' Apparently the
FCC reads section 705 as a general prohibition of "unauthor-
ized" reception of radio communications, and then concludes
that reception lacking government approval pursuant to the
INTELSAT Agreement is "unauthorized."'1 5 But, lengthy and
411. A treaty is self-executing if it "manifests an intention that its provisions shall
be effective under the domestic law of the parties at the time it comes into effect."
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, SECOND, § 154(2)
(1965); see also Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Se(f-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Posta"
Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-87 (1980) ("whether the treaty aims at
the immediate creation of rights and duties of private individuals which are enforcea-
ble and to be enforced by domestic tribunals"); id. at 898 n.29 ("the treaty must... be
specific enough not to need further concretization by domestic action").
412. 'TPreaty regulations that penalize individuals... are generally considered to
require domestic legislation before they are given any effect." Hopson v. Kreps, 622
F.2d 1375,1380 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsT-
TUTION 159 (1972)). See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, SECOND, § 141(3) (1965) (treaty cannot be self-executing to extent it involves
"governmental action that under the Constitution can be taken only by the Con-
gress"); Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Rela.
tions: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CAL. L. REv. 643, 651 (1937) (listing
the appropriation of money and the imposition of penalties for criminal offenses as
two examples of such governmental action); The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
151, 171-72 (1821); see also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 877 & authorities cited
therein (5th Cir. 1979).
413. Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35 n.27; accord, Rebroadcasts, supra
note 398, at para. 34; Transborder Satellite Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, para. 44 n.26
(1981).
414. Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35 n.27; Rebroadcasts, supra note 398,
at para. 84.
415. See Transborder Satellite Services, 88 F.C.C. 2d at para. 44 n.26:
The Communications Act, in Section 605, prohibits the unauthorized inter-
ception and disclosure of interstate or foreign radio-communications except
those designated as broadcasts for use by the general public.... After com-
pletion of the INTELSAT coordination process, and with the bilateral con-
currence of the foreign government, Section 605 will not stand as an
impediment to the reception of transborder television programming at U.S.
receive-only earth stations.
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opaque as section 705 is, there is nothing in it that can reason-
ably be read as prohibiting reception with the consent of the
sender.4' 6 Moreover, explicit language would be required since
section 705 is a criminal statute, to be strictly construed.411
There would also be first amendment problems in making
the reception of a foreign satellite signal illegal where the
sender has given consent. In Lamont, the Supreme Court
struck down a less onerous burden on incoming speech, the re-
quirement that the addressee send in a postcard request in or-
der to receive mail from abroad.418 True, the communication
there was by mail rather than radio, and the use of radio fre-
quencies traditionally has justified greater regulation.419 Fur-
ther, the United States has a substantial interest in complying
with its treaty obligations to INTELSAT. On the other hand,
the first amendment interests at stake here could be stronger
than in Lamont - if, for example, the signals from the foreign
satellite carried news coverage, and the receiving entity was a
news organization wanting to retransmit that news in the
IC
416. Too long and wordy to quote in full, section 705(a) is more usefully summa-
rized. Its first sentence prohibits any person receiving a communication from divulg-
ing its contents, "except through authorized channels," to "any person other than the
addressee," or a person employed to forward the communication, or on demand of
lawful authority. The second sentence provides that "[n]o person not being author-
ized by the sender shall intercept" any communication and divulge its contents. The
third sentence provides: "No person not being entitled thereto shall receive" any
communication and use it "for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not enti-
tled thereto." The fourth sentence provides that "[n]o person having received any
intercepted radio communication" shall divulge its contents or use it for his own bene-
fit. The fifth and last sentence provides that the section shall not apply to "any radio
communication which is transmitted by any station for the use of the general public
.... " 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985).
The FCC conceivably might rely on the third sentence, arguing that a person is not
"entitled" to receive a signal from a foreign satellite, although he has the consent of
the sender, if he does not also have the permission of the FCC given after compliance
with the INTELSAT Agreement. But some specific language should be necessary,
especially in a criminal statute, to establish that permission must come from the gov-
ernment and not just the sender. The third sentence seems more reasonably read as
the twin of the second sentence - prohibiting reception where the second sentence
prohibits interception, in both cases without the consent of the sender.
417. See United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1973); Brandon v. United
States, 382 F.2d 607, 611 (10th Cir. 1967); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 111
(1957).
418. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305-07 (1965); see supra text ac-
companying notes 20-25.
419. See, eg., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-78 (1984); supra
note 248 and accompanying text.
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United States.420
Thus, if the U.S. Congress had passed a law requiring FCC
permission for reception of programming from a foreign satel-
lite with the consent of the sender, a substantial constitutional
question would be presented. Congress has not passed such a
law, but the FCC interprets section 705 as though it had. This
position is untenable.
(c) Examples of U.S. Reception of Foreign Satellite
Signals
Against that background, some current examples of foreign-
satellite reception in the United States pose interesting legal
questions.
(i) Backyard Dish Reception
By mid-1986 more than 1.5 million homes in the United
States had their own earth stations-"backyard dishes"-to re-
ceive television programs from satellites.421 The satellites at
which these dishes are pointed include foreign satellites.2 2
Since dish owners normally lack the consent of the signal's
originator, their reception of satellite signals has been assumed
to violate section 705 of the Federal Communications Act, as
that section stood prior to the 1984 "satellite cable program-
ming" amendment.4 23  The questions arise whether that
amendment covers reception of signals from foreign satellites,
or whether other protection for such reception can be found in
section 705.
The 1984 amendment provides a specific exemption from sec-
tion 705 for reception of satellite signals by home-earth-
stations. It exempts the reception of "any satellite cable pro-
gramming for private viewing" unless the signal is scrambled
420. See supra note 408; infra notes 489-517 and accompanying text.
421. BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1986, at 74.
422. See, e.g., Sky's the Limit on Home Sales of Satellite Dishes, San Francisco
Chron., June 10, 1985, at 20 col. 1 ("Programming includes commercial-free feeds
from the major networks, foreign broadcasts and even pay-TV channels such as those
offering first-run movies"); D'Anustasio, Nyetwork TV America Tunes in Soviet
Broadcasts, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
423. See supra note 389, infra notes 424-31, and accompanying text. See National
Subscription Television v. S & H T.V., 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Com-
munications v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980); Cryan & Crane, supra note
380, at 859; 130 CONG. REc. 14286 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood on Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984).
[Vol. 9:635
TRANSBORDER SPEECH
or, if it is not scrambled, unless there is a "marketing system"
through which dish owners can buy the right to view the pro-
gramming.4 While most U.S. programmers have responded to
the amendment by scrambling their satellite-carried signals,42 .
programmers using foreign satellites may not have done so.426
If signals carried by foreign satellites are not scrambled, and
are not subject to a marketing system,427 the question remains
whether the 1984 amendment protects U.S. dish owners in re-
ceiving those signals.
There appears to be nothing in the amendment that pre-
cludes its application to foreign satellites. But the program-
ming must be "satellite cable programming,"42 defined as
programming "primarily intended for the direct receipt by
cable operators for their retransmission to cable subscribers." 429
This test apparently would protect U.S. reception of some sig-
nals carried by Canadian satellites, which evidently are trans-
mitted to Canadian "cable operators" similar to cable operators
in the United States.4 °
Where the satellites of other countries are concerned, ques-
tions arise. Must "cable operators" be private entrepreneurs?
Must "cable subscribers" pay separately for the cable service
(as distinct from supporting the government that provides the
service)? An affirmative answer to either question would ex-
clude from the 1984 amendment any programming carried by a
foreign satellite to a government-furnished cable system that
serves all homes in a given area, as may exist in the Soviet
Union and other countries.
There is nothing in the statutory terms "cable operators" or
"cable subscribers," however, that indicates any such limita-
424. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1985), Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 5(a), 6(a), 98 Stat. 2802, 2804
(1984).
425. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1986, at 74 (most major cable programmers will
have scrambled their satellite feeds by early 1987); BROADCASTING, Feb. 2, 1987, at 9
(CBS broadcast network sets July 1987 date to begin scrambling its satellite feed to its
affiliates).
426. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 443-46, 500-02 (reception of unscram-
bled Soviet programming); supra note 408.
427. The purpose of the amendment presumably would require that the marketing
system be available to viewers in the United States.
428. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1985).
429. IM § 705(c)(1).
430. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 371, at 20 (statement of David Ladd, Register of
Copyrights).
19871
COMM/ENT L. J.
tions.4 s ' In addition, no reason appears why the purpose of the
amendment-to make cable programming available for home
dish reception, unless the signal is scrambled or a marketing
plan provided--does not apply to programming destined for a
state-run and state-funded cable operation in another country.
What then if the programming carried by the foreign satellite
is distributed in the foreign country, not by cable, but by broad-
cast stations? In this situation the 1984 amendment clearly
does not apply. It may be suggested, however, that the home-
dish reception now is protected by the proviso to section 705,
which exempts reception of "any radio communication which is
transmitted by any station for the use of the general public. ' 4"4
The argument would be that since broadcasting is defined by
the Communications Act as radio communications "intended to
be received by the public,"'  satellite transmissions that result
in conventional broadcasts are "for the use of the general pub-
lic" under the proviso.434
In support of the argument, it can be said that nothing in the
statutory language prevents treating the broadcast-bound satel-
lite signal as a transmission "for the use of the general public,"
especially when the broadcast proceeds simultaneously with re-
ception of the signal by the broadcast station. Further, broad-
cast networks, like cable networks, are able to protect their
satellite signals by scrambling them.4w If they fail to do so,
why shouldn't their signals be fair game in the open sky for
home dishes?4s6
431. "[Cable operators" easily includes a government cable operation. "[Clable
subscribers" can mean separately-paying subscribers, but can just as well mean the
people who receive, and are entitled to receive, the cable service.
432. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985).
433. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1985); see National Subscription Television v. S & H T.V.,
644 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Chartwell Communications v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d
459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980).
434. Conventional broadcasts are distinguishable in this respect from subscription
broadcasts (STV) intended only for paying subscribers. It may further be argued, with
respect to some countries, that satellite transmissions destined for cable or other non-
broadcast distribution are likewise "for the use of the general public." See infra note
454.
435. See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
436. The argument can claim inferential policy support in the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 4573 '(1986). This act, while
amending the federal anti-wiretapping laws to reach unauthorized interception of
new communications technologies, excludes from its coverage the interception of an
unscrambled satellite signal "transmitted... to a broadcasting station for purposes of
retransmission to the general public," provided that the interception is not "for the
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain." Id.
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Still further, the Communications Act, through its definition
of "broadcasting" and its exemption for signals transmitted
"for the use of the general public," arguably embodies a policy
of enabling members of the public to have access somehow to
broadcast programming. This policy may be offended if mem-
bers of the U.S. public are prohibited from receiving at their
home-earth-stations, for private viewing, broadcast-bound pro-
grams from foreign satellites, when satellite reception is the
only way those programs can be received in the United
States. -
But the argument confronts major problems. The home-
earth-station receives the signal from the satellite. At that
point the signal is not being broadcast, but is being transmitted
point-to-point to the broadcast station. Point-to-point transmis-
sion, as distinct from broadcasting, probably was intended to be
outside the section 705 proviso.' Moreover, the argument
would have to apply also to reception of broadcast-network pro-
gramming from United States domestic satellites. Such an in-
terpretation of the proviso, making it applicable to "satellite
broadcast programming," would seem contrary to the limited
congressional intent behind the 1984 "satellite cable-program-
ming" amendment.' This is especially so because the satellite
§ 101(d)(2), 100 Stat. 4577 (1986). The legislative history makes clear, however, that
the act does not authorize any conduct that violates section 705(a) of the Communica-
tions Act. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1986); 132 CONG. REC. 14,
452-53 (daily ed. Oct. 2,1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias); Rice, supra note 389, at 437-
38.
437. One may reply, however, that if U.S. viewers are too remote to receive the
foreign broadcasts, they are not within the "public" that was intended to have access
to those broadcasts under either the definition of "broadcasting" or the section 705
proviso.
438. See Cryan & Crane, supra note 380, at 859 (section 705, with limited exemp-
tion for reception of satellite cable programming, "covers theft of. . . 'point-to-point'
radio messages"). In 1979, the FCC held, and a federal district court agreed, that
transmissions by amateur radio operators were not as a general rule "for the use of
the general public" under the proviso, in large part because they were point-to-point
transmissions. In the Matter of James Reston, Jr., FOIA, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 662, paras. 12-13 (1979); Reston v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697, 701 n.3,
702 (D.D.C. 1980). As a result, section 605 was amended in 1982 to make clear that
reception of amateur transmissions is within the proviso: "any radio communication
which is transmitted by any station for the use of the general public, which relates to
ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress, or which is transmitted by an amateur
radio station operator or by a citizens band radio operator." 47 U.S.C. § 705(a); see
Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-259 (1982); S. REP. No. 191,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1981); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60
(1982).
439. See 130 CONG. REc. 14286,14287 (statement of Sen. Packwood) ('This authori-
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feeds of the major U.S. broadcast networks lack the commer-
cials that the local stations insert in the programming.' 0 Re-
ception of the program signals direct from the satellite thus
would undermine the broadcast marketing scheme, a result
Congress did not intend."'
For these reasons, the argument that the section 705 proviso
protects home-dish reception of broadcast-bound programming,
whether received from foreign or from U.S. domestic satellites,
must be rejected.44
(ii) Reception for Academic Purposes
Legally-questionable reception of foreign satellite signals is
also found increasingly at American universities. According to
a 1984 report, "Columbia University has announced that it is
receiving up to fifteen hours a day of live television programs
broadcast internally in Russia."'  Having installed an eleven-
foot rooftop dish antenna to receive signals from four domestic
satellites of the Soviet Union, Columbia reportedly was using
the programs for research and teaching purposes."4 According
to a November, 1986 Wall Street Journal article, a growing
number of American universities, cable systems, U.S. govern-
ment officials, and private individuals were receiving Soviet
programming." 5 So far as appears, only one of these receivers
had obtained the consent of the Soviet originator." 6
zation is carefully designed as a specific, limited exception to the general liability asso-
ciated with unauthorized use"); Rice, supra note 389, at 426, 433, 438-39.
440. See San Francisco Chron., June 10, 1985, at 20 col. 1, quoted supra note 422;
Rice, supra note 389, at 434-35.
. 441. See supra note 439. Q. National Subscription Television v. S & H T.V., 644
F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1981) (decoding of STV signals would undermine STY market-
ing scheme).
442. The possibility of a first amendment right to receive satellite programming is
considered in the text accompanying notes 437-61 infra.
443. BROADCASTING, Nov. 5, 1984, at 79.
444. Id.
445. D'Anustasio, Nyetwoork TV: America Tunes In Soviet Broadcasts, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 4. The article reported that five small companies had been
formed "to build and market Soviet TV reception stations and the software to run
them." Id. Some 15 universities already had the receivers (which sold from $10,000 to
$100,000); a dozen more universities planned to buy them in 1987; and "[p]romoters
claim no fashionable campus will be without Moscow TV in a few more years." Id.
The United States Information Agency began receiving the signals in June 1986.
Meanwhile ten cable companies in large cities, including New York, were planning to
carry one week of Soviet programming to test the market. Id.
446. The Wall Street Journal reported that one private individual operating an
earth-station had asked the Soviets for permission and received it, in return for ar-
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University reception of foreign-satellite programming may
differ from home-earth-station reception in at least two legal
respects. First, the universities are engaged in an educational
and scientific endeavor. If Columbia University was sued by
the Soviets for copyright infringement in receiving the satellite
programming, and if the Soviets otherwise had a valid claim
under U.S. copyright law, the educational, scientific, and non-
profit nature of Columbia's activity might well provide a "fair
use" defense.447 It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets would
have a good claim in the first place. The Copyright Act ex-
empts the "public reception" of a television transmission "on a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes. 14" Notwithstanding the technical sophistication of the
antenna used by Columbia to receive the Soviet program-
ming," 9 the receiving sets on which the programs are shown
may well be of a kind commonly used in private homes.450
If the Soviets have no case against Columbia under the Copy-
right Act, they still may have a private action for violation of
section 705 of the Communications Act.4' Here a second dif-
ference between Columbia and the home-earth-station cuts
against the university. To the extent that the Soviet program-
ming is distributed to viewers in the U.S.S.R. by cable systems,
home-earth-station owners in the U.S. probably are protected
ranging a study of American reactions to Soviet television. Id. at 29, col. 4. More
recently it was reported that Orbita Technologies Corp., a company that markets
equipment for receiving programming from Soviet satellites and that had provided an
installation to Columbia University since 1984, in spring 1986 "received permission...
from the Soviet government to downlink anything it wanted from [Soviet MOLNIYA
satellites] for educational purposes." BROADCASTING, Feb. 16, 1987, at 53.
447. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), (4) (1985); 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (exemption for transmis-
sion of a work as part of "the systematic instructional activities of a ... nonprofit
educational institution," but limited to nondramatic works). See also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2225-27 (1985).
448. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1987); see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87
(1976); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975).
449. See Wall St. J., supra note 445; BROADCASTING, Feb. 16, 1987, at 53 (Soviet
MOLNIYA satellites, received at Columbia, are in eccentric polar orbit instead of geo-
stationary orbit, which required development of software to track the satellites and
switch from one to another as each became operational).
450. It might also be argued that any performance at Columbia is not "public" (see
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1987)). But the argument would seem precluded by the act's defi-
nition of "publicly" as "at a place open to the public or at any place where a substan-
tial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1987).
451. See 47 U.S.C. § 705(d)(3) (1985). The U.S. government might also bring a civil
or criminal action against Columbia for violating section 705. See 47 US.C. § 705(d)(1)
(1985).
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in receiving the satellite signals by the 1984 amendment to sec-
tion 705.452 A university, however, could not claim this protec-
tion. The amendment is limited to "private viewing," defined
as viewing for private use "in an individual's dwelling unit.""
Unconsented reception of Soviet signals by an American uni-
versity thus would seem to violate section 705, unless it could
find protection in the "use of the general public" proviso.4M As
indicated earlier, that proviso probably does not protect the re-
ception of signals being transmitted point-to-point, but only
those being broadcast.4" Hence, even if the signals ultimately
are distributed to the Soviet public by broadcasting, the univer-
sity's reception of them from the Soviet satellite, without the
consent of the originator, would still appear to violate section
705.456
Are there any other defenses for the university? Perhaps the
first amendment provides a right of access to unscrambled sat-
ellite signals, when the signals carry the basic television pro-
gramming of a nation and when that programming otherwise
would be inaccessible for study in the United States. 7
Whether or not the "free flow" principle supports a right to
broadcast into a country without that country's consent,45 it
452. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b)-(c) (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 424-31.
453. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b)-(c)(4) (1985).
454. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985); see supra notes 391, 432-36, and accompanying text.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 438-41.
456. See supra notes 438-42 and accompanying text. U' the reception of satellite
signals were within the proviso when the signals ultimately are distributed to the
public by broadcasting, one might argue, in the context of Soviet signals, that the
proviso should apply regardless of the mode of distribution. In the American context,
only broadcasting is considered to be "for the use of the general public," while cable
and other distribution modes are considered commercial, subscriber-supported, lim-
ited-audience enterprises. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1987); National Subscription Televi-
sion v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 823; Statement of Senator Packwood, 130 CONG. REc.
14286, supra note 387. In the Soviet Union, however, it may be that all modes of
program distribution are state-provided and available generally to the public in the
area served. If so, any programming transmitted by a Soviet satellite would be for the
use of the general public. This theory would protect reception not only by universi-
ties, but by anyone in the United States. (Cable systems that retransmitted the Soviet
programs would remain liable for copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)).
The theory still founders, however, on the likely inapplicability of the section 705
proviso to signals being transmitted point-to-point. See supra notes 438-42 and accom-
panying text.
457. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (first amend-
ment right of access to criminal trials); id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describes
decision as holding that "an arbitrary interference with access to important informa-
tion" abridges first amendment).
458. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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may support a right, protected against the U.S. government by
the first amendment, to receive from any country television
programming transmitted to the public there. 9
But the claim seems too broad, vague, and novel to stand in-
dependently on a first amendment foundation. There is no sat-
isfactory way to define and limit the programming to which the
right of access would apply.4° There is no stopping place short
of an unfettered right to receive from any satellite any un-
scrambled signal carrying "programming." While program-
mers indeed can scramble their signals,41 and the day may
come when unscrambled satellite signals are viewed as in the
public domain, it is hard to believe that the first amendment
already goes so far.
The first amendment interest in university reception of So-
viet programming might be accommodated, however, in an-
other, more flexible way. If the educational and nonprofit
character of the university's use of the programs would support
a fair-use defense to a Soviet claim of copyright infringe-
ment,4 a fair-use defense might be read into section 705 as
well.
459. As one indication of international norms, the Brussels Satellite Convention,
see supra note 396 and accompanying text, obligates each signatory to take action
against "the distribution on or from its territory of any program-carrying signal by
any distributor for whom the signal emitted to or passing through the satellite is not
intended." Brussels Satellite Convention, art. 2 (emphasis added). The Convention
apparently contemplates no action against the simple reception of satellite signals by
home viewers.
460. One may ask whether satellite-carried cable programming, if unscrambled,
would thus be made available by the first amendment for nonprivate viewing, over-
riding section 705. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a)-(c); see supra notes 424-27 and accompanying
text. Or whether reception of unscrambled satellite feeds of the U.S. broadcast net-
works, free of local commercials, would thus become a constitutional right. See supra
notes 438-42 and accompanying text. Or how "scrambling" is to be defined for consti-
tutional purposes, and why the constitutional right should not extend to the decoding
of "scrambled" signals, at least if this can readily be done with commonly available
equipment.
461. See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
462. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
463. The fair-use defense originally was read into copyright law by the courts. See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2225 (1985). It is
true that section 705 is not limited to copyright considerations. It is aimed not simply
at the taking of the material, but at the way it is taken- by intercepting a communi-
cation without the consent of the sender. See 47 U.S.C. § 705 (a). One would not want
to give a wiretapper a fair-use defense under section 705 based on his educational,
nonprofit use of the material overheard. In the case of unscrambled signals received
from a satellite, however, the element of eavesdropping is much more attenuated.
With more than 1.5 million satellite dishes operating in the United States alone, see
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Just as the fair-use defense to copyright infringement re-
flects first amendment interests,' a fair-use defense under
section 705 could vindicate the interest in access to a nation's
television programming.' Fair-use could provide a suitably
flexible vehicle under section 705, just as it does in copyright
law. It could protect reception of satellite programming for
"nonprofit, educational purposes," but not reception "of a com-
mercial nature." ' It could take into account the effect of the
signal reception on the "potential market" for the program-
ming.467 On this basis the reception of Soviet programming,
distributed free across an entire nation, might be protected,
while liability was retained for reception of programming dis-
tributed by cable systems or other market-based modes.4
There is, however, a substantial obstacle to reading a fair-use
defense into section 705. Congress has expressly included in
section 705 two "fair use" provisions-for "private viewing" of
"satellite cable programming"'  and for reception of signals
transmitted "for the use of the general public."470 Especially
since the section was amended in this context as recently as
1984,471 it is fair to infer that no further exceptions were in-
tended. 2 Thus, while the question is debatable, respect for
congressional intent should restrain the courts from reading a
fair-use defense into section 705.
Still, a fair-use defense would represent sound public policy.
A country's television programming today provides an indis-
pensable window into its culture, politics, language, and its soci-
supra note 421 and accompanying text, the reasonable expectation of privacy for an
unscrambled signal would seem quite limited. . United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977) (no justified expectation of privacy as against border search).
464. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2230
(1985).
465. See supra notes 432-37 and accompanying text.
466. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
467. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
468. The Brussels Satellite Convention takes a fair-use approach to the unauthor-
ized reception of satellite signals. It provides exemptions for reception of satellite
signals carrying "reports of current events," or used for instructional purposes, or
distributed "solely for the purpose of teaching." Brussels Satellite Convention, re-
printed in 28 PAT., TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 723, art. 4(i), (iii); see supra
note 396 and accompanying text.
469. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1985); see supra notes 424-30 and accompanying text.
470. 47 U.S.C. § 705(a) (1985); see supra notes 432-42 and accompanying text.
471. Act of Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 5(a), 6(a), 98 Stat. 2802, 2804 (1984);
see supra notes 424-30 and accompanying text.
472. See statement of Senator Packwood, quoted supra note 439, concerning the
1984 amendment, 130 CONG. REC. 14286, 14287 (1984).
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ety. For those wishing to study and know the country, access to
its television programming is no less important than access to
its newspapers, magazines, or books. When the nationwide,
publicly-distributed programming of the Soviet Union or any
other foreign country is accessible on satellites receivable in the
United States, reception of the satellite signals for purposes of
nonprofit education or research should not violate United
States law. Congress therefore should amend section 705. The
amendment might extend the exception already created for
"private viewing" of "satellite cable programming 473 to cover
private or educational viewing of any satellite-carried program-
ming, if unscrambled. Alternatively, Congress might simply
authorize the courts to apply to the reception of unscrambled
satellite signals under section 705 the same principles of fair-
use that are applied to copyright infringement.
Of course, American universities desiring to receive Soviet
programming might ask the Soviets for permission. In one re-
ported instance where permission was requested from the Sovi-
ets, it was granted.474 But even if permission in all appropriate
cases could be assured, it would not solve the legal problem.
The position taken by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion on reception of signals from foreign satellites means that
the universities would be violating. section 705 even if they had
the Soviets' permission, as long as they did not ,also have the
FCC's permission pursuant to the INTELSAT consultation
process. 475 This FCC interpretation of section 705, erroneous in
any event,476 seems especially wrong-headed here, given the na-
ture of the material being received and the other considerations
that support a fair-use defense. While the FCC's position
stands, however, the consent of the originator does not suffice
to make the reception legal.
(iii) Reception for Retransmission as News
A third current example of U.S. reception of foreign satellite
signals involves reception by a news organization for the pur-
pose of retransmitting the material as news within the United
473. 47 U.S.C. § 705(b) (1985); see supra notes 424-30 and accompanying text.
474. See Wall St. J., supra note 446, at 1, col. 4; see also the report on Orbita Tech-
nologies Corp. receiving an apparently blanket permission from the Soviet govern-
ment to receive programming for educational purposes. Id.
475. See supra notes 397-407 and accompanying text; see also supra note 408.
476. See supra notes 408-20 and accompanying text.
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States. This problem will be considered after examining cases
in which the reception of foreign satellite signals is specifically
permitted by U.S. law. 477
(d) Permitted Reception of Foreign Satellite Signals
Under U.S. Law
In some situations the FCC has authorized the reception in
the United States of programming from foreign domestic satel-
lites. Three such examples are the FCC's Transborder policy,
FCC permission given to Cable News Network for continuing
reception of Soviet signals, and grants of special temporary au-
thority to Cable News Network for coverage of international
news events.
(i) The FCCs Transborder Decision
In its 1981 Transborder decision,478 the FCC permitted own-
ers of earth-stations in the United States to receive program-
ming from Canadian domestic satellites (and simultaneously
permitted U.S. domestic satellite carriers to provide program-
ming to reception points in Canada, as well as in Central
America and the Caribbean). At least some of the proposed re-
ception services,'479 if not all of them,480 had the consent of the
originators. 48
477. See inkfra notes 498-504 and accompanying text.
478. Transborder Satellite Video Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 88
F.C.C.2d 258 (1981).
479. See id. at paras. 5, 14.
480. The FCC did not discuss the consent question, possibly implying that consent
was present in all cases. However, the FCC's 1985 final order approving the services
states that it "does not include the video programming of superstations (WGN, WOR,
and WTBS) and other premium pay services (i.e., Showtime etc.) because of copyright
concerns." In re 220 Television, No. 318-DSE-ML-78, para. 4, n.2., Nov. 22, 1985.
481. The FCC here reiterated its position that reception by a U.S. earth-station of a
signal from a foreign satellite, even with the consent of the sender, would be "unau-
thorized," in violation of section 705 of the Communications Act, if it did not also have
the permission of the FCC after the INTELSAT consultation process. 88 F.C.C.2d at
para. 44 & n.26; see supra notes 397-407 and accompanying text. This time the FCC
sought to bolster the position by relying also on the International Radio Regulations
(I.R.R.), in which the members of the International Telecommunications Union agree
to prevent "the unauthorized interception of radiocommunication not intended for
the general use of the public." 88 F.C.C.2d at para. 44 & n.26 (quoting Ch. VI, Admin-
istrative Provisions for Stations, ITU Radio Regulations, art. 23(a) (1982)). But the
I.R.R. share with the INTELSAT Agreement a lack of apparent intent, and probably
of legal capacity, to impose self-executing criminal sanctions on persons in the U.S.
See supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text. Moreover, the I.R.R. fall short even of
the INTELSAT Agreement in lacking any suggestion that an interception is "unau-
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The FCC determined that the proposed use of U.S. earth-sta-
tions for international service from a nearby country would be
consistent with U.S. law, in particular the Communications Sat-
ellite Act of 1962," and with the U.S. commitment to INTEL-
SAT and its global satellite system.4" As suggested by the U.S.
State Department, the FCC applied two tests for determining
whether use of non-INTELSAT facilities for an international
service should be approved: (1) whether the INTELSAT global
system could not provide the service, or (2) whether it would be
clearly uneconomical or impractical for that service to use the
INTELSAT system.' The Commission found that INTEL-
SAT was technically able to provide the transborder services
over its satellites, but that the use of INTELSAT facilities for
these services would be "uneconomical,... impractical and un-
desirable. ' '4a5 The FCC's decision was not final, but required
that the consultation process under Article XIV (d) of the IN-
TELSAT Agreement be pursued before the transborder service
could begin.4s6 This process took four years, reaching comple-
tion (and approval) at the October 1985 meeting of the INTEL-
SAT Assembly of Parties.4 7 In November 1985, the FCC issued
final grants of authority for the transborder services. s
(ii) FCC Approval for Continuing Reception from Soviet
Satellites
In another approval of foreign satellite reception, the FCC
has given permission to an American news organization, Cable
News Network (CNN), to receive signals from Soviet satellites.
In February 1985, CNN sought FCC permission to receive at its
Atlanta, Georgia, earth station, within the footprint of one of
the Soviet Union's GHORIZONT satellites, news programming
transmitted on the satellite by the Soviet-bloc news agency,
Intervision.8 9 With Intervision's consent, CNN planned to
thorized" when it has the consent of the sender but lacks the permission of the gov-
ernment. Compare supra note 410 and accompanying text.
482. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1985).
483. 88 F.C.C.2d at paras. 29-30.
484. Id. at paras. 46-54.
485. Id. at paras. 49-54.
486. Id. at paras. 58-59.
487. See In re 220 Television, No. 318-DSE-ML-78, par. 1, Nov. 22, 1985.
488. See id., paras. 1, 3, 4. The FCC previously had issued some authorizations
based on the January 1985 INTELSAT meeting. Id.
489. Ghorizont, Memorandum Opinion and Order No. 907-DSE-L-85 at paras. 1, 3,
May 14, 1985 (hereinafter Ghorizont].
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extract segments for insertion into its own news program-
ming.490 A few months later, CNN signed a two-year agree-
ment with the U.S.S.R.'s State Committee for Television and
Radio (Gostelradio) to exchange news, entertainment, and
sports programming. 491
In May 1985, the FCC, applying its Transborder standards,
approved CNN's request.4 2 The approval was conditioned on
consultation by the U.S. with INTELSAT pursuant to Article
XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement. It was also made sub-
ject to: (a) possible modification "as a result of consultation
with the Secretary of State on foreign, political and related
matters"; and (b) "express immediate revocation without hear-
ing" if the FCC, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
should determine that revocation was "in the public and na-
tional interest. ' 493
In October 1985, the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties ap-
proved the CNN proposal. 494 Meanwhile, the State Depart-
ment had also approved, but subject to two added conditions:
(a) that CNN be required to submit to the FCC and the State
Department "a report covering the first five months of usage of
the Soviet signal in terms of CNN air time and CNN's under-
standing of any Soviet use of CNN news programming"; and (b)
that the license be granted for only six months, "with renewal
requiring a favorable foreign policy finding made by the De-
partment of State. '495
In November 1985, the FCC, though noting that the six-
month term would be "considerably shorter than the term that
can be granted under the Communications Act," decided to
"defer to the State Department because of the important for-
eign policy considerations that are involved here.' '4 1 It thus
gave final approval to CNN's application on the conditions pro-
posed by the State Department.
490. Id. at para. 3.
491. BROADCASTING, June 3, 1985, at 129.
492. Ghorizont, supra note 489 at paras. 6-10.
493. Id. at para. 11.
494. Id. at para. 3.
495. Id. The State Department's determination would be based in part on CNN's
report. Id.
496. Id.
497. See id. at paras. 4-10. Subsequently, CNN asked the FCC for a six-month ex-
tension of the license, explaining that the earth-station had not yet been constructed
because the planned site had proved unavailable. In September 1986, the FCC
granted the extension. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 907-DSE-L-85, Sept. 22, 1986.
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(iii) Special Temporary Approvals for News Coverage
The FCC also has sometimes granted "special temporary au-
thority" (STA) to receive a foreign satellite signal for the pur-
pose of news coverage of a particular event. In 1984, the
Commission granted an STA to Turner Broadcasting System
(parent of Cable News Network) to receive coverage from Can-
ada's Anik B satellite of the Pope's visit to Canada. 4" In this
and other cases involving Canada, the FCC found that no fur-
ther steps were necessary. Bilateral coordination was provided
by a 1982 exchange of letters between the U.S. and Canada gov-
erning transborder use of U.S. and Canadian domestic satel-
lites, and INTELSAT coordination was provided by
INTELSAT's approval in 1982 of U.S.-Canada transborder
services.
In 1984, the FCC granted Turner an STA to receive coverage
of the Soviet bloc's "Friendship Games" from a Soviet satel-
lite.5°° This time it could not be said that INTELSAT coordina-
tion had been accomplished in advance. But the FCC, stressing
the immediacy of the need and the limited duration of the use,
nonetheless made the STA effective immediately, without go-
ing through the INTELSAT process.501 In 1985, the FCC
granted Turner an STA to receive from a Soviet satellite cover-
age of the Soviet Union's fortieth anniversary celebration of
the end of the second world war, again without waiting for the
INTELSAT coordination process.m2
These STA grants have made INTELSAT increasingly un-
happy. INTELSAT charges that the FCC, by its willingness to
In doing so it noted, and adopted, the State Department's further stipulation that
CNN's report on its use of Soviet programming and Soviet use of its programming
must be submitted prior to any renewal of the license. Id. at pars. 5. See supra note
495 and accompanying text.
The State Department reportedly again was instrumental in the FCC's February
1987 action denying permission to Orbita Technologies to receive Soviet programming
for the purpose of retransmission in the United States by the Discovery cable channel.
See supra note 408. The FCC's Common Carrier Bureau reportedly acted "at the
prompting of State Department" in denying the permission on the ground of failure to
go through the INTELSAT consultation process. BROADCASTING, Feb. 23, 1987, at 96.
498. See Turner Comments, supra note 408, at para. 6.
499. See id.; In re applications of Cable News Network, Inc., for modification of
radio station license to add the ANIK-B satellite as a point of communication ("Anik-
B Proceeding"), FCC File Nos. 2409-DSE-ML-84, 2410-DSE-MLA8, para. 5, Dec. 6,
.1984.
500. See Turner Comments, supra note 408, at para. 6 n.2.
501. See id.
502. BROADCASTING, June 3, 1985, at 84.
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bypass the coordination process, demonstrates its lack of under-
standing of U.S. obligations under the INTELSAT Agree-
ment. 3 In INTELSAT's view, it is not the FCC, but only
INTELSAT's Assembly of Parties, acting as part of the coordi-
nation process, that has authority to determine such questions
as economic harm to INTELSAT from the proposed service.5°
This clash between the FCC and INTELSAT over the grant-
ing of STAs illustrates the tension, indeed the fundamental in-
consistency, built into this area of U.S. law. A process requiring
advance approval by the U.S. government, not to mention pro-
tracted coordination with INTELSAT, cannot be squared with
the journalistic demands of reporting news events. Whether
such a process can be squared with the first amendment is con-
sidered next.
(e) Constitutional Problems in the U.S. Law Governing
Reception from Foreign Satellites
There are first amendment problems in a U.S. legal rule that
compels a news organization to apply to the FCC for permission
to carry on-the-scene coverage of particular news events. The
need to get a government license in order to report a news
event would seem to be a classic "prior restraint," forbidden by
the first amendment. 50
503. 1& (reported statement of INTELSAT deputy director).
504. Id.
505. See Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 590 n.17 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,245-50 (1936); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931). Among the different kinds of prior restraint, this
one recalls the licensing scheme of 17th-century England, which the first amendment
was especially intended to repudiate. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 648, 650 (1955); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
The first amendment objections become concrete when the government denies the
permission and thus prevents the broadcasts from taking place as planned. This hap-
pened in February 1987 when the FCC, reportedly at State Department "prompting,"
denied to Orbit a Technologies and the Discovery Channel permission to receive So-
viet programming directly from Soviet satellites for the purpose of retransmission by
Discovery to its 14 million cable viewers. See supra notes 408, 497. As a result, Discov-
ery during that week could transmit only 28 hours of Soviet programming live, in-
stead of 60 or more as planned, and had to use tapes to make up the difference.
BROADCASTING, Feb. 23, 1987, at 96. In addition, Discovery had to pay additional
money for the INTELSAT satellites that the FCC required it to use. Id. These bur-
dens on Discovery's speech may well have been open to constitutional attack. Discov-
ery's project of bringing typical Soviet television programming (including news
programming) to the American public served informational and educational purposes
near the heart of the first amendment. Moreover, the project was put together hur-
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In 1985, the Turner Broadcasting System urged the FCC to
lift the rule. Commenting in an FCC proceeding concerning
the rebroadcasting of radio transmissions,r w Turner sought a
ruling "that it does not violate section 605 to rebroadcast brief
excerpts of programming obtained from foreign satellites, with-
out FCC approval, but with the consent of the signal origina-
tor."5°7 Turner urged the FCC to conclude that "tapping into"
foreign satellite programming for the purpose of retransmitting
brief portions as part of bona fide news programming, with the
consent of the originator, was a "modified fair use" that did not
require INTELSAT coordination at all.508 Alternatively, Tur-
ner said the United States should ask INTELSAT to coordinate
such use by news organizations on a "generic" basis "for all
present and future non-INTELSAT satellites." '
Turner's argument, which was opposed by the Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation (Comsat),510 failed to engage the
FCC. "[T]he issues with respect to United States treaty obliga-
tions and international agreements raised in Turner's request
are beyond the scope of this proceeding," the FCC found, refus-
ing to rule on Turner's request. 1 1 The Commission claimed it
riedly (in just ten days) so that Discovery could present the Soviet progamming in the
same week that the ABC network was presenting a controversial mini-series (Amer-
ika) about life in America after a Soviet take-over. Id. Such journalistic urgency may
well be incompatible with a requirement for prior FCC approval pursuant to the IN-
TELSAT process.
506. Rebroadcasts, supra note 398, at para. 1.
507. Turner Comments, supra note 408, at (i) (Summary). Turner pointed out that
the INTELSAT approval process "can take from one and a half to three years," and
that if Turner bypassed the INTELSAT process it would "risk the sanctions - both
civil and criminal - that could be imposed pursuant to Section 605." Id. at 5, 7. Ac-
knowledging that there were special facilitating arrangements between the U.S. and
Canada, Turner said: "The problem for a U.S. news organization is that news events
are fast-breaking and unpredictable and do not all originate in Canada." Id. at 6.
508. Id. at 7-8. Turner pointed out that in copyright law, "'fair use' can be made of
copyrighted material even without consent of the copyright holder," and said it was
seeking only the ability to use material from foreign satellites with the consent of the
originator but without prior FCC approval. Id. at 7. C. supra text accompanying
notes 462-73 (possible fair-use defense under section 705 without consent of
originator).
509. Turner Comments, supra note 408, at 9 n.3.
510. See Rebroadcasts, supra note 398, at para. 34. Comsat argued that Turner's
request was inconsistent with the FCC's established position on "blanket authority to
intercept foreign satellites," and further that it introduced questions of "United States
treaty obligations and other national and foreign policy interests.. ." that went be-
yond the specified issues in the FCC's proceeding. Id. (Comsat is the designated U.S.
representative to INTELSAT. See 100 F.C.C.2d 250 n.5).
511. Rebroadcasts, supra note 398, at para. 35.
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was taking no position on the request, but noted that "once a
licensee has obtained clear authority from the Commission to
receive and use foreign satellite programming, there is no bar
to rebroadcasting such programming. "112 The implication
seemed clear that licensees like Turner were expected to obtain
that "clear authority from the Commission."
Turner's position, however, was well taken. The first amend-
ment means, the Supreme Court has said, that journalists are
"free to seek out sources of information not available to mem-
bers of the general public," and that "government cannot re-
strain the publication of news emanating from such sources.!' 1 s
When a news organization must get the government's permis-
sion to use on-the-scene television footage obtained abroad
(whether or not it must also wait while the government pur-
sues a diplomatic consultation process) the organization's news
coverage, if not restrained, is delayed and burdened in a way
offensive to the first amendment.1 4
To be sure, the FCC bases its position on the obligations of
the United States under the INTELSAT Agreement.1 5 Rati-
fied treaties like the INTELSAT Agreement are law in the
United States.516 In case of conflict, however, they must give
way to the Constitution.1 7 Such a conflict is presented by the
rule requiring FCC permission before a U.S. news organization
can obtain news coverage from a foreign satellite, even with the
consent of the originator.
512. Id.
513. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). The amendment prevents govern-
ment from "limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). See also United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), off'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1944)
("the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as many differ-
ent facets and colors as is possible"). In FCC v. League of Women Voters of Califor-
nia, 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down a restriction on
editorializing by public broadcasters, noting that editorial opinion "lies at the heart of
First Amendment protection." Id. at 381. News coverage, whether domestic or for-
eign, also lies at the heart of first amendment protection. See, e.g., New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
514. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 609 & n.38 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J.)
(first amendment violated by "every moment's continuance" of a restraint on publica-
tion that did not involve a fast-breaking news story). See also the February 1987 epi-
sode involving the Discovery Channel, supra note 408.
515. See, e.g., Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35 n.27.
516. United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 103 (1801); U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
517. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) (Black, J.).
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(f) The Right to Rebroadcast Programming Received
from a Foreign Satellite
Apart from the right to receive programming from a foreign
satellite, there is a separate question about the right to retrans-
mit that programming in the United States - as Cable News
Network would do, for example, by including excerpts of Soviet
news programming in its own news coverage.518 Until recently,
FCC regulations were confusing on the point.519 But CNN, in
its various applications for FCC permission to receive program-
ming from foreign satellites, apparently has never considered it
necessary to ask separate permission to retransmit the pro-
gramming. Such a requirement might indeed be an impermis-
sible prior restraint, not on the gathering of news, but on its
publication.5 20
In any event, it is now clear that such separate permission is
not required. In a 1985 ruling the FCC stated: "once a licensee
has obtained clear authority from the Commission to receive
and use foreign satellite programming, there is no bar to re-
broadcasting such programming."' 52
On the other hand, in enforcing its policy on foreign-satellite
programming the FCC appears to distinguish between recep-
tion and rebroadcasting. The FCC maintains that reception
alone, if done without FCC approval, is prohibited.52 2 Yet when
various universities and other entities have been described in
the press as engaged in receiving programs from Soviet satel-
lites (evidently without FCC approval),5 23 and have even pub-
licly proclaimed that they were doing so, 524 the FCC, so far as
appears, has taken no action. At the same time, the FCC has
insisted on granting or withholding permission to entities that
seek its approval to receive and retransmit Soviet program-
ming in the United States."2
The distinction draws no support from the FCC's view of the
518. See supra text accompanying notes 490-502.
519. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1207 (b)(4), (c) (1984); see also 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1985).
520. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
521. Rebroadcasts, supra note 398, at para. 35.
522. See supra notes 397-407 and accompanying text.
523. See Wall St. J., supra notes 445-46.
524. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
525. See the FCC rulings on requests by Cable News Network reported supra notes
489-502 and accompanying text. See also the denial of permission to the Discovery
Channel reported supra note 408.
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law.526 Conceivably it is explained by the fact that the retrans-
mitting entities, unlike those that simply receive programs,
have been submissive enough to ask the FCC for approval.
More likely, however, the submissiveness is itself based on a
recognition that the FCC considers the retransmission of for-
eign-satellite programming to be subject to regulation, while
the simple reception of such programming is not.527 Such a
view, lacking any basis in the law as seen by the FCC, would
involve a discrimination against media entities - against enti-
ties that not only receive programming but also transmit it -
that could raise questions under the first amendment.
(g) Summary Concerning U.S. Reception of Signals from
Foreign Satellites
Two points stand out from this examination of U.S. law con-
cerning reception of programming from foreign satellites.
First, reception of such programming in the United States, even
for private viewing at home or for academic purposes, may well
be unlawful under section 705 of the Communications Act if
done without the consent of the originator. It appears to be
lawful only if the reception is for private viewing and if the
programming is distributed in its home country by cable.52 Be-
yond that, one can argue (a) that the reception is lawful be-
cause the programming is transmitted "for the use of the
general public" under the proviso to section 705; or (b) that a
"fair use" defense should be read into section 705 for the recep-
tion of programming used for nonprofit educational purposes.
But both arguments are likely to fail, and should fail, under
section 705 as presently written.5," A first amendment right to
receive unscrambled satellite signals without the consent of the
originator also seems untenable at this time, though one day it
may be recognized.5 °
Second, the FCC claims that reception of foreign satellite sig-
nals with the consent of the originator is illegal under section
705, unless approved by the FCC pursuant to the INTELSAT
526. See supra notes 397-407 and accompanying text.
527. There is also the fact that Turner Broadcasting System, owner of the Cable
News Network, holds a license from the FCC for a valuable television station. See
Turner Comments, supra note 408, at 1.
528. See supra text accompanying notes 424-31.
529. See supra text accompanying notes 432-72.
530. See supra text accompanying notes 457-61.
[Vol. 9:635
TRANSBORDER SPEECH
Agreement. 53l The FCC takes this position even with respect
to reception by a news organization for the purpose of news re-
porting in the United States. 2 The FCC's claim stands on
weak ground, however, both as an interpretation of section 705
and as a restriction of first amendment speech. 5 3
III
Regulation of Speech Flowing Out of the
United States
A. Regulation of Outgoing Information Flow in General
If there is surprisingly little United States law on the applica-
tion of the first amendment to information flowing into the
United States,' there is even less on information flowing out
of the country. There appears to be only one court decision di-
rectly on point, the 1986 ruling by a federal district court in
Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick.5 In that case, involving the U.S.
government's certification of films as "educational" for the pur-
pose of duty-free import to other countries under the Beirut
Agreement,- the court squarely considered "whether the First
Amendment applies with equal force to communications di-
rected toward foreign audiences as it does to domestic
communications."5 7
The U.S. government took the position in Bullfrog Films that
"the exercise of free speech within foreign nations by Ameri-
cans is subordinate to significant foreign policy considerations
and, as such, subject to reasonable regulation."m The court
disagreed. Analyzing Haig v. Agee 539 and other Supreme Court
531. See, e.g., Earth Stations, supra note 398, at para. 35 n.27.
532. See supra notes 489-502 and accompanying text. See also supra note 408.
533. See supra notes 408-20, 505-27, and accompanying text.
534. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
535. 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-6630 (9th Cir.).
536. See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text; infra notes 584-610 and accom-
panying text.
537. 646 F. Supp. at 502.
538. See id. at 503. Previously, in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), see supra text
accompanying notes 92-93, the government had told the Supreme Court that the Sec-
retary of State could refuse to issue a passport to a U.S. citizen who proposed to go to a
foreign nation to denounce U.S. policy toward that nation, since "the freedom of
speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from that that we can exercise in
this context." 453 U.S. at 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting oral argument of
Solicitor General). ..
539. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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"right to travel" cases relied on by the government,5 "4 the court
found that they did not establish a lower level of constitutional
protection for speech by Americans abroad than for domestic
speech.54
1
However that may be, speech by Americans abroad is not
necessarily the same as speech by Americans in the United
States to audiences abroad. When media content flows from
the United States to other countries, what crosses the border is
"pure speech," unencumbered by the movement of persons and
by attendant government powers such as the control of foreign
travel.5" When what enters the United States is speech alone,
like the mail in Lamont,54 the protection afforded by the first
amendment may be substantially stronger than it is, for exam-
ple, when what enters is a live foreign visitor, subject to the
government's power to exclude aliens.5 " Similarly, the consti-
tutional protection of outgoing speech may be stronger when
the speaker remains in the United States, and pure transborder
speech ensues.
Still, the audience is foreign, and this fact arguably undercuts
the first amendment claim. If the chief purpose of the first
amendment is to let truth prevail in the marketplace of
ideas, 5 45 and specifically to enable Americans to enlighten
themselves in order to govern themselves,5" these objectives
arguably do not apply when the audience is foreign. The gov-
ernment thus contended in Bullfrog Films: "the world at large
is not a 'First Amendment forum.' ,,7
540. E.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see 646 F. Supp. at 503-04.
541. Id.
542. ., e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-09.
543. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 20-24.
544. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1971); supra text accom-
panying notes 26-29, 58-71.
545. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREsSION 6 (1970).
546. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1926) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 37-
39 (1948); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
547. 646 F. Supp. at 503 n.16. The government additionally contended, as stated by
the court,
that when United States citizens direct their speech to foreign audiences, the
government may regulate such speech on the basis of content; further, that
the traditional standards for determining if a law is unconstitutionally vague
should be relaxed when foreign audiences are involved, since the govern-
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The government was wrong. When the audience is foreign,
the constitutional protection afforded to speech should not be
diminished. In the first place, what the Constitution protects is
"freedom of speech."'  It would elevate the asserted purpose
of the first amendment over the amendment itself to deny pro-
tection to the speaker or the speech because of the location or
nationality of the audience.m9 Second, facilitating the search
for truth, political or otherwise, is not the only respected pur-
pose of the first amendment. In addition to the social ends
served by freedom of expression, "[sipeech is protected not as a
means to a collective good but because of the value of speech
conduct to the individual." This purpose applies regardless
of the nationality, the location, or perhaps even the existence of
the audience.
Third, the world at large is a first amendment forum. The
interdependence of nations and the worldwide reach of com-
munications media in today's world make the "marketplace of
ideas" no less international than the marketplace of trade.
Political, military, economic, and other decisions made abroad
can affect the United States almost as readily as decisions made
in the United States. Speech conveyed from the United States
to a foreign audience can have an impact, directly or indirectly,
on domestic debate in the United States.m1
ment must be permitted to fashion foreign affairs-related regulations in a
broad manner.
Id. at 503. See also Kamenshine, infra note 583, at 868 ("No reason exists... to permit
purely foreign communication unless we internationalize our concept of the first
amendment or regard foreign pressure on the United States government as part of
self-governance").
548. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
549. As the court in Bul bg Films said with respect to an American speaking
abroad: "the government obviously could not constitutionally prohibit, say, an Ameri-
can professor of political science from expressing his or her opinions before an inter-
national symposium in Paris on the ground that his or her foreign listeners do not
participate in the American political process." 646 F. Supp. at 506-07.
550. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 966 (1978); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring); T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 3-11 (1970); Bullfrog Films, 646 F.
Supp. at 507 ("speech concerning public affairs is more than a tool of self-government;
it is also an essential form of self-expression").
551. O. Bullfrog Films, 646 F. Supp. at 503 n.16 ("matters occurring abroad, e.g.,
government 'news leaks' to the foreign press, are likely to find their way into this
country and become a part of our domestic political debate"). As the Bultftw court
further pointed out, inhibition of a U.S. speaker who is addressing a foreign audience
may "chill" that speaker's future speech to domestic audiences. Id. at 502 n.14. See
also Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1477, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert granted sub nom.
Boos v. Barry, 107 S. Ct. 1282 (Feb. 23, 1987), No. 86-803 (Wald, C. J., dissenting)
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The court in Bullfrog Films, thus, correctly concluded that,
"in the absence of some overriding governmental interest such
as national security, the First Amendment protects communi-
cations with foreign audiences to the same extent as communi-
cations within our borders." 2
Against that background, the following sections review pro-
visions of U.S. law that restrict information flowing out of the
country.m
1. Restrictions on International Mail
A U.S. restriction on incoming mail was held to violate the
first amendment in Lamont v. Postmaster General.- In han-
dling outgoing mail, however, the United States stands ready to
enforce restrictions adopted by other countries.
As one example of this readiness, a provision of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act authorizes the U.S. Post Office to
block politically-inflammatory mail sent by a foreign agent in
the United States to another "American republic" whose law
bars the material.s
More broadly, U.S. willingness to block international mail
undesired by other countries is reflected in provisions of the
Universal Postal Union to which the U.S. has subscribed. The
("there can be no clear-cut division between foreign and domestic political debate-
limiting speech addressed to foreign embassies will inevitably affect the competition
of ideas in the United States").
552. 646 F. Supp. at 502.
553. In addition to the provisions reviewed in the text here, restrictions on the
foreign travel of U.S. citizens, when based on what those citizens may say while
abroad, also constitute controls on information flowing out of the country. See Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), and supra text accompanying notes 87-93; Neuborne & Sha-
piro, supra note 11, at 738-40.
554. 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see upra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
555. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611(j), 618(d) (1979). These sections of FARA provide that if an
"agent of a foreign principal" offers for mailing to "any other American republic"
material that promotes "any racial, social, political, or religious disorder," forceful
conflict, or the forceful overthrow of a government in an American republic, and if
the Postmaster General is informed by the Secretary of State that the diplomatic rep-
resentative of that republic has declared "that the admission or circulation of such
communication or expression in such American republic is prohibited by the laws
thereof and has requested in writing that its transmittal thereto be stopped," the Post-
master General may declare the matter to be nonmailable.
The material described in section 618(d) falls under clause (2) of FARA's definition
of "political propaganda." See 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1979). Unlike the rest of FARA,
which requires the labeling, filing, and reporting of foreign "political propaganda"
distributed in the United States (see 22 U.S.C. § 614; supra text accompanying notes
139-47), this subsection provides for the actual stopping of "political propaganda" on
its way out of the United States.
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United States has agreed through the Universal Postal Union
to refuse to accept for mailing materials that are prohibited by
the destination country.5- Among the prohibitions currently
listed for various countries: Peru will not accept "Communist
propaganda;"557 Indonesia bars printed matter in the Indone-
sian language that was printed outside Indonesia, except for ed-
ucational books approved by the Indonesian Department of
Commerce;m Iran prohibits fashion newspapers;-'  and the So-
viet Union excludes toys "of a military nature" or "in the form
of a military firearm.' '" °
As Dean Price has observed, these regulations "assume that
the United States can constitutionally be party to an interna-
tional agreement for the exchange of information where one
party reserves the right to censor."-"" The regulations may not
be constitutional, at least if the United States itself performs a
censoring or blocking function. While the foreign addressees
may have no first amendment right to receive uncensored mail
from the United States,562 the sender of the mail is a speaker
in the United States who can claim the first amendment's
protection.m
Nonetheless, these regulations have been accepted and
adopted by the U.S. government and are apparently enforced.
They would provide a precedent for agreement by the United
States, for example, to an international DBS convention recog-
nizing rights of receiving states to regulate or help shape in-
556. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, INTERNATIONAL MAIL MANUAL § 131.32
(1986) ("Articles which are prohibited by the destination country, are nonmailable.").
Moreover, mail containing such materials may be returned or seized by the destina-
tion country, "whether or not notice of such prohibition or restriction has been pro-
vided to or published by the Postal Service." Id. at § 131.33.
557. See id. at app. D.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Price, supra note 203, at 891 n.63.
562. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. at 307-08 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (case might be troublesome if it turned on first amendment rights of foreign
senders); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762 (alien speaker has no first amend-
ment right to enter U.S.).
563. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945). f. Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (whatever the merits of prisoner's claim to uncensored corre-
spondence with an outsider, the outsider has first amendment interest in uncensored
correspondence with the prisoner (citing Lamont)); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) (addressees in U.S. have first amendment
right to receive); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762-65 (professors in U.S. may
have first amendment right of access to foreign speaker).
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coming DBS broadcasts.564
2. Export Restrictions
The United States has extensive restrictions on the export of
information considered to have national-security significance.
Under the Arms Export Control Act,- the State Department
has issued regulations limiting the export of classified informa-
tion and of unclassified information related to weapons and
munitions.w Unclassified "technical data" may also require an
export license.5 7 However, these regulations are subject to a
general exemption permitting the export of unclassified infor-
mation in printed form which is available to the public through
newsstands, bookstores, subscriptions, or public libraries.56s
Under the Export Administration Act,59 the Department of
Commerce has issued regulations requiring a license for the ex-
port of a large range of advanced technical information.5 7 0 The
information covered need not be classified, and its technical ap-
plications need not be military.5 71
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,572 the export of a wide
range of information related to nuclear technology is prohib-
ited unless approved by a number of U.S. officials. 73 In United
States v. The Progressive, the government claimed authority
under this act to restrain the publication of unclassified mate-
rial in the public domain concerning atomic technology, publi-
cation of which allegedly threatened "immediate, direct and
irreparable harm to the interests of the United States. 5 75 The
court granted the government's request for an injunction, but
the case was withdrawn when it became evident that the mate-
rial was already publicly known.576
564. See Price, supra note 203, at 890-91.
565. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
566. 22 C.F.R. §§ 125.1-125.10 (1987).
567. Id. at § 125.2.
568. Id. at §§ 125.1(a), 120.18.
569. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. 1987).
570. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.1-399.2 (1987).
571. See id.
572. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (Supp. 1987).
573. 10 C.F.R. § 810.6 (1987).
574. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), dismissed mer., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.
1979).
575. Id. at 991.
576. The Justice Department announced that the publication of similar material
had mooted its attempts to block publication of the Progressive's article. See Knoll,
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Under one or more of these statutes, particularly the Arms
Export Control Act, the U.S. Department of Defense claims the
right to restrict or cancel the presentation of unclassified re-
search papers at international scientific conferences in the
United States.577 The theory is that delivery of a scientific pa-
per to an audience including foreigners constitutes an "export"
of the technical data and hence requires an export license.578
On this basis the government in 1982 forced the cancellation of
at least 100 of the 700 papers scheduled for presentation at an
international symposium of photo-optical engineers,5 79 and
again in 1985 forced the cancellation of at least twelve papers at
a photo-optical conference and limited the attendance by for-
eign scientists at the presentation of other papers.-8° The gov-
ernment also has defined the teaching of certain technical,
though unclassified, information to foreign students as an ex-
port of technical data requiring an export license, and has
warned university professors to use care in such instructionsMl
Many universities have vigorously rejected the government's
efforts,-" but at least one major university has offered a course
open only to U.S. citizens.sea
3. Certification of "Educational" Films for Duty-Free
Import to Other Countries
As discussed earlier,"s under the Beirut Agreement 5ss a per-
son seeking duty-free transborder shipment for audiovisual
materials must apply for a certificate of their educational, sci-
entific, or cultural character from the appropriate agency of the
exporting country.-"6 The certificate is then submitted to the
National Security: The Ultimate Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MINN. L. REV.
161, 163 n.15 (1981).
577. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 740-41.
578. Id. at 741.
579. Id. and authorities cited.
580. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1985, at 11, cols. 5-6 (national ed.).
581. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 741 and authorities cited.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 741-43 & n.98. On the first amendment issues raised by restrictions on
the export of scientific information see id. at 764; Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports
of Ideas and Information: First Amendment Issues, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 863
(1985).
584. See supra text accompanying notes 122-35.
585. 17 U.S.T. 1579, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197 U.N.T.S. 3 (July 15, 1949) (entered into
force for the United States Jan. 12, 1967); see supra notes 122-35 and accompanying
text.
586. Treaty, art. IV, para. 2.
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importing country, which makes its own determination but
must give "due consideration" to the exporting country's
certification.
Under the terms of the treaty, materials shall be deemed of
"educational, scientific and cultural" character:
(a) When their primary purpose or effect is to instruct or
inform through the development of a subject or an aspect of a
subject, or when their content is such as to maintain, increase
or diffuse knowledge, and augment international understand-
ing and goodwill; and
(b) When the materials are representative, authentic, and
accurate; and
(c) When the technical quality is such that it does not inter-
fere with the use made of the material. 5"
In the United States, the President has designated the United
States Information Agency (USIA) to administer the Agree-
ment.-"9 One of the USIA's implementing regulations,59° defin-
ing the materials the Agency will certify, incorporates word-
for-word the definition contained in the treaty.591 A second,
"interpretive" regulation provides that the Agency will not cer-
tify materials "which by special pleading attempt generally to
influence opinion, conviction or policy (religious, economic or
political propaganda), to espouse a cause, or conversely, when
they seem to attack a particular persuasion .... A third
regulation, also "interpretive," provides:
The Agency does not regard as augmenting international un-
derstanding or good will and cannot certify or authenticate any
material which may lend itself to misinterpretation, or misrep-
resentation of the United States or other countries, their peo-
ples or institutions, or which appear to have as their purpose or
effect to attack or discredit economic, religious, or political
views or practices.593
587. Treaty, art. IV, paras. 4-6; On the administration of the Beirut Agreement by
the United States with respect to audiovisual materials seeking duty-free import into
the United States, see supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
588. Treaty, art. I.
589. See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Pub. L.
No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (1966).
590. 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.1-502.8 (1985). Under the regulations, applications for certifi-
cation first are reviewed by an Attestation Officer; a denial by him may be appealed to
a Review Board; and final Agency review is by the Director of USIA. 22 C.F.R.
§§ 502.3(g), 502.5(b), 502.5(c) (1986).
591. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3).
592. Id. § 502.6(b)(3).
593. Id. § 502.6 (b)(5).
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In Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick,5" the owners of seven films
that the USIA had declined to certify challenged the USIA
regulations as inconsistent with the first amendment. The
films included In Our Own Backyards: Uranium Mining in
the United States, Whatever Happened to Childhood?, and
From the Ashes. Nicaragua Today.595 The USIA had found the
films ineligible because they "espouse[d] a cause," were "inac-
curate" or "imbalanced," or were capable of "being misinter-
preted or misunderstood by foreign audiences lacking adequate
American points of reference."5" While declining to certify
these films, the USIA had certified such films as To Catch a
Coud A Thoughtful Look at Acid Rain, by the Edison Electri-
cal Institute; Radiation... Naturally, by the Atomic Industrial
Forum; and The Family: God's Pattern for Living, by the
Moody Institute of Science.
Judge Tashima of the federal district court in California, rul-
ing in October 1986, first found that the plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the USIA certification process. 58  He then con-
cluded that, in the absence of some overriding interest such as
national security, "the First Amendment protects communica-
tions with foreign audiences to the same extent as communica-
594. 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986), appeal filed, No. 86-6630 (9th Cir.).
595. See id. at 496. See generally Note, USIA Censorship of Educational Films for
Distribution Abroad, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REv. 403 (1984).
596. 646 F. Supp. at 496. For example, In Our Own Backyards: Uranium Mining
in the United States was found to "espouse a cause and influence opinion" because it
presented "an anti-nuclear message" and had a purpose of "persuad[ing] the audience
that all uranium mining should be prevented." Id. Whatever Happened to Child-
hood? was found not to be "representative" because "the Agency does not find that
the youth in the film are typical or representative of all American youth today." Id.
From the Ashes: Nicaragua Today was rejected because it led viewers to conclude
"that the United States is the primary cause of instability, poverty, and oppression in
Nicaragua," thereby constituting both "an attempt to persuade" and "an attack on the
institutions of the United States." Id. at 496-97. The film was also found to be unbal-
anced because it did not discuss "any of the reasons for the policy adopted by the
Government of the United States toward the present or former government of Nica-
ragua." Id. at 497.
597. Id. The last film was certified under a section of the regulations making
materials eligible if "intended for use only in denominational programs or other re-
stricted organizational use in moral and religious education ... ." 22 C.F.R.
§ 502.6(b)(3); see 646 F. Supp. at 497 n.7.
598. 646 F. Supp. at 497-502. Although the plaintiffs remained free to distribute
their films anywhere in the world, and simply had to pay whatever customs duties the
importing country might require, they had been denied the exporting country's certi-
fication which is "an indispensible prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of the
Treaty," the court said. Id. at 501-02.
COMM/ENT L. J.
tions within our borders.' 5
Applying the first amendment, the court held that the
USIA's two "interpretive" regulations were unconstitutionally
vague.' No one could know what was meant by terms such as
"special pleading," or "'attempt generally'" to influence opin-
ion, or "'seem to attack a persuasion,'" the court said.601 Fur-
ther, the two regulations impermissibly "discriminate on the
basis of political content."' °2 In particular, the provision re-
jecting materials that "misrepresent" the United States "places
the government in the position of determining what is the
'truth' about America, politically and otherwise." The court
held the first interpretive regulation additionally invalid be-
cause it prohibited certification of materials that state a point of
view, thus impermissibly limiting expressions of opinion on is-
sues of public controversy.6° 4
The court also struck down the regulation that adopted ver-
batim the treaty's definition of "educational."' 6 5 The require-
ments that the material "augment international understanding
and goodwill" and be "representative, authentic and accurate"
were unduly vague, and the term "accurate" also involved con-
tent discrimination and a government determination of truth,
the court said.6os The court did not strike down the treaty it-
self, expressing the belief that regulations could be drafted that
would fit within the treaty's definition of "educational" and
still be specific and neutral enough to comply with the United
States Constitution.6°7 The court ordered the USIA to recon-
sider the eligibility of each of the plaintiffs' films under proper
constitutional standards.608
The district court's decision in Bullfrog Films (which the
government has appealed)' is correct. It is sound both in its
path-breaking analysis of the first amendment's application to
"foreign audience" speech and in its appraisal of the USIA
599. Id. at 502; see supra notes 534-52 and accompanying text.
600. Id. at 505.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 506.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 506-07.
605. Id. at 507-08.
606. Id.
607. Id. at 510-11.
608. Id.
609. See supra note 9.
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regulations under first amendment standards. Although denial
of a certificate under the Beirut Agreement does not block ex-
port of the materials, it burdens their export more substan-
tially than the statute in Lamont burdened the import of
material through the mails.61 0 The Beirut Agreement admit-
tedly requires the U.S. government to determine, somehow,
what films are "educational." Developing neutral and specific
standards for this task does pose a difficult problem. Perhaps
the solution lies, not only in drafting better standards, but in
delegating the job of applying them to a body insulated from
direct government control. In any event, determinations
founded on the vague and content-based standards reviewed in
Bullfrog Films cannot coexist with the first amendment.
B. Regulation of Outgoing Electronic Media Flow
1. Licensing of International Broadcast Stations
While the USIA regulations in Bullfrog Films could at least
claim their genesis in a treaty, no such explanation can be of-
fered for the overt content regulation of outgoing speech
found in the FCC's licensing scheme for international broad-
cast stations. These are stations, licensed to private entities,
that broadcast overseas from the U.S. on short-wave frequen-
cies. The applicable regulations require licensees to "render
only an international broadcast service which will reflect the
culture of this country and which will promote international
goodwill, understanding, and cooperation. ' 61 1 This provision
was strongly opposed on its adoption in 1939.6 1' But it remains
in effect and apparently has not been challenged in the
courts.
6 1 3
Another FCC regulation for international radio stations re-
stricts commercial advertisements. Among other things, it re-
quires that commercials "give no more than the name of the
sponsor of the program and the name and general character of
610. 381 U.S. 301 (1964).
611. 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1986).
612. It was met by the "united opposition of the industry and ... attacked in
Congress as being an entering wedge for censorship of domestic programs." C.B.
ROSE, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTING 244 (1940). But the protests were
mooted when the wartime government took over private international broadcasting,
and they have not resurfaced. See Garay, WRNO Worldwide: A Case Study in Li.
censing Private US International Broadcast Stations, 26 J. BROADCASTING 641, 642
(1982).
613. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1986); Price, supra note 203, at 897.
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the commodity, utility or service, or attraction advertised." 14
This requirement was adopted by the FCC "because it appeared
that institutional advertising [as distinct from product advertis-
ing] would create a better impression of the United States."6 15
The private international broadcast service of the United
States, while still limited, has grown in recent years.616 In 1973,
the FCC set a flexible ceiling of 100 frequency-hours per day
for all U.S. private international broadcasters as a group; each
station used varying frequencies and had to apply for daily fre-
quency assignments for each season.617 At that time, the
number of frequency-hours used per day had fallen from about
seventy-five to about forty-five in the previous two years. 618 In
1986, U.S. private international broadcasters as a group used
about 450 frequency-hours per day.619
One constant of private international broadcasting has been-
the dominance of religious programming. Of the stations oper-
ating in 1986, only one clearly did not have a religious format.620
The single nonreligious station, which went on the air in
1982, was the first station licensed in nearly two decades.6 ' Its
license application met considerable resistance at the FCC, re-
flecting at least in part an official reluctance to have anyone
but the U.S. government broadcasting abroad from the United
States. 22 The FCC chairman said of the application:
I think a... fundamental issue is: Should we have this type of
allocation of frequencies? Why should private entities be
broadcasting viewpoints overseas? That's part of the VOA
[Voice of America], RFE [Radio Free Europe], or other govern-
614. 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(b)(1) (1986). This requirement was waived by the FCC,
however, for WRNO, the one clearly-commercial international station it has licensed.
Telephone interview with Jonathan David, Chief of International Negotiations, Mass
Media Bureau, FCC (March 27, 1987); see infra text accompanying notes 621-24.
615. International Broadcasting, Report and Order, 41 F.C.C.2d 736, para. 34 (1973).
616. In 1980, only four stations were transmitting. Garay, supra note 612, at 642.
In 1985, twelve stations were listed in an industry directory. See BROADCASTING/
CABLECASTING YEARBOOK 1985, at B-350 (1986).
617. See Garay, supra note 621, at 644; 41 F.C.C. 2d at para. 16.
618. 41 F.C.C.2d at para. 5; Garay, supra note at 612, at 644.
619. Telephone interview with Tom Polzin, Mass Media Bureau, FCC (March 27,
1987).
620. See BROADCASTING/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK, supra note 616, at B-350-51. An
attorney at the FCC's Mass Media bureau explained that the stations are not commer-
cially attractive because of the relatively steep power requirements for international
transmission. Telephone interview with Jonathan David, Chief of Inter-
national Negotiations, Mass Media Bureau, FCC (March 27, 1987).
621. See generally Garay, supra note 612.
622. Id.
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ment entities. Why should foreign policy be determined by a
private licensee's view? 623
The chairman, however, was alone in opposing the applica-
tion.62 And his view was at odds with the 1948 Smith-Mundt
Act, which created the United States Information Agency.tm
That act prohibits the U.S. government from monopolizing
short-wave broadcasting, and provides that the USIA director
"shall reduce such Government information activities when-
ever corresponding private information dissemination is found
to be adequate. '62 6 On the other hand, the limited scope of pri-
vate overseas broadcasting from the United States suggests that
the FCC chairman's view may better reflect the prevailing
reality.
2. U.S. Government Use of International Broadcast
Frequencies
Despite Congress' directive that the government not monop-
olize overseas broadcasting, 627 something not very far from that
has happened. In 1973, overseas broadcasting by the Voice of
America (VOA), the broadcasting arm of the United States In-
formation Agency, had increased to about 440 frequency-hours
per day, while private international transmissions had de-
creased to about forty-five frequency-hours per day. 2s The
FCC at that time set a ceiling of 100 frequency-hours per day
for private transmissions, over the protests of VOA that even
this was too much.m Noting the statutory prohibition of a gov-
ernment monopoly, the FCC remarked that "[t]o set a ceiling
on private international broadcasters that would give them less
than one-fifth of the frequency-hours used by the U.S.-based
623. Id. at 649-50.
624. See id.
625. United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1462
(1985). The chairman also need not have worried about the foreign-policy predilec-
tions of the new licensee. The licensee's programming objective was to "play rock 'n'
roll music for the world" and turn a profit in the process. Garay, supra note 612, at
652. Confronted with the regulation requiring service that "will reflect the culture of
this country," see supra text accompanying note 611, the licensee responded, reason-
ably enough, that "[tihere's nothing more American in our culture than rock music
... ." Garay, supra note 612, at 654 & n.56.
626. 22 U.S.C. § 1462 (1985).
627. 22 U.S.C. § 1462 (1985); see International Broadcasting, 41 F.C.C.2d at para. 11;
see supra text accompanying note 626.
628. 41 F.C.C.2d at para. 5; see supra text accompanying note 618.
629. 41 F.C.C.2d at para. 8.
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stations of VOA borders on being contrary to this mandate."63°
By 1986, private international transmissions had increased
tenfold to about 450 frequency-hours per day.63 ' But transmis-
sions by the VOA had increased almost threefold, to about 1200
frequency-hours per day.632 Private transmissions thus still
amounted to a little more than one-third the volume of govern-
ment transmissions. Moreover, the 100-frequency-hour "ceil-
ing" on private transmissions has not been formally changed.63
That ceiling serves, perhaps, to keep private international
broadcasters on notice that they should not expect too much.
The deterrent effect on actual and potential broadcasters is dif-
ficult to estimate.
The ceiling on private frequency-hours is not the only way
the U.S. government discourages private international broad-
casting and protects its own position on the international air-
waves. By limiting private broadcasters to "institutional"
commercials that give no more than "the name and general
character" of the article advertised,- 4 the FCC makes the ser-
vice unattractive to potential commercial broadcasters. It is no
wonder that, until 1982, all the private international stations
had religious formats.6- s Justifying its ceiling on frequency
hours, the FCC in 1973 noted ironically, "we may not expect a
great rush into international broadcasting since it is not a finan-
cially remunerative activity. ' '6 m Further government efforts to
limit the private service were evidenced in the resistance at the
FCC to licensing the one commercial station in 1982.637
These efforts by the U.S. government to keep international
broadcasting mostly for itself not only seem inconsistent with
the congressional directive that government information activi-
ties be reduced "whenever private information dissemination is
found to be adequate. '638 They contradict the FCC's own obser-
vation that "[a] credibility gap attaches to governmental broad-
630. Id.
631. See supra note 619 and accompanying text.
632. Telephone interview with Phil Goodwin, communications specialist, Voice of
America (May 7, 1987) (the 1200-frequency-hour figure includes both VOA Europe
and Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba).
633. Telephone interview with Jonathan David, supra note 620.
634. 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(b)(1) (1985); see supra note 614 and accompanying text. But
see supra note 614.
635. See supra notes 620-21 and accompanying text.
636. 41 F.C.C.2d 736, para. 18 (1973).
637. See generally Garay, supra note 612.
638. 22 U.S.C. § 1462 (1985); see supra text accompanying note 626.
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casting. Broadcasting by private stations is often more effective
because it has a greater credibility."'  Further, for a nation
that gives such a dominant role in its domestic broadcast sys-
tem to private, commercial broadcasting, such reluctance to
show the same face to the world suggests a lack of self-confi-
dence about what goes on at home.
The U.S. government's enthusiasm for its own overseas
broadcasting was demonstrated anew in 1985 by the inaugura-
tion of a new Voice of America service, called Radio Marti,
broadcasting to Cuba.'
So far as the content of the U.S. government's overseas
broadcasting is concerned, the Congress has required that
Voice of America news broadcasts be "accurate, objective, and
comprehensive."641 The statute also requires that VOA "pres-
ent a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant
American thought and institutions," that it "present the poli-
cies of the United States clearly and effectively," and that it
"also present responsible discussion and opinion on these poli-
cies."642 After some debate, Congress made Radio Marti subject
to the same standards.r43
The extent to which VOA broadcasts meet these standards is
difficult to gauge from the United States. One reason is a statu-
tory directive that information disseminated abroad by the
USIA "shall not be disseminated within the United States," ex-
cept that it shall be a'vailable on request, "for examination
only," to members of the press, scholars, and members of Con-
gress.64 4 While this provision presumably seeks to protect the
U.S. public from government propagandizing, it also denies to
the U.S. public knowledge about the content of the informa-
tion, or propaganda, disseminated by their government to the
rest of the world.
3. Sale of U.S. Television Programming Abroad
There are no direct limits in U.S. law on the sale of U.S. tele-
639. 41 F.C.C.2d at para. 12. The efforts are not solely the FCC's, however. As the
Commission noted, the increased budgets of the Voice of America demonstrate con-
gressional support for VOA's proliferating broadcast activites. Id. at para. 5.
640. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, Pub. L. No. 98-111, (1983); 22 U.S.C. § 1465
(1985).
641. 22 U.S.C. § 1463 (1985).
642. Id.
643. 22 U.S.C. § 1465(b) (1985).
644. 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (1985).
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vision programming (or other media content) for distribution
abroad. Any such limits not only would be inconsistent with
U.S. trade interests, but would raise constitutional problems as
well.6"
The foreign market for U.S. television programming is so
substantial, however, that the control of this market by the
three major U.S. networks has been limited in an attempt to
reduce network control over the production of programming in
the U.S. The FCC has barred the networks from syndicating in
foreign countries programs of which the network was not the
sole producer, and from acquiring financial interests in the ex-
hibition or distribution of such programs abroad.6 In 1983, the
FCC proposed to lift these restrictions, along with parallel re-
strictions governing syndication and financial interests in the
U.S.," 7 but opposition from the motion picture industry killed
the proposal."' In any event, similar restrictions have been im-
posed on the three networks by consent decrees in antitrust
suits brought by the U.S. government.649 These decrees, which
go somewhat farther than the FCC restrictions,' will remain
in effect, unless modified, until the late 1980s or early 1990s.65
The limitations thus imposed on the export of television pro-
gramming produced by the U.S. networks seem fundamentally
different from other U.S. limitations on outgoing media flow.
In this case, the regulation of transborder speech serves as an
adjunct of a domestic regulatory policy, the effort to reduce
645. See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986); supra notes
534-52 and acccompanying text; of. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
It is hard to find here any of the national security considerations that support export
controls on technological information. See supra notes 565-83 and accompanying text.
646. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1984).
647. See 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, paras. 12, 202 (1983).
648. See BROADCASTING April 1, 1985, at 95; Kintzer, The Proposed Repeal of the
Financial Interest and Syndication Rules: Nettoork Domination or Public Interest
Representations?, 6 COMM/ENT L.J. 513 (1984).
649. E.g., United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978); see also U.S. v.
CBS, Proposed Final Judgment and Competition Impact Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 34,
463; U.S. v. ABC, Proposed Final Judgment and Competition Statement, 45 Fed. Reg.
58,441 (1980).
650. Unlike the FCC regulations, the consent decrees prohibit the networks from
procuring the rights to foreign syndication of foreign-produced programming in the
same negotiations in which they obtain domestic syndication rights. See 94 F.C.C.2d
1019. at para. 19 (1983).
651. See U.S. v. CBS, 45 Fed. Reg. at 34,463; U.S. v. ABC, 45 Fed. Reg. at 58,441; 449
F. Supp. at 1132.
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network dominance, and is not based on reasons peculiar to
transborder communications.
4. Satellite Distribution of U.S. Programming Abroad
Just as United States law restricts the use of satellites to
bring television programming into the United States,e 2 compa-
nies wishing to send programming abroad by way of satellite
also must contend with U.S. legal requirements.
If U.S. cable networks or other program distributors wish to
use even INTELSAT satellites to send their programming
abroad, they need the permission of the FCC. FCC permission
is required under provisions of the Communications Act re-
garding new transmission services,tm and also under provisions
of the Communications Satellite Act regarding construction
and operation of international earth-stations." The FCC, how-
ever, now readily grants these permissions. In 1984, the Com-
mission liberalized its policy on ownership of U.S. earth-
stations using the INTELSAT system.6m It ruled that such sta-
tions no longer need be owned by a consortium of carriers, and
said further that applications to provide television services
through such stations would be processed "in routine fash-
ion."' e Thus, in 1985, the Commission granted an application
by Turner Teleport, Inc., a subsidiary of Turner Broadcasting
System, to transmit television programming through INTEL-
SAT satellites over the Atlantic.e 7
But signal transmissions by way of satellite are expensive.tm
Therefore, just as receiving stations in the United States seek
to receive programming from foreign domestic satellites al-
ready carrying the signals, where the "footprint" of the satel-
lite falls on the United States,09 carriers and programmers
652. See supra text accompanying notes 397-407.
653. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982); see INTELSAT, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 250,
paras. 13 n.23, 20, 22 (1984).
654. INTELSAT, 100 F.C.C.2d at paras. 13 n.23, 20 n.43, 22.
655. Id. at para. 55.
656. See id. paras. 3, 21, 56.
657. Turner Teleport, Inc., Nos. CSG-85-001-P/L; file no. I-T-C-85.033, March 13,
1985.
658. See infra note 666.
659. See supra notes 478-504 and accompanying text; Transborder Satellite Video
Services, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, para. 47
(1981). The footprint of a typical U.S. domestic satellite will cover the 48 contiguous
states, parts of Canada and Mexico, and a substantial part of the Caribbean and Latin
America. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 371, at 17 (statement of David Ladd).
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seek to distribute programming carried by U.S. domestic satel-
lites to countries abroad in the same manner.
In its 1981 Transborder decision, "the FCC ruled, not only
that U.S. earth-stations could be used to receive programming
from Canadian domestic satellites,661 but also that U.S. domes-
tic satellites could be used to distribute programming to Canada
and to countries in Central America and the Caribbean.6m
Since these were non-INTELSAT satellites, the Commission
ruled that the consultation process established in the INTEL-
SAT Agreement had to be observed."' As noted earlier, this
requirement could hinder the reception of programming in the
United States, including news programming, and thus presents
constitutional problems.6" The requirement may have the
same effect on the transmission of programming from the
United States, and so may present similar problems (involving
this time a U.S. speaker).e
Where the footprints of U.S. domestic satellites do not reach,
it has been necessary for U.S. programmers to use INTELSAT
satellites to distribute their product abroad.6 Currently, how-
ever, INTELSAT is losing its monopoly position over interna-
tional satellite communications from the United States. In
1984, President Reagan determined that the U.S. national inter-
est required separate U.S. systems providing international sat-
ellite service, as long as restrictions were imposed to protect the
economic health of INTELSAT.667 The FCC subsequently es-
tablished policies for authorizing separate systems6 and condi-
660. Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981); see supra notes
478-88 and accompanying text.
661. See supra text accompanying notes 478-80.
662. See 88 F.C.C. 2d. at paras. 8-15.
663. Id. at paras. 46-60.
664. See supra notes 505-27 and accompanying text.
665. Cf supra notes 534-52 and accompanying text.
666. At least one U.S. programmer complains that distribution of U.S. program-
ming to distant countries has been impeded by monopoly prices charged by INTEL-
SAT for the use of its satellites. The general counsel of Turner Broadcasting System,
parent of Cable News Network, said in 1985 that efforts to "take CNN international"
were impeded by INTELSAT's pricing policy. He said that networks in Australia and
Japan wanted to receive CNN's news programming, that the reception costs were
minimal because the footprint of CNN's INTELSAT satellite fell there, but that IN-
TELSAT's extra charges for down-link points added a prohibitive cost of some
$120,000 per receiving country. Telephone interview with Robert Ross, general coun-
sel, Turner Broadcasting System (Jan. 22, 1985).
667. Admin. Order No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (1987); see 47 U.S.C. §§ 701(d),
721(a) (1985).
668. Separate Systems, Report and Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985).
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tionally granted six applications, subject to the INTELSAT
coordination procedure.669 The first of these applications was
approved by the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties in April
1987.670
The FCC initially restricted the separate-system operators to
selling their facilities or leasing them for a minimum of one
year, in order to protect INTELSAT's basic revenues.6 71 But
the FCC subsequently reversed its position and ruled that the
sale-or-lease requirement did not preclude contracts of one
year or more for "occasional use television service."67 2 This rul-
ing presumably will facilitate the use of the separate systems to
distribute news programming by U.S. television networks that
do not use the facilities on a full-time basis.
Until recently, then, the INTELSAT system appeared to
pose substantial obstacles, both legal and financial, to the satel-
lite distribution of private U.S. programming abroad - much
as the U.S. government's domination of the short-wave fre-
quencies impeded the terrestrial distribution of private U.S. ra-
dio programming. 67 The Transborder decision and the advent
of private international satellite systems, however, may mark-
edly liberate the distribution of U.S. programming by satellite.
C. Conclusion Concerning Outgoing Speech
United States restrictions on outgoing speech are less devel-
oped than restrictions on incoming flow, largely because the
available policy justifications are not as numerous or strong.
There is less room to invoke national security or foreign policy
considerations, and no room to rely on the government's power
to exclude aliens or on trade protectionism. Hence, there is no
restriction on outgoing speech that is nearly as broad as the reg-
ulation of all political speech distributed by "foreign agents" in
the United States under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act,67 4 or the facial exclusion under the McCarran-Walter Act
669. E.g., International Satellite, Inc., Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authori-
zation, 101 F.C.C.2d 1201 (1985); Pan American Satellite Corp., Memorandum Opin-
ion, Order and Authorization, 101 F.C.C.2d 1318 (1985); see BROADCASTING, Jan. 5,
1987, at 144-46.
670. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 26, 1987, at 18.
671. Separate Systems, 101 F.C.C.2d at paras. 120-23.
672. Separate Systems Reconsideration Order, Docket No. 84-1299 FCC (April 17,
1986); compare Separate Systems, 101 F.C.C.2d at paras. 120-23.
673. See supra notes 627-44 and accompanying text.
674. See supra text accompanying notes 137-48.
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of all would-be visitors who have been "communists. 675
At the same time, the restrictions on outgoing speech reflect
some effort by the U.S. government to shape the content of.
transborder information. The government appears to acknowl-
edge this objective by its claim in Bullfrog Films that "the exer-
cise of free speech within foreign nations by Americans is
subordinate to significant foreign policy considerations .... 676
The USIA regulations struck down in Bullfrog Films show an
effort by the U.S. to deny duty-free treatment under the Beirut
Agreement to films critical of United States positions. 77 These
appear to be much the same kinds of films that are treated as
"political propaganda" under the Foreign Agents Registration
Act.678 Thus, while not attempting directly to stop the trans-
border flow of such films, the U.S. government restricts that
flow in both directions. It regulates the films as "propaganda"
when they are distributed on behalf of a foreign entity within
the United States, and it seeks to prevent the films from circu-
lating duty-free to other countries.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government's domination of the inter-
national short-wave frequencies suggests a desire to maximize
the government's own speech to the rest of the world at the
expense of speech by private U.S. citizens. 79
Still, these efforts by the U.S. government to restrict outgo-
ing speech are quite limited in scope. The overwhelming pro-
portion of that speech is unaffected. Moreover, the U.S.
government's decision to license private international satellites
outside the INTELSAT system may markedly facilitate the dis-
tribution of U.S. television programming to other countries, as
well as the distribution in the United States of programs and
news from abroad.6s
IV
Conclusion
United States regulation of transborder speech reflects per-
675. See supra text accompanying notes 48-86.
676. See supra note 538 and accompanying text.
677. See supra notes 584-610 and accompanying text.
678. Compare supra notes 594-96 and accompanying text with supra notes 149-50
and accompanying text.
679. See supra notes 611-40 and accompanying text.
680. See supra notes 666-72 and accompanying text.
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vasively the opposing tendencies already noted. "' There are
first amendment rights to receive information from abroad and
to send information abroad-rights recognized most clearly by
the Supreme Court's decision in Lamont," the Court's opinion
in Mandel,"3 and the district court's decision in Bullfrog
Films. 4 But there also are various laws restricting trans-
border information flows, and these laws generally have been
upheld by the courts.m
Particularly hard to reconcile with the "free flow" and first
amendment commitments of the United States are the visa re-
strictions of the McCarran-Walter Act 6s and the "political
propaganda" provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act. 87 Both statutes show an unwillingness to allow foreign
speech to enter the United States and compete on equal terms
with domestic speech.6"
The most important restrictions on transborder flow with
respect to the electronic media are the ban on foreign owner-
ship of U.S. broadcast facilities" 9 and the rules limiting recep-
tion of signals from foreign satellites.690 The ban on foreign
ownership, though antiquated and unnecessary, can claim some
historical justification and apparently is consistent with inter-
national practice.69' It also is balanced by U.S. toleration for
foreign ownership in virtually all other media.69 2
The restriction on reception of signals from foreign satellites,
insofar as it applies (in the view of the FCC) to reception with
the consent of the originator, is based on the treaty obligations
681. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19, 240-47.
682. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see supra notes 20-25 and
accompanying text.
683. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972); see supra notes 26-29, 58-71
and accompanying text.
684. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492; see supra notes 584-610 and
accompanying text.
685. See supra notes 48-189 and accompanying text.
686. See supra notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
687. See supra notes 136-89 and accompanying text.
688. (f. Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Re-
strictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 780 (1985) ("Issues such
as the exclusion of foreign speakers precisely because of their political views, or the
identification of foreign films as propaganda, present for consideration governmental
actions that would, if taken in the domestic context, present core first amendment
violations") (footnotes omitted).
689. 47 U.S.C. § 310(a); see supra notes 267-302 and accompanying text.
690. See supra notes 267-302 and accompanying text.
691. See supra notes 272-73, 288 and accompanying text.
692. See supra notes 38-42, 303-22 and accompanying text.
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of the United States to INTELSAT.693 On its face, this is a con-
tent-neutral consideration. But the FCC's position, as applied
to incoming signals, harbors a distinct strain of content control.
Content control is most apparent in the FCC's imposition of
conditions, requested by the U.S. State Department, limiting
Cable News Network to a six-month license for reception of
Soviet programming and stipulating that renewal depends on a
"favorable foreign-policy finding."6 94 Potential content control
is also inherent in the requirement that CNN (or other U.S.
programmers) get FCC permission to receive any programming
from a foreign satellite, even for coverage of a news event.695 It
is hard to see why this requirement is not a "prior restraint"
inconsistent with the first amendment. 6
Content control and the first amendment aside, the FCC's re-
quirement of FCC approval for reception of foreign-satellite
signals with the consent of the originator lacks support in sec-
tion 705 of the Communications Act or in any other provision of
U.S. law.697
U.S. law does restrict the reception of foreign-satellite signals
without the consent of the originator, even for private viewing
at home or educational viewing at universities.698 Present law
appears to permit such reception only for home viewing of un-
scrambled signals being transmitted by the satellite to cable
systems.6 99 This state of the law is difficult to condemn today
on first amendment grounds.7°° The law should be amended,
however, to legitimize nonprofit educational viewing of un-
scrambled signals, preferably on a fair-use rationale.7 ° '
Across the range of U.S. regulations of transborder speech, a
number of provisions seem inconsistent with the "free flow"
position of the United States, if not also with the first amend-
ment. This should not be surprising. The diverse laws dis-
cussed in this report were adopted at different times, in
different political climates, and for different purposes. They
693. See supra notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
694. See supra notes 492-97 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 408, 497,
505 (Discovery Channel's effort to carry Soviet programming).
695. See supra notes 408, 489-527 and accompanying text.
696. See supra note 505 and accompanying text.
697. See supra notes 397-417 and accompanying text.
698. See supra notes 385-96, 421-72 and accompanying text.
699. See supra notes 421-72 and accompanying text.
700. See supra notes 457-61 and accompanying text.
701. See supra notes 462-73 and accompanying text.
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have never been collectively and systematically considered by
the U.S. Congress from the point of view of their impact on
transborder speech, or of their consistency with current U.S.
principles respecting both domestic and international speech.
These laws are overdue for such an appraisal. They need to
be measured against both the "free flow" commitment of the
United States and the first amendment. Lacking such an as-
sessment, United States regulation of transborder speech will
continue to reflect a wide gap between the nation's laws and its
principles.

